US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA6847

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 006847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KJUS, PREL, PTER, PHUM, CO, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: GOC EXPLAINS JUSTICE AND PEACE TO DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
 
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Summary 
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1. (U) On July 15, Foreign Minister Carolina Barco, Peace 
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, and Vice Justice Minister 
Mario Iguaran presented the Law for Justice and Peace to the 
diplomatic corps.  Iguaran reviewed the law in detail and 
tried to dispel accusations that it did not encourage full 
confession, would be shot down on constitutional grounds, and 
created impunity.  He said the President would sign it by the 
first week of August.  Restrepo and Iguaran fielded questions 
on a variety of issues, including an explanation of how all 
illicit assets would be seized and why the law did not 
acknowledge an armed conflict.  They assured the Ambassador 
that each ex-terrorist's free declaration would be cross 
checked with all others to compile complete criminal 
histories.  The government was preparing to create the 
institutions called for by the law, such as the special 
Fiscalia unit, name a high-ranking demobilization "czar," and 
demobilize the rest of the AUC.  Restrepo emphasized that 
resource shortages and security in the former AUC zones were 
presssing concerns.  End summary. 
 
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Iguaran Explains Law 
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2. (U) Vice Justice Minister Iguaran (who was named 
Prosecutor General on July 19) explained the Justice and 
Peace Law to the diplomatic corps on July 15 to dispel 
confusion and accusations from critics about impunity, lack 
of confession, and constitutional issues.  His main points 
included: 
 
-- The President will sign the bill into law by the first 
week of August. 
 
-- "Ordinary" legislation: the GOC did not violate 
constitutional norms by passing the law as ordinary, rather 
than statutory, legislation.  If the law had created a new 
court to process ex-terrorists it would have been statutory, 
but, instead, the already existing Superior District Courts 
would be used.  (Critics, such as Human Rights Watch, have 
claimed the Constitutional Court will reject the law because 
it deals with fundamental rights and therefore cannot be 
ordinary legislation.  Statutory legislation would have 
required approval by absolute majorities in all four debates 
within one legislative session.) 
 
-- Confession: according to the Colombian constitution, 
self-incrimination is prohibited.  Confession therefore 
cannot be forced.  Instead, according to Iguaran, the GOC 
found the next best option: no benefits are given for crimes 
intentionally concealed; each accidentally omitted crime 
results in a 20 percent increase in the alternative sentence; 
and if an ex-terrorist refuses to give an open statement, he 
is denied all benefits. 
 
-- Impunity: the law does not let criminals go free. 
Instead, it offers a reduced sentence and conditionally 
suspends the original sentence only if the ex-terrorist 
fulfills all obligations under the law. 
 
-- Jail terms: Iguaran insisted the claim that ex-terrorists 
would only spend one to two years in jail was false.  The law 
clearly prohibited all sentence reductions except that up to 
18 months spent in a concentration zone would count against 
the sentence. 
 
-- Reparations: victims are guaranteed reparations. 
According to Iguaran, the final text on reparations was taken 
entirely from opposition draft laws. 
 
-- Eligibility: the law explicitly states that only crimes 
committed during membership in, and in service of, the 
illegal armed group are eligible.  Any crimes committed 
before membership or for personal gain are prohibited.  These 
requirements were added to prevent narcotraffickers from 
clearing their records. 
 
-- International agreements: the law states that all 
international treaties or agreements remain active and 
intact. 
 
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Logistics a Major Concern 
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3. (U) In response to the Argentine Ambassador's question how 
the remaining 60 percent of paramilitary groups would 
demobilize, Restrepo took the opportunity to list resource, 
personnel, and security shortages the GOC faces. 
 
4. (U) Restrepo said he was confident, for the first time, 
that all paramilitary groups in the country would demobilize. 
 The AUC's Central Bolivar Bloc, the single largest bloc with 
over 5,000 members, the Middle Magdalena Bloc, and Jorge 40's 
forces had all pledged to demobilize.  The Elmer Cardenas 
Bloc, which had refused to join peace talks, had also agreed 
to demobilize. 
 
5. (U) Restrepo warned, however, that the logistics of 
demobilizing so many paramilitaries before the end of the 
year presented a major challenge.  For example, 400 public 
officials were needed to demobilize the 594 members of the 
Montes de Maria Bloc.  Each demobilization takes seven to 21 
days.  Given personnel and resource restraints, the 
government can only average two demobilizations each month. 
Providing security in the former AUC territories was an added 
challenge.  For example, the Army had to displace two 
counterguerrilla battalions to secure the Catatumbo Bloc's 
former area of control.  Restrepo said the military could not 
afford to continually displace troops to secure the areas. 
Instead, he estimated the government needed 5,000 to 10,000 
new police, including some with special counternarcotics 
training to prevent other illegal armed groups or cartels 
from moving in.  To complete the remaining demobilizations, 
Restrepo believed the government needed 300 to 400 billion 
pesos (between USD 130 to 174 million). 
 
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Question and Answers 
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6. (U) After Iguaran's lengthy presentation, Restrepo opened 
the floor to questions: 
 
Q:  The Ambassador asked if the authorities would cross check 
the open declarations to compile all criminal information 
available. 
 
A:  Iguaran assured him the tribunals all would have 
officials responsible for cross checking all information. 
 
Q:  When will law be implemented? 
 
A:  Restrepo reported that several tasks remained: 
 
-- Institutions: Once the President signed it into the law, 
the government would need time to create the institutions 
called for by the law, such as the special Prosecutor 
General's Office (Fiscalia) unit. 
 
-- Intelligence: The Fiscalia would need sufficient time to 
research the ex-terrorist so the appropriate questions could 
be asked during the free declaration. 
 
-- Demobilization: One of the law's conditions is that the 
ex-terrorist must have demobilized.  Sixty percent of the AUC 
has yet to demobilize.  Restrepo assured the audience that by 
December 31, 2005, all of the AUC would be demobilized.  If 
not, active members remaining would not be eligible for any 
benefits under the law. 
 
-- Demobilization Czar: The government needed to name a high 
level official to direct the law's implementation. 
 
Q:  How will authorities determine when an ex-terrorist 
joined the illegal armed group? 
 
A:  Restrepo said there were two ways: (1) the ex-terrorist 
is required to report the date he joined in his open 
statement, and (2) judges have access to all intelligence and 
criminal information on the ex-terrorist.  Iguaran added that 
illegal armed groups organized for the purpose of drug 
trafficking or individuals principally devoted to drug 
trafficking were not eligible for benefits. 
 
Q:  Are illicit assets seized only if they were acquired when 
the ex-terrorist was working for the illegal armed group? 
 
A:  No.  All illicit assets will be seized regardless of when 
they were acquired. 
 
Q:  Are 20 prosecutors sufficient for the special Fiscalia 
unit? 
 
A:  Iguaran noted that 20 is the number of prosecutors 
officially assigned to the unit, but that the Fiscalia was 
free to use as many prosecutors necessary to do the job. 
 
Q:  Why does the law make paramilitarism an act of sedition? 
 
A:  Restrepo emphasized that the article was added primarily 
for practical reasons.  Otherwise, it was not possible to 
pardon paramilitaries guilty of only having belonged to an 
illegal armed group.  No major crimes could be considered 
connected to sedition.  He also said that, in the face of 
complaints of government cooperation with the paramilitaries, 
they wanted to make it clear that even membership was a 
crime. 
 
Q:  Why does the law not recognize an armed conflict? 
 
A:  Restrepo said it was for political reasons, but would not 
prevent the government from respecting all international 
agreements and international humanitarian law. 
 
WOOD