US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3022

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 003022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, IZ, National Assembly, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: A STATUS REPORT ON CONSTITUTION NEGOTIATIONS IN 
THE WAKE OF THE ASSASSINATIONS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The assassination of two Sunni Arab 
constitution committee representatives added urgency 
to negotiations on July 19 and 20.  By the end of the 
day, Sunni Arab delegates had made clear to the Charge 
that they intend to continue participating in the 
drafting process.  Key figures on all sides of the 
negotiations also voiced a commitment to the August 15 
deadline, but Constitution Committee Chairman Humam 
al-Hamudi asked Charge for help in convening an 
internal Iraqi political summit so that top leaders 
can settle core disputes.  The debate over federalism 
continued to dominate the talks, with signs emerging 
that Kurdish leaders are willing to cede ownership of 
resources to the central government even as they push 
for extra provincial authorities on resource 
"management."  Sunni Arab delegates told the Charge 
that they were willing to make concessions on Kurdish 
federalism in the north so long as they do not become 
a blueprint or inspiration for a new regional entity 
in the south. 
 
2.  (C) We see progress on the key federalism issue 
but still wide gaps.  Boiled down, we see three major 
disagreements on federalism.  First, the sides differ 
on the point in time at which provinces should be 
allowed to join into regions.  The Shia and Kurds 
would allow provinces to merge right after the 
December 2005 elections.  Sunni moderates, at least, 
would put this off for years.  Second, they differ 
over how de-centralized the authorities at the 
provincial or regional level should be.  Finally, they 
differ over whether the national authorities should 
have a say in the merger of provinces into regions 
even if the local populations have agreed to it. 
 
3.  (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: SCIRI's Hamudi reviewed but 
did not yet pass an incomplete draft text with the 
Charge that showed considerable progress.  Draft 
provisions appear to settle disputes on presidential 
authorities and the shape of the new government.  But 
the draft showed controversial judgments on Iraq's 
Arab identity, the acknowledgement of "Persian" 
rights, dual citizenship, women's rights, Kirkuk, 
military restrictions, and the future of de- 
Ba'athification.  END SUMMARY. 
 
4.  (C) The Embassy is now in the midst of a full- 
scale press on constitutional issues.  Here follows a 
snapshot of ongoing negotiations synthesizing meetings 
between the Charge and Constitution Committee Chairman 
Humam al-Hamudi and separately with leading Sunni Arab 
delegates to the drafting committee.  It also draws on 
multiple meetings by Poloffs with a host of 
constitution committee members. 
 
------------------------- 
Sunnis Angry But On Board 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Sunni Arab constitution committee member and 
National Dialogue Council leader Salah Mutlak began 
July 20 threatening to suspend participation in the 
process but finished in a meeting with the Charge 
discussing the way forward.  The Sunnis Arabs are 
angry but clearly still participating in the process. 
Sunni Arab Shaykh Anwar al-Nada called Poloff the 
evening of July 20 after the meeting with the Charge 
and said he had spoken with the National Dialogue 
Council after the meeting with the Charge and the 
group said it had decided to stay engaged.  Ayad al- 
Samarrai, however, had already earlier that afternoon 
failed to attend a regularly scheduled press 
conference on the constitution drafting process.  The 
panel of committee members thus lacked a Sunni Arab 
and included Chairman Humam al-Hamudi, KDP member 
Sa'adi Barzinji, Iraqiya list member Qasim Daoud, and 
Sadrist Secretary Baha al-Araji.  All of them spoke 
warmly of the slain members, described them as 
productive partners, and condemned the attack. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Commitment to the Deadline, 
But Wants USG to Facilitate Summit 
---------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Key figures in the process on all sides 
continued to voice commitment to the August 15 
deadline in multiple meetings and contexts on July 19 
and 20.  Constitution Committee Chairman Humam al- 
Hamudi announced at the July 20 press conference that 
the deadline would be met despite ongoing conflict 
over federalism and the assassinations. He said a 
draft would be presented to the TNA by August 1, to be 
followed by two weeks of discussion and necessary 
amendments.  Hamudi said the committee has held 80 
conferences on constitutional issues via regional 
offices so far and plans to distribute 5 million 
copies of the TNA-approved constitution after August 
15.  He said, "There will be one for every home." 
(See septel for detailed report on public outreach.) 
 
7.  (C) Hamudi told the Charge in private on July 19 
that he could only make the deadline by holding a full 
one-week summit of Iraq's main political leaders.  He 
repeatedly described the need to put them all in an 
"operations center" to seal the deal.  Negotiations 
had reached the core conflicts, and none of the 
members of the committee had the authority to make 
compromises, he said.  Even PUK leader Fuad Ma'asum 
has reversed himself after contacts with Talabani, 
Hamudi said.  Plus, a culture that leads all sides to 
put forward outlandish opening demands is delaying the 
process of getting down to core compromises, he 
lamented. 
 
8.  (C) Hammudi said the first step would be bringing 
together key coalition leaders from the TNA for two 
days of meetings this week.  If that fails, and Hamudi 
expected it would, the representation would need to be 
raised a notch.  Hamudi said he would then need to 
convene Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Ibrahim al-Ja'afari, 
Jalal Talabani, Masoud Barzani, and Muhsin Abd al- 
Hamid.  Hamudi acknowledged that pulling this crowd 
together would not be easy.  He said Mustapha Barzani 
had once been asked whether he planned to go to Mecca 
for the Haj and responded, "Mecca can come to me." 
Hamudi said he believed the Sunni Arab members of the 
committee would feel comfortable allowing Iraqi 
Islamic Party President Hamid to represent them at a 
summit.  (COMMENT: We find that doubtful and expect 
further Sunni Arab representation would be necessary. 
END COMMENT) 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Shape of the Federalism Showdown 
------------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) All sides have acknowledged that their 
differences on federalism are the key obstacle to 
completing the constitution.  The key disputes and 
emerging compromises and red lines on federalism are 
breaking down as follows: 
 
-- SIGNS OF KURDISH FLEXIBILITY AND SUNNI FEAR ON 
RESOURCE OWNERSHIP:  Regional authorities Sub- 
Committee Chairman Sa'adi Barzinji, a KDP member, told 
PolCouns July 19 that he was comfortable with language 
stating resources belong to Iraq or the people of 
Iraq.  Hamudi was equally amenable to that language in 
a subsequent meeting with the Charge, and both men 
appear to have dropped the idea of provincial 
ownership of resources.  Barzinji is more concerned, 
however, about provincial authorities on resource 
development and exploitation.  He said that allowing 
the federal government "ownership" should not be a 
step to putting all oil exploitation under government 
direction, a socialist move that would stifle 
development.  Regional entities ought to be able to 
make judgments on business ventures within their 
boundaries.  The Sunni Arab delegates warned the 
Charge that regional resource ownership would mean 
"civil war" and trigger a resource scamble in Iraq 
that could lead Anbaris to dam the Euphrates while 
others block the Tigris.  They also complained that 
the Kurdish drive for resource ownership is not 
matched with a willingness to assume any debt burden. 
They called for a clearer accounting of all of Iraq's 
sources of revenue -- be they natural resources, 
taxes, or tourism. 
 
-- SUNNIS CALL SOUTHERN REGIONAL ENTITIES PREMATURE: 
Multiple Sunni Arab delegates made clear in their 
meeting with the Charge that a southern regional 
entity would inevitably fall under Iranian sway and 
potentially conduct ethnic cleansing.  Such entities, 
they said, could not be permitted to arise.  Iraqi 
Islamic Party leader Ayad al-Samarrai made clear that 
his principal objection to southern federalism was the 
"timing," particularly given the weakness of the 
central government and high ethnic tensions. He said, 
"It's OK for the future, but not now."  Samarrai said 
he felt that the provinces were still not mature 
enough politically to be entrusted with such 
authorities.  Political immaturity has put them under 
the sway of religious parties and liable to sectarian 
extremism.  Making a similar but more colorful point 
on the need for a gradual approach to federalism, 
Sunni Arab committee member Mahmud Mashhadani said, 
"Federalism is like a pregnant woman trying to give 
birth to a baby prematurely.  If she does so she could 
die with the baby." 
 
-- SUNNIS PREPARED FOR A SPECIAL KURDISH CASE:  The 
Sunni Arab delegates made clear to the Charge that 
they were prepared to offer the Kurds significantly 
expanded authorities in the north, but they took pains 
to ensure that this be considered an exception, not a 
model for the rest of Iraq.  Mutlak said the Kurds 
needed to be reined in lest they achieve so much that 
they inspire irredentism in the south.  After all, he 
and others observed, the Shia, with mass graves and a 
history of suppression, see their story as analogous 
to that of the Kurds.  The Kurds, Mutlak said, are 
currently making excessive demands on military rights, 
and the right to pursue foreign treaties that he said 
were over the top.  Mutlak warned that Basra-based 
Shia Constitution Committee member Wael Abd al-Latif, 
an ardent federalism proponent, had already 
threatened, "Whatever the Kurds get, we want." 
(Comment:  This extends well beyond Wael Abd al-Latif. 
Sami al-Askari, an ambitious Sadr trend 
parliamentarian on the committee told PolCouns on July 
19 that the Shia must get the same regional 
authorities that the Kurds get.  End Comment.) 
Mashhadani later pointed out that the Kurds want full 
say over their own affairs along with wide influence 
in the central government, an arrangement that doubles 
their appropriate representation.  The current health 
minister in Baghdad has less authority nationally than 
the Kurdish health minister in the Kurdistan, he 
alleged. 
 
-- FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ENTITY FORMATION: Hamudi 
indicated to the Charge that the constitution would 
allow governorates to merge with the approval of their 
respective populations or provincial councils.  He 
said the central government and national assembly 
would not have any authority to limit this process. 
Samarrai made clear separately to the Charge that he 
thought such a framework was far too liberal and that 
the right offered to the provinces would be far too 
absolute given the impact their decisions would have 
on Iraq as a whole. 
 
---------------------------- 
Other Ongoing Constitutional 
Controversies 
---------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Several other ongoing constitutional 
controversies continue to generate heat, although none 
at the level of the federalism debate.  They break 
down as follows: 
 
-- IRAQ'S ARAB IDENTITY:  Hamudi told the Charge that 
Sunni Arab delegates are still insisting that all of 
Iraq, not merely its Arab majority, be cited as part 
of the "Arab ummah," a provision that marginalizes 
Kurds unacceptably. 
 
-- ACKNOWLEDGING "PERSIAN" IRAQIS AND OFFICIALIZING 
SHIA ISLAM: The committee's minority rights advocates 
may have achieved too much success in their efforts to 
ensure that all of Iraq's minorities are listed by 
name.  A current draft goes so far as to list 
"Persians" as one protected part of the Iraqi mosaic. 
Sunni Arabs told the Charge that they see this 
provision as nothing less than a legitimization of the 
very community they see as a fifth column.    Sunni 
hard-liner Khalaf Al-Ayan told us he rejected 
altogether the legitimization of "Persians" as Iraqi 
citizens when such people were clearly Iranian 
infiltrators.   Iraqi Islamic Party leader Ayad al- 
Samarai also claimed to the Charge that the Shia were 
seeking to enshrine the "marja'iya" in the 
constitution as a "guiding force" and outline 
administration of key holy sites.  (COMMENT: We have 
seen no evidence that Samarrai's claims have a basis 
in the text.  END COMMENT). 
 
-- DUAL CITIZENSHIP: Hamudi told the Charge that he 
expected the constitution to allow dual citizenship 
but require candidates for senior government positions 
to relinquish all but their Iraqi citizenship.  The 
Sunni Arab delegates said they objected to the concept 
of dual-citizenship because they believed it would 
lead to a plethora of Iranian citizens in Iraq. 
 
-- WOMEN'S RIGHTS:  Hamudi downplayed concerns raised 
on women's rights provisions in the document in his 
meeting with the Charge.  He acknowledged that the 
document bounded rights by the Sharia but said that it 
also guaranteed equal rights for all Iraqis 
irrespective of their gender.  He said he was ready to 
make that provision even clearer if need be.  When one 
journalist during the July 20 press conference asked 
whether the document would limit women's legal rights 
and ability to represent themselves on personal status 
issues, Hamudi said the document never addressed that 
issue beyond guaranteeing equal rights for all Iraqis. 
He said he did not consider the rest be a 
constitutional issue.  (See septel on women's rights 
questions in the emerging - but hardly final - text.) 
 
-- THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITIES:  Hamudi said that the 
powers now allotted to the presidency council would be 
concentrated in the president alone under the new 
constitution.  The country may still have two vice 
presidents, but they would not share the president's 
authorities. 
 
-- CARRYING OVER ARTICLE 58: Hamudi said he intends 
for the constitution to carry over the compromise 
formula on Kirkuk outlined in Article 58, potentially 
by simply restating the provision.  One Sunni Arab 
delegate, expert consultant Hassan Zaydan, denounced 
the entire TAL as illegitimate in the meeting with the 
Charge and appeared unprepared to accept the carry- 
over of any TAL provision. 
 
-- RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ACTIVITY: Hamudi told the 
Charge that the constitution would put the Iraqi 
military firmly under civilian control, but he 
acknowledged an ongoing debate with Kurds seeking 
further limits on the force.  The Kurds want regional 
entities to control the entry or exit of national 
forces from their borders.  Samarrai warned that the 
Kurds want to pass language that gives special 
privileges to "militias that fought the former 
regime," which he said was a by-word for the Pesh 
Merga and Badr Corps.  He said that scores of militia 
members have already infiltrated the Iraqi armed 
forces. He questioned how the U.S. could watch that 
take place without allowing the Sunnis to form their 
own militia force. 
 
-- THE RIGHT OF SECESSION: KDPer Barzinji was still 
clearly peddling more expansive version of Kurdish 
rights than his colleagues during the constitution 
committee's July 20 the press conference.  When a 
reporter asked if any regional entities would have the 
rght o secede, Barzinji said that the Kurds would be 
able to request such a thing.  He offered though that 
the first two elections, which he expected to come 
over 8 years, would tell the tale of the 
constitution's effectiveness for all Iraqis. 
 
-- STYLE OF THE NEXT ELECTIONS:  This issue is not 
likely to be set in the constitution, but uncertainty 
over it is influencing the constitution debate. 
Hamudi said Shia and Sunni Arab delegates and others 
support a multiple-district election with slots for 
provinces divided in accordance with food ration 
system population data.  He acknowledged that the 
Kurds are uncertain over this idea because they think 
it will depress their representation.  He claimed that 
Masoud Barzani had given him private assurances that 
he was interested in multiple-district elections. 
Meanwhile, Sunni Arab delegates told the Charge that 
they will not feel comfortable with the next elections 
unless the "politicized" IECI is replaced or 
overhauled. 
 
-- THE FUTURE OF DE-BA'ATHIFICATION:  Hamudi was still 
working out the wording of the future mandate of the 
de-Ba'athification commission, but he confirmed that 
the new constitution would include a wide ban on the 
Ba'ath Party, "Ba'athist thought," and any sectarian, 
chauvinistic groups.  Mutlak warned the Charge that he 
did not even consider the issue of the Ba'ath Party to 
be an appropriate subject for treatment in the 
constitution. 
 
-- OTHER OUTSTANDING POINTS: Hamudi said he was still 
putting together a unified draft on the role of Iraq's 
special tribunal and needed to determine provisions on 
amending the constitution. 
 
--------------------------------- 
COMMENT: Refereeing the Debate 
While Keeping the Sunnis On Board 
--------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Charge is traveling to Irbil July 21 to push 
for the summit Hamudi says he needs to produce a final 
compact.  We will keep pushing all sides to stay in 
the negotiating room and make their complaints and 
proposals specific as we approach the wire.  All sides 
realize that Kurdish rights will have to be expansive, 
and all sides realize that drawing a new internal map 
is more than they are currently capable of.  What 
remains is determining the framework for the future 
and the interim authorities for the present.  We have 
heard the Sunnis speak openly of decentralization. 
They will not go so far as to speak of "political 
authority" in non-Kurdish areas.  We see progress, 
therefore, but still wide gaps.  Boiled down, we see 
three major issues on federalism.  First, the point in 
time at which provinces should be allowed to join into 
regions.  Hamudi (and the Kurds) would allow provinces 
to merge right after the December 2005 elections.  The 
Sunni moderates, at least, would put this off for 
years.  Second, they differ over how de-centralized 
the authorities at the provincial or regional level 
should be.  Finally, they differ over whether the 
national authorities should have a say in the merger 
of provinces into regions even if the local 
populations have agreed to it.  (The Shia and Kurds 
want no national authority intervention; the Sunnis 
when they countenance federalism insist on this 
condition.) 
 
12.  (C) Keeping the Sunnis on board will require 
close attention to several issues, from the mundane to 
the profound: 
 
-- WATCHING THAT SECURITY PACKAGES ARE PROVIDED: TNA 
Speaker Hachim al-Hasani agreed July 20 to offer a 
security package to the Sunni Arab members as a step 
toward keeping them on board.  We have to push him to 
come through on this immediately, especially since 
Mutlak is convinced that there is an Iranian 
intelligence plan to liquidate all Sunni Arab 
constitution committee delegates.  We are also working 
to make sure that all new Sunni Arab members are 
quickly badged and facilitated in exit and entry to 
the International Zone, particularly as the 
assassinated members are replaced. 
 
-- ENSURING AN INVESTIGATION TAKES PLACE: The Sunnis 
need to see the Iraqi government investigate this 
assassination, if only to prove the government was not 
complicit.  Mutlak claims that he previously submitted 
a report and request for the Iraqi government to 
investigate the threats to these members and the 
request was unanswered.  All of the Sunni Arab 
delegates are convinced that government counter- 
terrorism efforts are a mask for an anti-Sunni 
campaign.  An investigation will not end the paranoia, 
but it will apply a salve. 
 
-- SENDING A MESSAGE OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT: More than 
anything else, the Sunni Arab delegates made it clear 
that U.S. engagement was a key condition of their 
engagement.  They urged a firm U.S. hand to keep all 
the parties to the deadline and away from extremist 
proposals on federalism that would threaten Iraq's 
unity. 
 
13.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield