US embassy cable - 05ABUJA1323

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR AF CONSTANCE NEWMAN, AF MICHAEL RANNEBERGER, AF THOMAS 
WOODS 
FOR INR/AA FRANCES JONES, INR/AA JAMES SANDERS 
FOR S/P M. JAMES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015 
TAGS: NI, PGOV, PREL 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  IBB FACTOTUM SPECULATES ON A COUP, 
PRESIDENT OBASANJO "ACCIDENT" 
 
REF: A. A) LAGOS 706 
     B. B) ABUJA 1285 
 
Classified By: E.O. 12958 DECL: 07/20/2015; 1.4(A,D) 
 
(S) 1.  Summary:  Ukandi Damachi (protect throughout) , 
businessman and advisor to former Chief of State and current 
presidential candidate Ibrahim Babangida told me that 
President Obasanjo has alienated his natural constituency of 
ex-military men and risks being overthrown through a military 
coup or that there might be an "accident" that removes him 
from the scene before the 2007 elections.  I replied that any 
such action would be unacceptable to the U.S. and the 
international community.  He said that my recent speeches on 
the rule of law and the critical importance to Nigeria's 
democracy of the 2007 elections has "riled" the traditional 
military/business establishment, which is also deeply worried 
about the possible revocation of their U.S. visas because of 
our well-founded suspicion of their individual corruption. 
He also said that Supreme Court Lord Chief Justice Uwais was 
intimidated successfully by the President in advance of his 
decision upholding the 2003 elections.  See comments 
beginning para  6. 
 
(C) 2.  Damachi had breakfast with me at his request on July 
15 in the JO quarters I occupy when I am in Lagos.  Damachi, 
a businessman whose fortune appears to be based on lucrative 
dredging contracts, has been close to Ibrahim Babangida since 
the latter became chief of state in 1985.  He has been a 
contact of  U.S. ambassadors and the mission since then. 
 
(S) 3.  Obasanjo has distanced himself and alienated himself 
from his natural power base, Damachi argued, by proposing 
that former military rulers be excluded from political power 
in Nigeria, by his failure to distribute "equitably" the 
profits of office to his supporters, and by his alleged 
desire to manipulate the political system so that he can stay 
in office after 2007.  In addition to Babangida, Damachi 
identified Danjuma and Malu as leaders of this opposition to 
Obasanjo.  In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision 
upholding the 2003 elections, and Obasanjo's perceived 
continued efforts through the National Reform Conference to 
ensure that he can remain in office, Damachi said that it was 
increasingly likely that the retired generals/businessmen 
would "unleash the greyhounds", mid-level military officers 
who could mount a coup. 
 
(S) 4.  I reiterated what a disaster a coup against an 
elected government in Nigeria would be.  Even if civil war 
were avoided, the country would return to pariah status, 
there would be negative implications for investment, and most 
international assistance programs would stop.  Damachi said 
that Babangida's circle is aware of these consequences. 
Therefore, there was also the possibility that Obasanjo would 
suffer an "accident" or "fatal illness", perhaps similar to 
the circumstances of former military dictator Abacha's 
demise.  I responded that Obasanjo is duly recognized as the 
chief of state, and that his achievements are major:  ECOWAS, 
AU, a host of regional issues, now debt relief.  Nigeria and 
Obasanjo are partners of the U.S.  Coups and "accidents" are 
not acceptable options for the U.S. or the international 
community. 
 
(S) 5.  Damachi said that my recent speeches on democracy, 
the rule of law and the need for successful 2007 elections 
have been "noticed" and have "riled" at least parts of the 
military/business establishment.  He also said that my 
statements about reviewing for possible revocation the U.S. 
visitor visas of those for whom there is a well-founded 
suspicion of corruption has generated considerable anxiety 
among the same group.  He knew about, and referred to, 
Ambassador Obiozor's "urgent" meeting with me to discuss a 
specific visa case.  Obiozor had wrongly  linked a visa 
refusal to such anti-corruption efforts.  (In this particular 
case, the visa applicant "forgot" to mention American citizen 
children.) 
 
(S) 6.  Turning to the July 1 Supreme Court ruling upholding 
the 2003 elections, Damachi said that the presidency 
successfully intimidated Chief Justice Uwais to render a 
favorable decision.  The intimidation of Uwais had been so 
intense, Damachi continued, that the Lord Chief Justice had 
tried to resign.  He had remained in office at the 
importuning of his northern supporters.  Damachi said that 
Uwais and other judges were vulnerable on grounds of 
corruption -- and there had been a highly embarrassing press 
campaign accusing Supreme Court justices of malfeasance 
unleashed by the presidency. 
 
(S) 7.  Comment: Because we see Damachi from time to time, I 
assume he was freelancing, that our meeting was at his own 
instigation, not Babangida's.  Nevertheless, it is 
extraordinary to hear a member of Babangida's even outer 
circle talking about the possibility of a military coup or an 
"accident", though Damachi has come close before with the 
Lagos CG (ref A).  Therefore, I want to make a  record of the 
conversation.  I was at pains about the utter unacceptability 
to the U.S. and the international community of coups or 
"accidents".  Damachi has known Babangdia for a long time: 
when Babangdia was chief of state in the late 1980's, he used 
Damachi as his link to the Nigerian labor movement and also 
to the U.S. embassy.  But, Damachi has never served as a 
minister, and has been careful to keep a low official 
profile.  Through all of the twists, turns, coups, 
counter-coups and elections in Nigeria since the end of the 
Biafra war, Damachi has never been jailed.  Certainly 
Damachi's comments should not be taken as definitive of 
Babangida's own thinking.  They may, however, reflect what is 
being said around him. 
 
(S) 8.  Comment, continued:  the relationship between 
Obasanjo and Babangida is by no means clear.  Ref. B reports 
Obasanjo's alleged mistrust of National security Advisor 
Aliyu Mohammed as one of Babangida's men.  Nevertheless, they 
have been associates  and coup co-conspirators for much of 
their careers and have been closely allied at various times 
to advance their tactical interests.  Both, for example, 
appear opposed (at least for the moment) to Vice President 
Atiku's presidential aspirations.  And, despite Damachi's 
suspicion, the President continues to state that he will 
leave office in 2007.  Serious enmity between the two would 
seem more likely if Obasanjo did, indeed, seek to remain in 
office after 2007 than it is now. 
 
(S) 9.  Comment, continued:  There continues to be no 
evidence that I have seen of coup plotting.  It is also 
unclear how much influence retired military officers such as 
Danjuma or Malu retain over the military forces.  it is true, 
however, that we know relatively little about the 
"greyhounds" or their ilk, and we do know that the military 
continues to be starved of funds and characterized by inept 
management.  Nor, if Obasanjo dies suddenly or unexpectedly, 
should it be presumed that it results from malfeasance.  We 
have reported in various channels that Obasanjo is older than 
his official age, apparently has diabetes, pursues violent 
exercise with little sleep, and blacks out from time to time. 
 And, in general, Nigeria's standards of aviation or road 
safety are notoriously low. 
 
(S) 10.  Comment continued:  Damachi's comment about possible 
U.S. visa revocation is evidence that this is an important 
way we can demonstrate our support for anti-corruption in 
Nigeria.  We are also well-served by our inability to provide 
the names or numbers of those whose visas have been revoked. 
It is widely assumed that far more have been revoked than is 
the reality. 
 
(S) 11.  Comment, continued:  I cannot comment one way or the 
other on whether or how Uwais was pressured by  the 
presidency over the 2003 decision.  However, it is nearly 
universally believed that the 2003 elections were deeply 
flawed, and the Court's decision has little credibility on 
the street.  It is easy to ascribe to intimidation the 
rationale for the Court's decision. 
 
(S) 12.  Concluding comment:  I see the significance of this 
conversation as that talk about coups, largely absent when I 
arrived in May 2004, has resurfaced.  And, unless or until 
Obasanjo convincingly shows he is going to step down by 
supporting a successor in 2007, it is no surprise that people 
around Babangida (and many others) should speculate about 
possible dire scenarios.  My bottom lines:  I suspect 
Damachi's scenarios here reflect speculation -- or wishful 
thinking.  But they are an indicator of the political 
atmosphere in this country as we move into an electoral 
season. 
CAMPBELL