US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3015

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015 
TAGS: PINS, PREL, MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, IZ, IR, Iran 
SUBJECT: BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS--IRAN'S 
INFLUENCE IN IRAQ'S CENTER-SOUTH 
 
REF: A. QDIA IIR 6 847 0129 05 
     B. QDIA IIR 6 847 0125 05 
     C. QDIA IIR 6 847 0130 05 
     D. QTDX-315/37994-05 
     E. QDIA IIR 6 847 0056 05 
     F. QDIA IIR 6 847 0045 05 
     G. QTD 314/19304-04 
     H. QTD 314/32440-05 
     I. TD 315/31532-05 
     J. QDO TN 04-2236 
     K. QDIA IIR 6 847 2037 05 
     L. QDIA IIR 6 847 0104 05 
     M. QCIOC INFO PAPER 29 MAY 05 
     N. QDIA IIR 6 847 0036 05 
     O. QIIR 7 921 1204 05 
     P. QTD 314/33861-05 
     Q. QDIA IIR 6 847 0098 05 
     R. QDIA IIR 6 847 0099 05 
     S. QDIA IIR 6 847 0117 05 
     T. QTD 314/31456-05 
     U. QSCID IIR 6 110 0040 05 
     V. QSCID IIR 6 110 0132 05 
     W. QNGIC-1843-7026-05 
     X. QCIOC INFO PAPER 21 JUN 05 
     Y. QCIOC INFO PAPER 02 JUN 05 
     Z. QSCID IIR 6 110 0055 05 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(b) 
and (d) 
 
 1.  (S//NF) Summary. Despite the relative spirit of 
democratic cooperation demonstrated by the Shia parties that 
dominate the governing coalition in Iraq, some of these 
parties and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods 
Force (IRGC-QF), Iran's vanguard political and unconventional 
warfare organization, are waging a multi-dimensional campaign 
to shape the geopolitical dynamic in central and southern 
Iraq. The operational thrusts of this campaign are to support 
financially the dominance of pro-Iranian Shia political 
parties at the national and provincial levels; consolidate 
the authority of the Badr militia over the security 
environment in specific regions of interest;  promote an 
extreme Shia-Islamic social order in the southernmost 
provinces using intimidation and violence if necessary; and 
develop the capability to disrupt, through force of arms, the 
ability for Coalition Forces to master the security 
situation.  As the Sunni insurgency, responsible for the 
preponderance of kinetic attacks, commands the attention of 
the Coalition, the Shia-dominated regions appear deceptively 
tranquil. But beneath this relative calm, benign surface, 
exists a dark undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity 
detrimental to U.S. interests. Steps should continue to be 
taken to mitigate IRGC activity in order to establish 
democracy in Iraq on firmer ground. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
A KINDER, GENTLER ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (S//NF) The United Iraqi Alliance's (UIA) electoral 
success and the formation of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government (ITG) have given rise to significant anxiety about 
possible Iranian-backed Shia-Islamist influence in the 
government, particularly in the security services. Thus far, 
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI) has tempered the revolutionary agenda and proved 
accommodating in both its political rhetoric and actions 
within the ITG. For example, as anticipated in previous 
reporting (REFTEL BAGHDAD 1403), at the national level, the 
SCIRI, and more generally the UIA, has eschewed radical moves 
within the security services.  Minister of Interior Bayan 
Jabr, a SCIRI party member with reportedly strong 
associations to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security (MOIS), has conducted himself like a dedicated, 
professional technocrat. Though accusations have been leveled 
at him for purging Sunni officials from the ministry, it can 
be argued that these actions served to streamline the 
institution rather than effect any sectarian vendetta (REFTEL 
BAGHDAD 2376). Similar restraint has been demonstrated in the 
Ministry of Defense. (NOTE. In what may be a reversal of this 
well-modulated trend, the ITG is now reported to be exploring 
close, cooperative relationships with the MOIS and planning 
to transform the office of the State Ministry of National 
Security into a new Ministry. Patterned after the MOIS, it 
would supplant the existing Iraqi National Intelligence 
Service, viewed by the ITG as politically unreliable. REFTEL 
BAGHDAD 3001. END NOTE.)  (REF. A, B) 
 
3.  (S//NF) On the broader political front, SCIRI politicians 
have openly disavowed the Iranian model of the Islamic 
jurisprudent, 'velayat e-faqih,' as a model for Iraq and at 
present espouse progressive democratic ideals sonorous to the 
ears of Western diplomats (REFTEL 0312). Whether or not this 
represents a genuine political reengineering of SCIRI's 
Islamic revolutionary foundation or is a well-orchestrated 
show of expediency, it appears to originate from within the 
party rather than through the invisible hand of Tehran. That 
SCIRI's policy decisions are motivated more by an internal 
political calculus (and not by a foreign agenda which may or 
may not be convergent) suggests progress in Iraq's democratic 
consolidation. 
 
4. (S//NF)  Despite SCIRI's cooperative disposition, its 
financial sponsorship by the IRGC-QF and other Iranian 
sources has markedly degenerative consequences for the 
process of democratization. In 2005, Iranian sources, 
including the IRGC-QF, reportedly supported SCIRI and its 
affiliates with approximately $100 million; $45 million was 
specifically allocated to its militia arm, the Badr Corps, 
which recast itself as a political party, the Badr 
Organization, for participation in the January elections. 
(COMMENT. This report will use the term 'Badr militia'. END 
COMMENT.) The economic horsepower that SCIRI and its alliance 
partners wield has effectively squelched more liberal, 
secular voices within the Shia constituency. Shia moderate 
politicians hoping to achieve some level of political 
participation are now faced with the choice of either 
compromising their ideals and allying themselves with 
Iranian-backed parties or simply watching developments from 
the sidelines (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2805). As SCIRI and its 
partners "play the game" in line with U.S. interests, 
unchecked IRGC-QF and other Iranian patronage ensures that 
the Shia political spectrum is conclusively dominated by 
political parties that are at least sympathetic, if not 
entirely beholden, to their financial benefactors. (REF. A, 
C, D) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
CHANGING OF THE GUARD - BADR SECURES THE PROVINCES 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5.  (S//NF) In contrast to the relative calm at the 
national-level, trouble has been brewing in the provinces. 
Almost immediately after their electoral victories, the new 
SCIRI-dominated Provincial Councils moved to replace 
non-partisan police chiefs in the region extending from the 
Iranian border west through Wasit and Qadisiyah provinces to 
the holy city of Najaf.  This occurred with relative 
efficiency in Qadisiyah, while in Najaf the governor used 
Badr militia forces to install forcibly the favored 
replacement (who was then killed, ironically enough, in the 
associated gunfight; the deputy governor, a senior Badr 
militia officer, later assumed the role of police 
chief)(REFTEL BAGHDAD 1463). A tense situation remains in 
Wasit where the police chief, despite consistent maneuvers by 
the SCIRI-led provincial council to oust him,  is standing 
firm and refusing to vacate his post bolstered by a loyal and 
formidable special police unit. While some degree of legal 
ambiguity exists in such cases regarding the respective 
authorities of the Provincial Councils (PCs) and the central 
MOI under CPA Order 71, the prevailing opinion is that the 
PCs (and to an extent the MOI) have transgressed the spirit 
of the existing legislation (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2210). In 
general, the overriding tone of the SCIRI-dominated PCs in 
South-Central Iraq is one of defiant independence, and moves 
to entrench Badr militia stalwarts into the local security 
services have been scarcely concealed. (REF. E, F, G) 
 
6.  (S//NF) Beneath these maneuvers, which at least assume a 
thin mantle of legitimacy, run efforts to expand the 
non-official security role of the Badr militia, initially 
conceived by the Iranians as an adjunct to the IRGC-QF 
Ramazan Corps (responsible for unconventional warfare 
operations in Iraq) and now designated as an independent 
paramilitary organization within the IRGC-QF structure. 
Collateral reporting indicates that SCIRI has sanctioned the 
use of vehicular Badr militia patrols and checkpoints 
throughout Baghdad to provide security in Shia majority 
areas.  Moreover, Al-Hakim has reportedly encouraged the 
provincial leadership to utilize the Badr militia network to 
facilitate more effective security operations and 
security-related information sharing across provincial 
jurisdictions, an aspect where local police forces are 
notoriously weak. (REF. H, I, J) 
 
7. (S//NF) The provincial governor in Najaf, in a probable 
expansion of this trend, has inaugurated an ad-hoc 'special 
police force' composed primarily of Badr militia personnel. 
Also exploring militia-based security options, Minister of 
State for National Security Abdul Kareem Al An'zi, a member 
of the conservative Shia party Dawa-Tanzim, has chartered a 
concept paper for the development of an 'armed neighborhood 
watch' composed of private citizens responsible for security 
and information gathering in their local communities who 
would report to a secret police officer assigned to a 
community-level area of responsibility. U.S. IRMO advisors 
report that Interior Minister Bayan Jabr has proposed similar 
mechanisms to enhance local security. On the one hand, these 
could be considered reasonable actions in Iraq's volatile and 
deadly environment. However, these deviations from a 
developing rule -of law could possibly be more alarming given 
the financial sponsorship and likely operational direction of 
the Badr militia by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT: Post is monitoring 
SCIRI/Badr-dominated security forces to determine if they are 
constraining legitimate political activity. So far, this has 
not been detected on a serious scale. END COMMENT.) (REF. J, 
K, L) 
 
------------------- 
MISSISSIPPI BURNING 
------------------- 
 
8.  (S//NF) A different dynamic operates in the steamy 
wetlands of the southern Tigris-Euphrates Valley, where 
Iranian supported groups like Sayyid Al-Shuhadah, Tha'rallah, 
and 15 Sha'aban cultivate their passionate Islamist agenda. 
Here, SCIRI does not categorically dominate. Amidst a 
virulently anti-Ba'athist climate, the IRGC-QF surrogates vie 
for political authority against more nationalist Shia 
political parties such as Al-Fadillah and the Islamic Action 
Party. (COMMENT. Al-Fadillah took the Basra governorship from 
SCIRI in the recent elections, demonstrating that there are 
other Shia Islamist alternatives that can compete. SCIRI's 
association with Iran led many to vote against the groups 
supported by Iran. END COMMENT) The machinations of SCIRI and 
Badr to obtain influence are a comparatively well-tempered 
sideshow to the back-alley violence and intimidation wielded 
by the IRGC's more aggressive proxies. 
 
9. (S//NF) The genesis of these groups is not altogether 
clear. Reporting suggests that Sayyid Al-Shuhadah (Lord of 
the Martyrs), was formed by a nucleus of Badr intelligence 
operatives in the early 1990s and remained in relative 
obscurity until the U.S. invasion. Either as a splinter group 
of Sayyid Al-Shuhadah or with their organizational support, 
Tha'rallah (Revenge of God) was later conceived, developing 
their own uniquely radical character. 15 Sha'aban, named 
after the inaugural day of the 1991 uprising, also emerged in 
the early 1990s later to surface as a political group after 
the fall of Saddam. Despite their hazy origins, these 
organizations all share some basic characteristics: a popular 
center of gravity in Basra with additional support bases in 
the southern cities of Al-Amarah and Nasiriyah, nominal cover 
as legitimate political organizations, an extreme Shia 
Islamist agenda, a history of patronage from the IRGC-QF, and 
a track record of militant activity since the arrival of 
Coalition Forces. (REF. M, N, O, P,) 
 
10.  (S//NF) Though remaining largely in the shadows, Sayyid 
Al-Shuhadah, has been widely reported to facilitate the 
transfer of weapons and munitions across the Iranian border 
into Iraq and to provide fiscal and logistical support to 
more violently inclined groups such as Tha'rallah. Recent 
collateral reporting suggests they may be abetting efforts to 
assassinate political opponents targeted by IRGC, though 
their principal overt activities revolve around the 
development of Islamist student or cultural centers in Basra. 
Under the fiery leadership of Sayyid Yousif Al Musawi, 
Tha'rallah, renowned in the streets of Basra for its thuggery 
and demagoguery, generated public attention with the armed, 
temporary takeover of the local port of Khor Al-Zubair in 
early March 2005 and Tha'rallah's threats to kill the port's 
workers. More recently, it has been implicated in the 
intimidation and assassination of Sunni Arabs in the southern 
provinces and in ongoing attempts to penetrate and control 
the Basra police forces. (REF. P, Q, R, S, T) 
 
11. (S//NF) This activity has a distinctly Islamist, 
pro-Iranian tenor, and is targeted at political opponents 
that are, though Shia and Islamist in stripe, less supportive 
of Iranian influence, and targeted more generally at the 
population at large in order to project a sense of moral 
authority and enforce a rigorously Islamic code of conduct. 
Anecdotal reporting about the climate of intimidation and 
repression in the southernmost provinces is increasing. 
(REF. N) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
TARGETING AMERICANS - THE SHEIBANI NETWORK 
------------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (S//NF) Explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) charges, 
with a directed metal diaphragm that dynamically transforms 
upon detonation into an aerodynamic projectile traveling at 
2000 meters per second, can punch through one side of an 
armored vehicle and out the other with catastrophic 
consequences to occupants inside. In recent months, this 
advanced Improvised Explosive Device (IED) technology has 
been identified in a growing number of deadly IED attacks 
against Coalition Forces throughout southern Iraq. The use of 
such devices appears to be expanding. Its introduction into 
the Iraq theatre of operations has been directly linked to 
the IRGC-backed network of Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, a former 
IRGC-QF agent and Badr intelligence chief. In its cellular 
structure and operating methods, the network is reported to 
be modeled after Lebanese Hizballah, itself an organization 
historically known to be supported by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT. 
EFP technology has been widely used by Hizballah and its 
Palestinian surrogates against the Israeli Army. END 
COMMENT.) According to a former member of the organization, 
Sheibani's organization receives training both in Iraq and 
Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah instructors, using excerpts from 
professionally developed Hizballah instructional videos, have 
taught detailed construction and placement techniques for EFP 
IEDs. Evidence also suggests close ties to other IRGC-QF 
surrogates such as Sayyid Al-Shuhadah for operational and 
logistical support. (REFS. J, U, V, W) 
 
13.  (S//NF) Since January 2004, the use of EFP technology 
has resulted in an estimated 16 deaths and about 35 wounded 
with a 200 percent increase in fatalities over the last 
month. Though the overall numbers of IEP/EFP attacks have 
been very low compared to those by other identified non-Shia 
insurgent groups, the lethality of these attacks with their 
capacity to defeat vehicle armor has been extremely high. It 
is speculated that Sheibani's organization is only one of 
several such IRGC-supported networks that are being 
cultivated to maintain a latent capability to direct highly 
lethal attacks on Coalition Forces when required. It is also 
surmised that the ability to field EFP devices may have 
spread to Sunni insurgent elements, and MNF-I is actively 
targeting key leaders of Sheibani's elusive network who 
transit frequently across the border between Iran and Iraq. 
The devastating effects of EFPs on Coalition Forces indicate 
that kinetic IRGC-QF activity in Iraq is not limited to 
coercion or violence directed at indigenous political 
opponents, but also involves a nascent capability and 
demonstrated willingness to target American lives.  (REFS. X, 
Y, Z) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
CONCLUSIONS: COUNTERING THE MANY FACES OF THE IRGC 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
14.  (S//NF) Beneath a relative calm, benign surface exists a 
dark, menacing undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity 
inimical to U.S. interests in Iraq's center-south. As a 
result, present efforts to promulgate democracy and the rule 
-of law in Shia-majority areas face particular challenges: 
 
-     Iran's (including IRGC's) patronage of SCIRI, Badr, and 
other pro-Iranian Shia groups erodes public confidence in the 
political process by supplanting genuine public discourse 
with Iranian-funded patronage, media propaganda, and bribery. 
 
-     The Badr militia's more aggressive activity in 
center-south, particularly in Najaf, Karbala, and Qadissiyah 
could suppress the restrained, quietist message of the Shia 
Marja', typified by Ayatollah Al-Sistani, that has largely 
been a brake against radicalization of the Shia population at 
large; overall, Badr's activity degrades the rule -of law. 
 
-     Attempts by more radical IRGC-supported groups in the 
south to aggressively islamicize local communities undermine 
efforts to develop a more civic-oriented, libertarian 
political culture, and, if left unchecked, foster more 
radical activity. 
 
-     Munitions and weapons trafficking supported by the IRGC 
continues to be an explicit threat to Coalition Forces and 
the ISF and compromises their ability to maintain positive 
control of the security environment. 
 
15. (S//NF) We need to continue the following steps to 
mitigate these trends: 
 
-     Assure vigilance in monitoring the upcoming electoral 
processes in the South and thwart any efforts to subvert or 
distort them. 
 
-     Continue to oppose strenuously the existence of militia 
organizations not under the control of the national authority. 
 
-     Extend U.S. sponsored democratization programs that 
advocate participation, transparency, and accountability into 
southern Iraq, not just in predominantly Sunni areas. 
 
-     Monitor carefully the eastern Iraqi border with Iran to 
stem the illicit transit of people, weapons and ordnance, and 
money. 
 
-     Demarche the Iranian government on the IRGC's 
involvement in insurgent operations in Iraq, and maintain 
Iraqi and regional pressure on Iran to live up to its stated 
commitment to help ensure a secure and stable Iraq. 
 
15.  (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO KIRKUK 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield