US embassy cable - 05MADRID2714

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002714 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM AND EUR/WE; DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO 
THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, TSPA, KSCA, SP, MTCRE 
SUBJECT: MTCR/SPAIN: MORE SPANISH REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL 
ON NORTH KOREA 
 
REF: A. 7/18/05 DURHAM-FORDER CLASSIFIED EMAIL 
 
     B. MADRID 2713 
     C. SECSTATE 127451 
 
Classified By: ESTHOFF KEN FORDER PER 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) In a July 20 meeting with MFA International 
Disarmament Affairs Ambassador Tomas Rodriguez Pantoja and 
MFA MTCR POC Ambassador Manuel Viturro de la Torre, ESTHOFF 
provided Ref A U.S. reaction to Ref B Spanish thoughts on Ref 
C U.S. MTCR North Korea proposal.  Rodriguez Pantoja and de 
la Torre said they had discussed our North Korea proposal 
with the French who, per Ref C, had received our proposal 
from the U.S. Embassy in Paris.  They also indicated that the 
French had shared the U.S. proposal with the UK and perhaps 
others and that the U.S. proposal would be discussed at a 
July 26 meeting of EU MTCR members. 
 
2. (C)  The Ambassadors said that they and several European 
counterparts had doubts about the wisdom of trying to 
"formalize" greater scrutiny of North Korean activities via 
the adoption of a formal MTCR consensus decision recorded in 
the plenary's Chairman's Summary.  They said that such a move 
would be opposed by at least Russia, India, Brazil and South 
Africa.  They also stressed that many key European MTCR 
partners, including Spain, France, the UK and Germany were 
already doing what the U.S. proposal suggests (i.e., paying 
closer attention to the activities of North Korean-flagged 
vessels and ships bound from or going to North Korea). 
Trying to formalize greater scrutiny of North Korea via the 
MTCR could actually hurt rather than help, by giving 
ammunition to opponents who would argue, "why only North 
Korea and not Israel," or "why not via other multilateral 
nonproliferation fora?" 
 
3. (C) Given these concerns, the EU MTCR partners would 
probably prefer to address the U.S. proposal in a more 
informal Madrid plenary forum, such as the Heads of 
Delegation dinner.  The more limited participation would 
reduce the chances that Heads of Delegation would feel 
compelled to "grandstand" and take harder line positions to 
impress their inter-ministerial delegation members.  While 
they agreed on the need to pay greater attention to North 
Korean activities, the Ambassadors thought this could be 
better achieved via informal vice more formalized MTCR 
cooperation. 
 
4. (C)  The Ambassadors suggested that an EU/MTCR consensus 
position on how to address North Korea at the September 
Madrid MTCR plenary could emerge from the July 26 meeting. 
It was clear that Madrid would almost certainly join this 
consensus position. 
 
5. (C)  COMMENT:  De la Torre's position has evolved since 
the last time we spoke with him (July 18 - Ref B).  In the 
two-day interim, he:  (1) hosted a Spanish inter-ministerial 
working group meeting that discussed, inter alia, our North 
Korea proposal; and (2) had in depth conversations with his 
French MTCR counterpart.  One or the other (or both) appears 
to have increased his skepticism about the U.S. proposal to 
use the MTCR to heighten the attention given to North Korean 
proliferation concerns. 
 
AGUIRRE