US embassy cable - 05CAIRO5547

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, KPAL, IS, IZ, EG 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13 MEETING WITH 
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUL GHEIT 
 
 
Classified by Charge Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1.  (U) June 13, 2005; 3:45 p.m.; Cairo, Egypt. 
 
2.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
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The Deputy Secretary 
Charge Michael Corbin 
NEA PDAS Elizabeth Cheney 
Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli 
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson 
Embassy notetaker 
 
Egypt 
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Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit 
Chief of Staff Sameh Shukry 
Ambassador Shaida Farag, American Affairs 
Walid Abdel Nasser, Deputy Head of Mission, Washington D.C. 
Mohammed Abulkheir, Minister's Cabinet (American Affairs) 
Ali Erfan, Minister's Cabinet (Peace Process) 
Alaa al-Hadidi, Minister's Cabinet (Arab Affairs) 
Hisham Afifi, Minister's Cabinet (Sudan) 
Ahmed Ezzat, Minister's Cabinet (Press) 
 
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Summary 
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3.  (C) The Deputy Secretary discussed Sudan, Iraq, the 
fragile state of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and 
Egypt's Foreign Military Funding (FMF) with Foreign Minister 
Ahmed Aboul Gheit on July 13, 2005.  On Sudan, the parties 
confirmed the need to continue USG-GOE cooperation, maintain 
frequent high level contacts with GOS officials, ensure that 
external influences in Sudan (e.g. Eritrea) remain 
constructive, and maintain pressure for accountability on 
Darfur through  the International Criminal Court.  On Iraq, 
the Deputy Secretary urged the GOE to remain engaged despite 
the recent murder of Ambassador Sherif and noted that Iraqi 
PM Jafari sought an invitation to Egypt.  Aboul Gheit made it 
clear that there would need to be a calming period between 
Egypt and Iraq and stressed his displeasure over Iraqi 
accusations that Sherif was interacting with insurgents. 
Aboul Gheit was concerned over statements by Prime Minister 
Sharon following the July 12 suicide bombing in Netanya.  He 
predicted, however, that Abu Mazen would do whatever possible 
to avoid spilling Palestinian blood.  Aboul Gheit made a plea 
that Secretary Rice and NEA Assistant Secretary Welch do more 
to ward off efforts in Congress to reduce Egypt's FMF. 
Zoellick reassured Aboul Gheit of the Department's support, 
but stressed the important role Egypt's progress on reform 
could play in improving Egypt's image in Congress.  End 
summary. 
 
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Sudan 
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4.  (C) The Deputy Secretary praised the GOE's efforts to 
promote peace in Sudan, citing its work with the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), the dispatch of peacekeepers, and 
humanitarian assistance to Darfur.  He also highlighted the 
potential for greater USG-GOE cooperation in the coming 
months. 
 
5.  (C) Aboul Gheit appreciated the Deputy Secretary's 
observation about the need for more positive press on Egypt's 
work in Sudan, and asked him to help improve Egypt's image in 
the U.S.  Agreeing that the current peace is fragile, Aboul 
Gheit said that USG-GOE cooperation on Sudan will need to 
continue for years, not months.  He also said that Egypt 
wants to do more in Sudan, but the African Union is an 
obstacle.  Aboul Gheit elaborated on his personal outreach, 
stating that he had told Osman El-Merghani, whose party was 
considering whether to join the government or work as an 
opposition party, that a decision to participate would reduce 
the likelihood that the GOS will be subject to the 
fragmentation of the past 40 years.  Aboul Gheit said that he 
was concerned about the release of Turabi pursuant to the end 
of martial law, describing Turabi as dangerous and cunning. 
 
6.  (C) Achieving success in Sudan, according to Aboul Gheit, 
will depend on three factors.  He noted first the need for 
high level visits by both Egyptian and U.S. officials.  We 
must keep Sudan "leashed" to us, Aboul Gheit said, and 
commended the Deputy Secretary for visiting Sudan three times 
in the past several months.  Second, outside influences must 
be neutral.  For example, Aboul Gheit observed, Eritrea has 
not been helpful.  Aboul Gheit said he and Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director General Soliman have 
been pressuring Eritrea to be more cooperative and, in 
exchange, offered to help Eritrea resolve its dispute with 
Ethiopia.  Aboul Gheit urged the U.S. to apply similar 
pressure -- to "check Eritrea" -- by whatever means.  The 
Deputy Secretary reported that the U.S. Ambassador to Eritrea 
recently pressed President Isais to be constructive regarding 
the Beja, and that the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa will visit Eritrea in a few weeks carrying the same 
message. 
 
7.  (C) The final critical element in the Sudan equation, 
Aboul Gheit said, is preventing the emergence of any tension 
that may derail the process.  Referring to the possibility 
that work by the International Criminal Court (ICC) could 
eventually lead to the prosecution of GOS officials, Aboul 
Gheit urged the ICC to maintain pressure in a way that does 
not corner the GOS, thereby pressuring it to abandon its 
commitment.  The Deputy Secretary noted the need for the ICC 
not to interfere in the Sudanese peace process. 
 
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Iraq 
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8.  (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed sympathy on behalf of 
the USG and Secretary Rice over the murder of Ambassador Ihab 
Sherif.  He shared his impression that Iraqi Prime Minister 
Ja'fari is acutely aware of the delicate state of Iraq's 
relationship with Egypt.  Ja'fari would, the Deputy Secretary 
noted, welcome an invitation to visit Egypt.  Given President 
Mubarak's experience, the Deputy Secretary observed, he would 
be a good counselor to the new Iraqi leader.  The Deputy 
Secretary also shared his impression that Iraq's Sunnis 
 
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appear to be moving in the right direction and that Ja'fari 
is sensitive to the Sunni dynamic.  He encouraged the GOE to 
maintain ties with Iraq, whether through military training or 
humanitarian outreach, at a pace comfortable for Egypt. 
 
9. (C) There must be a calming period between Egypt and Iraq, 
Aboul Gheit responded, explaining the decision to withdraw a 
large number of people from the Egyptian mission in Baghdad. 
Aboul Gheit characterized as "not helpful" Iraq's effort to 
deflect responsibility for Sherif's killing and its 
accusations that Sherif had contact with insurgents.  If Iraq 
could not bring itself to apologize for Sherif's death, it 
should have remained silent, Aboul Gheit said, particularly 
because there was no evidence whatsoever that Sherif, who had 
only been in country for 31 days, had any contact with 
insurgents.  Moreover, Aboul Gheit remarked, if such contacts 
did exist between GOE officials and Iraqis, it would not have 
been at the initiative of a diplomat like Sherif.  Should the 
new Iraqi ambassador to Egypt ask to come tomorrow, Aboul 
Gheit said, the GOE would ask for a delay. 
 
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Peace Process 
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10.  (C) Aboul Gheit characterized the Palestinian situation 
as "a mess," referring to Sharon's reported pledge to retake 
Tulkarm and destroy the Islamic Jihad.  "He will fail," Aboul 
Gheit proclaimed, "as he has failed for 35 years."  While he 
said he is publicly calling for restraint on both sides, 
Aboul Gheit warned that circumstances may force him to put 
public pressure on Israel. 
 
11.  (C) Regarding Abu Mazen's ability to build security, 
Aboul Gheit expressed guarded confidence that with time, 
support, encouragement, and understanding from moderate 
Israelis, Abu Mazen will be o.k.  The situation Abu Mazen 
inherited is admittedly difficult, Aboul Gheit sympathized, 
listing corruption, a shattered Fatah, and a broken 
Palestinian Authority as among the challenges.  But, Aboul 
Gheit predicted, Abu Mazen will continue to honor the sacred 
Palestinian oath not to spill Palestinian blood, although, at 
a certain point, he will need to act like Ben Gurion and be 
willing to jail or even hang people to ensure the sacrifices 
made over decades are not lost.  Aboul Gheit warned that 
there is widespread skepticism among Arabs that a Gaza first, 
Gaza last mentality prevails.  In spite of the challenges he 
faces, Abu Mazen will not, Aboul Gheit declared, allow a 
civil war among his people. 
 
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Foreign Military Funding 
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12.  (C) Expressing his annoyance and concern over efforts to 
reduce Egypt's Foreign Military Funding (FMF) by 
Representatives Lantos and Hyde, Aboul Gheit asked that 
Secretary Rice and NEA Assistant Secretary Welch be seen to 
 
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engage the House and Senate to defend Egypt's interests.  He 
raised concern over reports that the U.S. Department of 
Defense is not "doing its part" to defend Egypt vigorously. 
13.  (C) The Deputy Secretary defended efforts by the 
Department and DOD to reach out to Congress, citing a letter 
to the Appropriations Committee and efforts by Acting Deputy 
Secretary of Defense England.  NEA PDAS Cheney observed that 
 
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one way to defend against attempts to reduce FMF is by 
highlighting Egypt's progress on reform.  When Aboul Gheit 
asked Cheney for her views on the state of reform, she said 
Egypt is heading in the right direction.  The Deputy 
Secretary elaborated on the need to ensure that Egypt's 
 
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progress on reform is well-publicized, noting that while 
political processes in the USG appear transparent, they are 
quite complex. 
 
14.  (U) This message was cleared by D. 
 
 
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CORBIN