US embassy cable - 05CAIRO5544

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 005544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2030 
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, KPAL, SY, LE, IS, IZ, EG 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 13, 2005 MEETING 
WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CHIEF OMAR 
SOLIMAN 
 
 
Classified by Charge Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1.  (U)  July 13, 2005; 12:30 p.m.; Cairo, Egypt. 
 
2.  (U)  Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
The Deputy Secretary 
Charge Michael Corbin 
NEA PDAS Elizabeth Cheney 
Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli 
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson 
ORA Chief 
Embassy notetaker 
 
Egypt 
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Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Omar 
Soliman 
EGIS Undersecretary for Intelligence Liaison General Kennawi 
 
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Summary 
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3.  (C)  In a July 13 conversation at the Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service (EGIS), Deputy Secretary Zoellick 
discussed Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Middle East peace 
process, and Sudan with EGIS Director Soliman.  On Iraq, the 
Deputy Secretary offered U.S. condolences on the 
assassination of Egypt's ambassador in Iraq and reviewed 
impressions from his visit to Iraq several days before, 
highlighting concern about Syria,s role, and PM Ja,fari,s 
interest in visiting Egypt.  Soliman said that Egypt would 
send an ambassador back after some time and he described 
Egypt,s work with Sunnis in Iraq, aimed at encouraging 
support for the political process there.  Soliman urged that 
the U.S. open a back channel to the Syrians. 
 
4.  (C)  On the Middle East Peace Process, Soliman labeled 
Gaza disengagement Egypt,s first priority and highlighted 
the need for it to result in a free Gaza that controls its 
own territory.  The Deputy Secretary expressed general 
support and said Abu Mazen needed to exert more "decisive 
control" over his security forces.  The Deputy Secretary 
cited GOE contributions to the Sudanese peace process and 
called upon Egypt to better publicize its role.  End Summary. 
 
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Sunni Inclusion in Iraq 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Deputy Secretary Zoellick offered his deep sympathy 
for the death of Egypt's chief of mission in Baghdad, 
Ambassador Ihab Sharif.  Soliman said the GOE was astonished 
that the kidnappers had killed Sharif without any 
communication with Cairo or any indication of their demands. 
He said Egypt has extensive ties with Sunni tribes and 
families in Iraq and is trying to convince the Sunni to seek 
reconciliation and integration, not division.  He added that 
Ambassador Sharif did not have any instructions to make 
contact with insurgents.  Soliman did not think Sharif was 
even informed about Egypt's various links to Sunni tribes. 
He said the envoy's death was a blow to relations with Iraq 
and to Egypt's Sunni ties, but that the GOE would continue 
working to integrate the Sunni into Iraq's political process. 
 
6.  (C)  Soliman said the GOE would send another envoy to 
Baghdad "after some time" and sought security coordination 
with the U.S. and Iraq.  Egypt would maintain links with the 
Sunni, and EGIS would maintain its station in Iraq, as well 
as in Kurdistan.  The Deputy Secretary noted that insurgent 
attacks on diplomats in Baghdad were intended to undermine 
foreign support for the Iraqi government.  He noted that 
Sunni forces seemed to dismiss the possibility that they 
themselves would have the most to lose if they successfully 
split society into sectarian factions.  The electoral and 
constitution drafting processes were giving the Sunni an 
appreciation for the opportunity to participate in unified 
governance.  The Deputy Secretary had met with key Sunnis in 
the Constitutional Commission; they were engaged on the 
substantive issues, and that demonstrates progress. 
 
7.  (C)  Encouraging Iraq to complete the constitution 
drafting process by August 15 was important, said the Deputy 
Secretary.  He stated that Prime Minister Ja'fari was 
 
SIPDIS 
sensitive about Iraq's relations with Egypt and had expressed 
his upset over the murder of Sharif.  Ja,fari wanted to come 
to Cairo, the Deputy Secretary said, and sought an 
invitation.  Such a visit would be an opportunity to discuss 
Egypt's offers of security training, among other topics, and 
a chance for Iraq to show its respect for Egypt's role in the 
region.  The Deputy Secretary urged the GOE to consider 
offering an invitation. 
 
8.  (C)  Highlighting the need for a three-pronged strategy 
to defeat an insurgency that includes political, economic and 
security tracks, the Deputy Secretary said he sensed progress 
on the ground yet called for further efforts to create a 
sense of momentum.  This had been visible during his trip to 
Hillah, where provincial leaders appreciated external support 
and assistance in addressing provincial matters. 
 
9.  (C)  Soliman asked why some quiet areas in Iraq were not 
enjoying a more obvious peace dividend -- a better life for 
Iraqis in those areas of calm would send a message to others 
that nonviolence is the path to prosperity.  He said 70% of 
Sunnis hated what the insurgents were doing and were willing 
to work against them if life showed more signs of 
improvement.  Soliman said the Sunni needed to be encouraged 
to be more in the trenches against the insurgents.  The 
Deputy Secretary said improving the quality of life is a key 
objective.  The U.S. was particularly focused on electricity 
(second only to security as a priority for Iraqis) and 
overcoming the highly centralized system established under 
Saddam.  In spite of their transitional nature, Iraq's new 
ministers were focused on core priorities as well as longer 
term issues. 
 
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Syria/Lebanon 
------------- 
 
10.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary said Syria continued to 
provide a pathway for insurgents to interfere in Iraq, citing 
the number of persons infiltrating from abroad.  Syria was 
both a conduit and a safe haven for these forces, he noted. 
Soliman said Egypt had told Syria to be careful to control 
the border with Iraq well before the Iraq conflict began. 
"No one listened," and the borders remained too open to 
insurgents, according to Soliman. 
 
11.  (C)  Soliman claimed to have told former Secretary 
Powell that the U.S. "must dance with Syria" by extending a 
hand of cooperation and praise now and again.  The Syrians 
would be more helpful if they felt appreciated.  He cited 
Syria's helpful approach after September 11, 2001. 
Bargaining is "the way of the merchants," said Soliman, 
recounting that through his 30 years of dealing with the 
Syrians he knew that Damascus would never do something for 
nothing. 
 
12.  (C) The Deputy Secretary noted a "fine line" between the 
benefits of praising Syrian efforts and the dangers of 
half-efforts from Damascus in return.  Key goals for Syria 
should be ceasing support for terrorist threatening the peace 
process, stopping interference in Lebanon, and keeping the 
border with Iraq secure.  The merchant mentality also 
required pressure, said the Deputy Secretary, and President 
Asad needed to clarify in which direction he intended to lead 
Syria. 
 
13.  (C)  Unsavory characters crossing in and out of Syria 
come to Egypt too said Soliman, citing his country's interest 
in preventing insurgent mobility.  Damascus understood very 
well the imperative of controlling terrorist factions, said 
Soliman, but followed a "mistaken agenda."  The U.S. could 
help alter that agenda through engagement, he suggested. 
Soliman said Asad wanted political change yet faced an old 
guard advising him against that.  Maintaining the dignity of 
a proud nation was key, said Soliman.  Egypt pressured Syria 
to accept UNSCR 1559 when Asad initially balked, according to 
Soliman, yet Damascus did not see sufficient improvement in 
relations with the U.S. and Europe in exchange for its 
compliance.  A high priority in improving relations could be 
a coordinated focus on enhanced security on the Iraqi border, 
in addition to better cooperation from Palestinian factions. 
 
14.  (C)  Regarding recent violence in Lebanon, Soliman said 
"stupid people" from Palestinian factions or Syrian 
intelligence cells might be responsible.  President Asad was 
not culpable, he emphasized, noting that some regime elements 
could take action without the knowledge of Asad.  Soliman 
described three dimensions of Lebanon's current situation: 
Hariri's assassination had integrated society against Syria 
and created a viable opposition to pro-Syrian elements; 
Hizbollah found itself a significant political power making 
alliances with other parties; Lebanon's flagging economy 
would not improve without international support and the lack 
of an improving economy would prevent any president from 
unifying society.  Soliman called for rebuilding capable 
armed forces and security services that had too long relied 
on Syrian expertise, pouring significant funds into the 
Lebanese economy, and giving full support to the elected 
government.  Echoing Soliman on the need to support a new 
Lebanon, the Deputy Secretary said consideration was being 
given to a Beirut conference in the fall.  The Government of 
Lebanon also needed a workable "reform approach" to the 
economy to overcome debt and banking challenges.  Economic 
support and help for Lebanon to build its armed forces over 
time, supported by a Hizbollah that acts as a responsible 
political entity, would work to bolster Lebanon's prospects 
for stability. 
 
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Middle East Peace 
----------------- 
 
15.  (C)  Soliman said Egypt's top priority in the Middle 
East peace process was Gaza disengagement.  Egypt wanted to 
help the GOI make disengagement real and did not want Israel 
out of Gaza but still wielding control there.  The IDF did 
not want to vacate the Philadelphi strip, he lamented, and 
was making it difficult for Prime Minister Sharon.  He said 
Egypt was ready to alleviate pressure on the border with the 
dispatch of more capable border guards, but did not sense IDF 
flexibility in vacating the other side (Philadelphi strip). 
 
16.  (C)  Clearly unhappy with the status of negotiations on 
the text of a protocol for dispatching border guards -- a 
protocol which he claimed was not needed -- Soliman said the 
GOI had rebuffed suggestions that Egypt might better control 
the entire border with Israel with military border guard 
units.  He said the GOE and GOI continued to exchange texts 
(two of which he showed to the Deputy Secretary) and had 
essentially agreed on the substance, but the Israelis were 
haggling as if to prevent the agreement. Israel continued to 
insist on positing Egypt as primarily responsible for 
smuggling.  He said he would call PM Sharon on July 17 to say 
that both militaries needed to be ordered to reach a workable 
agreement.  Sharon, he insisted, wanted a deal soon, as did 
Mubarak. 
 
17.  (C)  Soliman pointed out the unacceptability of moving 
the crossing between Egypt and Gaza from Rafah to a point at 
which travelers would have to transit Israel.  That move 
would put customs control in Israeli hands, he emphasized, 
and was inconsistent with Palestinian control over ports and 
land crossings in a free Gaza.  Travel between the West Bank 
and Gaza was also important, although Soliman said that 
strict Israeli control over marshaling points and train cars 
carrying Palestinian passengers between the two areas would 
create difficulties; people will not feel free and life will 
not improve. 
 
18.  (C)  Palestinian security battalions also needed 
armaments and ammunition to do their job, said Soliman. 
Israel's refusal to permit appropriate equipment, and its 
suggestion that the PA gather its armaments from Hamas, 
indicated that Israel did not seek a cooperative effort at 
Gaza security.  Israeli sensitivity towards security is 
destroying everything, he stated, adding that disengagement 
requires some risk.  Keeping the IDF in the Philadelphi strip 
would also be "a disaster," according to Soliman. 
 
19.  (C)  If disengagement did not progress well, Soliman 
said the GOI might not be in a position to offer additional 
withdrawals in 2006, but every effort should be made to keep 
momentum moving towards more changes the following year.  He 
called for a conference on refugee issues in 2006 to give 
people hope. 
 
20.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary agreed that long term momentum 
was important, but that a successful initial withdrawal was 
also key.  He said Abu Mazen needed to exert more control 
over his security forces and the Syrians needed to give some 
thought to their role as well.  The Deputy Secretary cited 
the value of the Wolfensohn and Ward missions to "bring 
people together."  Until Abu Mazen takes "decisive control," 
said the Deputy Secretary, Israel would take a tough stance 
on security.  The Deputy Secretary said the USG would see 
what it could do with regards to the border guard deployment 
issue, as well as in addressing barriers and issues 
associated with customs and airports. 
 
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Sudan 
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21.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary commented favorably on GOE 
contributions to the peace process in Sudan and called for 
ongoing engagement to combine implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with progress on Darfur.  He 
said the Abuja process was critical to show that the benefits 
of the North-South agreement could be replicated in other 
areas.  Soliman agreed that the U.S. and Egypt must work 
together towards a stable Sudan, a country whose neighbors 
did not all work to enhance its stability.  He cited Eritrea 
as a wild card.  Soliman emphasized that signing agreements 
was much easier than implementing them, and the need for 
Sudan's neighbors to stay engaged. 
 
22.  (C)  The Deputy Secretary suggested that Egypt be more 
active in touting its efforts in Sudan to the U.S. Congress. 
Egypt's engagement overcame a sense of division between the 
Arab world and Africa, he noted, and was indicative of 
Egypt's important regional role. 
 
23.  (U)  This message has been cleared by D. 
 
24.  (U)  Khartoum minimize considered. 
 
 
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CORBIN