US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: SUNNI CONSTITUTION DRAFTERS COMMITTED TO AUGUST 15 
DEADLINE: THE BIG ISSUE IS FEDERALISM 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3000 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Satterfield. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Two principal members of the newly 
appointed members to the Constitutional Committee told 
us July 18 that they are committed to finishing a 
draft by August 15 if possible but they are opposed to 
a federalist vision of Iraq.  An influential member 
(who was subsequently murdered on July 19) of the 15- 
member Sunni negotiating team has suggested either 
decentralizing authority to the provinces.  Another 
tactic that all Sunnis agree on is delaying resolution 
of the most contentious questions until the convening 
of the next assembly after December's elections.  We 
are urging them to stay in the game (which may prove 
difficult; both an UN advisor and representative of 
the Sunni Waqf report the Sunni drafters will withdraw 
from the committee), continue to promote solutions to 
ensure the unity of Iraq and seek compromise on the 
type of federalism all parties can live with.  It 
appears unlikely that the Kurds will negotiate their 
existing regional government authorities.  The Shia 
are unlikely to accept regional Shia conglomerations 
having fewer authorities than the Kurds already enjoy. 
In this situation, it will be easier for the Kurds and 
Shia to repeat the experience of last spring's cabinet 
formation and make a separate deal and then presenting 
a fait-accompli to the more rigid Sunni Arabs.  We 
will continue our efforts to convince the Sunni Arabs 
that federalism would be a vehicle to protect their 
interests.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Sunnis Lay Out Dispute with Federalist Vision 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Sunni supplemental member of the 
Constitutional Drafting Committee, Mujbil Ali Haseen 
al Shaykh Issa told PolCouns on July 18 (prior to his 
assassination) that the Kurds were pushing their 
version of federalism for the south.  He appeared 
resolutely opposed to language allowing any provinces 
to form a regional government aka the KRG model.  He 
laid out two key reasons.  First, he said that regions 
that control security, court systems and all economic 
policy would have the attributes of states and sooner 
or later would succeed from Iraq.  They would also be 
subject to greater influence from outside powers. 
Shaykh Issa postulated the Shi'ite citizenry was not 
even in favor of this interpretation of federalism. 
Al Issa accused the Kurds of pursuing 'confederalism' 
rather than 'federalism' and described their demands 
as 'asking for the moon'. 
 
3.  (C) PolCouns countered that the international 
community supported the vision of a federal Iraqi 
state in UNSCR 1546.  There would be no going back to 
the old style of the Iraqi state.  He asked Shaykh 
Issa if it would be really better for residents of 
Anbar or Ninewa to have governors appointed by a 
(likely) Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, for 
example.  Shaykh Issa said he approved the concept of 
decentralization, but not federalism.  Administrative 
authorities, such as management of electricity, water, 
roads and health could be left to provincial or even 
regional authorities.  Political authorities, such as 
the power to legislate or to manage the judicial 
system, had to be left to the central government. 
Shaykh Issa claimed that left alone to legislate every 
province in southern Iraq, and most of the Sunni 
provinces as well, would become entirely religious 
governments.  If an issue like social policy were left 
to these governments, in the southern provinces "it'd 
be like under the Taliban - you wouldn't see a woman's 
face".  In addition, he feared the Sunni Arabs would 
be left with little revenue.  He welcomed PolCouns' 
note that the U.S. was urging ownership of natural 
resource revenues remain with the national government. 
PolCouns added that strong constitutional protections 
of individual and community rights could minimize the 
problem of extremists' dominating local politics. 
Shaykh Issa shot back that Iraq has no history of 
respecting rule of law, and the Sunni Arabs' current 
experience is not encouraging. 
 
4.  (C) Shaykh Issa said that if the Shia and Kurds 
want governorates to have legislative and judicial 
powers, the Sunni Arabs would agree as long as 
governorates are not allowed to join into regions. 
This way they would not be tempted to break away into 
independent states. 
 
5.  (C) The Iraqi Islamic Party's Dr. Ayad Samarra'i, 
also a member of the 15 person Sunni team, asserted to 
Poloff July 18 that the southern Shi'ites were being 
manipulated by 'others' into forming a Southern 
Regional Government amid conditions that were not 
'permissive'.  (Comment: Samarra'i was most likely 
pointing to pro-Iranian political parties.  End 
Comment.)  Samarra'i further stipulated that the 
formation of any regional government should be subject 
to a national (rather than regional) referendum. 
Also, there should be a clause allowing provinces that 
become disenchanted with their regional bloc to 
secede. 
 
6. (C) Samarra'i cautioned he was not opposed to 
future regionalization in principle.  Should, for 
example, Maysan and Basra one-day wish to join that 
would be 'an administrative question' for the National 
Assembly.  Nonetheless, at this stage it is simply too 
dangerous to the unity of the nation.  He noted 
ethnic/sectarian tensions and/or intimidation is 
already leading to the displacement of ethnic or 
sectarian minorities.  The application of further 
regionalization, based on 'geographic' or ethnic 
basis, e.g. could fuel the flight of Sunnis from 
Basra.  The formation of a Southern Regional 
Government, consisting of either a minimum of three to 
a maximum of all of the nine Shi'ite provinces would 
lead to a similar (reactive) Sunni initiative.  The de 
facto result would be three states: Shia, Sunni and 
Kurdish.  He also observed a nine-province Southern 
Regional Government (an idea he claimed was supported 
by Ayatollah Sistani) would exert too much influence 
on the central government. 
 
------------------------------ 
Moving Forward, Sunni Endgame? 
------------------------------ 
 
7.  (C) Shaykh Issa told us that the border issue was 
exceptionally sensitive.  He had seen the Kurdish map 
mentioned in ref A and scoffed at its seriousness.  A 
resident of Kirkuk himself, he said Kirkuk should be 
addressed later and outside the constitution, 
including the tough issue of Kirkuk's borders.  His 
conclusion was that the toughest issues in general 
should be postponed until after the December 2005 
elections. 
 
8.  (C) Samarra'i noted the individual members (from 
all factions) of Constitutional Drafting committee had 
clearly established their ideological positions over a 
week beforehand.  Now -- for the last three days -- 
drafters were simply reiterating their stances.  He 
advocated getting down to the business of drafting the 
text and then turn over the issues that are unresolved 
to their political party leaders.  While he noted, "a 
bad constitution (by August 15) was better than no 
constitution", he indicated the Sunnis do have a 
contingency plan if they are dissatisfied with the 
final draft.  Observing "that many" may change their 
position during the two month period for discussion 
(August 15 - October 15), Samarra'i said the Sunni 
Arabs would use this period to poll their 
constituents, consult internally and then make a 
decision whether to urge their supporters to vote for 
or against.   He refuted the possibility of a Sunni 
walk-out from the drafting process, but left open the 
possibility that if the Sunni Arab politicos cannot 
convince their constituents that the document was the 
best compromise possible -- and that it was superior 
to the Transitional Administrative Law -- they'd 
oppose the passage of the referendum. 
 
------------------- 
Other Problem Areas 
------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Shaykh Issa listed several other points of 
contention.  He thought they could be resolved, but 
there is no immediate resolution in sight.  These 
include 
 
-- whether to call the country the Republic or Federal 
Republic of Iraq; 
 
--  how to handle the issue of the Arab identity of 
Iraq; 
 
--  whether to allow dual nationality (the Sunnis 
oppose); 
 
--  whether Kurdish should be a national language with 
Arabic; 
 
10.  (C) COMMENT:  Samarra'i, his usual dour, but 
sharp-witted self was nervous about the course of 
negotiations; he was dubious that an agreement 
suitable to the Sunni Arabs could be found.  Shaykh 
Issa was less visibly downbeat.  He displayed 
ideological rigidity, but his recognition of 
decentralization may leave some room to negotiate up. 
The problem is that the Kurds won't negotiate down, 
and the Shia are unlikely to accept regional Shia 
conglomerations having fewer authorities than the 
Kurds already enjoy.  In this situation, it will be 
easier for the Kurds and Shia to repeat the experience 
of last spring's cabinet formation and make a separate 
deal and then present a fait-accompli to the more 
rigid Sunni Arabs.  It is hard to see how the Sunni 
Arabs would in turn accept such a negotiating tactic 
and return to their own bases and try to sell the 
Shia/Kurdish position.  We will continue to explain to 
the Sunni Arab community how federalism will protect 
their interests and urge the Interior Ministry to 
start addressing the allegations of human rights 
abuses that lie just beneath the surface of almost any 
conversation we have with Sunni Arabs now. 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT/BIO CONTINUED.  Mujbil Ali Haseen al 
Shaykh Issa was born July 1, 1957 and maintained a 
home in his native village (and insurgent stronghold) 
Hawija as well as in Kirkuk.  He was assassinated on 
July 19.  (Ref A)  He said he once served at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  He noted that he, with 
Dhamin Hasan Aleiwi (a member of the Sunni 
Constitutional 'expert' committee, assassinated 
alongside Shaykh Issa) and an Akhmet Horshi started 
the Kirkuk University's faculty of law.  He said 
shortly after the arrival of the CF the Kurds passed 
false information to the American military leading to 
his detention.  He was released after one week.  He 
also served as legal council to several Amman-based 
international firms and claimed an income of 10-15,000 
USD per month.  He said his name was proposed as a 
candidate for the Governing Council and Iraqi Interim 
Government Minister of Industry and Minerals.  We 
heard his name mentioned a possible minister during 
the messy government formation in May.  As with his 
nomination to the Constitution Committee there was 
significant Kurdish opposition to his candidacy.  He 
admitted, smiling, they classified him as 'anti- 
federalist'.  Issa said he'd recently formed a 
political party called al Qarar, the 'Decision,' with 
fellow National Dialog member, Professor D. Nabeal 
M.S. Younis (of International Relations and Public 
Policies, Baghdad University.)  Issa reported he was 
single and was a blog afficiando, honing his English 
through chatting.  He, in the consistent manner of 
most Sunni politicos, ridiculed his colleagues.  He 
mentioned if Hatem Mukhlis tried to hitchhike in his 
hometown of Tikrit, no one would pick him up (he's so 
little known).  Extremely tall (approximately 6'5") 
and fashionably dressed, Issa confessed his profound 
indignity of incarceration with common criminals by 
the Americans.  Nonetheless, he energetically urged we 
'rebuild' the bridges between the Sunnis and the USG, 
and offered to serve as a facilitator with new 
influential and legitimate representatives of the 
minority.  Outwardly secular and liberal, his death 
may lead to shift toward the hard-line element in the 
nascent Sunni leadership.  Already, (Ref A) the two 
moderate Sunnis who left the committee were replaced 
by conservative ideologues with likely strong ties to 
the insurgency. 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT/BIO CONTINUED.  Shaykh Muhammad Tahir 
al-Abid Rabbo al-Jaburi, another added Sunni Arab 
member of the Constitution Drafting Committee was born 
in 1956 in Mosul and is a leading shaykh of the Jaburi 
tribe.  He holds a law degree and is currently 
enrolled as a student at the Sharia Academy in Mosul. 
He served as an officer in the Iraqi Army for over a 
decade before being arrested in 1996 on charges of 
plotting a coup.  Jaburi acknowledges now that the 
charges were true, but says the plan never came close 
to fruition.  Jaburi says he adamantly refused for 
years to put a picture of Saddam Husayn in his home, a 
small rebellion seen as suspicious at the time, and he 
let his Ba'ath Party membership lapse in 1993 after 
joining in a pro forma fashion.  After the charge of 
treason, he was sent to one of the Ba'athist state's 
most notorious prisons, al-Hakimiyya, which he claims 
makes the feared "Palace of the End" prison seem "like 
tourism."  Jaburi spent about 6 months in prison 
before using connections to the prison warden to 
secure his release.  He returned to Mosul and decided 
to run for the "People's Assembly," the former Saddam- 
era parliament, in 2000.  Jaburi says Revolutionary 
Council Deputy Chairman Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri saw his 
candidacy and the popular support he was drawing as a 
threat and saw to it that Jaburi's name was pulled off 
the ballot.  By that point, Jaburi said, he had come 
to the conviction that Saddam Husayn needed to go 
"even if Satan himself came to replace him."  It was 
in that spirit that he welcomed U.S. forces to Mosul 
in 2003 and served on the first city government in 
May, 2003.  Jaburi also holds a degree in engineering 
but appears to derive his income from his assets and 
influence as a tribal leader in Mosul.  He prides 
himself on his independence and is considering running 
in the next elections on a slate with other leaders 
without formally joining any political party.  A self- 
professed lover of women, he is married with four 
wives and claimed to be single while chatting up a 
female Rashid Hotel employee after a recent meeting 
with PolOff.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Satterfield