Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05BRUSSELS2748 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BRUSSELS2748 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brussels |
| Created: | 2005-07-20 09:33:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PARM ZK IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002748 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PARM, ZK, IR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: A/S FRIED - EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA, JULY 13, 2004 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason: 1.4(B)(D) 1. (C) Following a luncheon discussion with all 25 EU Political Directors on transatlantic relations, the EU's neighborhood policy, and the Middle East (reported septel) A/S Fried met with the EU "troika" led by UK Political Director Sawers, Council DG for CFSP Robert Cooper, and Commission RELEX DDG Karel Kovanda to discuss Guantanamo, Iran, Uzbekistan, China, the Western Balkans, and Africa. Key action items to emerge from the discussions include: -- An EU request for the U.S. to invite the UN's Special Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo; -- An EU question on whether the U.S. would be willing to de-list the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization from our recent non-proliferation executive order if European diplomacy with Teheran yields an agreement; -- A U.S. proposal for closer U.S.-EU consultations on support for reformers and civil society in Iran; -- A call for close U.S.-EU coordination of next steps in Uzbekistan, as both U.S. and some EU member states face the same dilemma of how to influence Karimov while not jeopardizing valuable basing rights in that country; -- A call for informal G-7 coordination regarding Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency; and -- The U.S.-EU "Strategic Dialogue" on East Asia should continue, with more emphasis on economic themes. The EU wants close coordination with U.S. on the question of market economy status for China. End Summary. Guantanamo ----------------- 2. (C) Council Director Robert Cooper urged the U.S. to invite the UN's Special Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo. He noted that U.S. indications that it would be willing to do so had been important in gaining EU support to oppose the Cuban resolution on this issue at the UNHRC. A/S Fried agreed to look into the issue. Iran ----- 3. (C) Sawers said diplomacy with Iran had entered a "tricky phase" following the elections. It could no longer be said there was a range of views within Iran's ruling elite -- all institutions are now in the hands of the hard-line/radical camp. The EU will judge the new regime by its actions -- on nuclear issues, regional stability, support for terrorism, and human rights. He expressed European appreciation for U.S. support to the EU-3's diplomatic efforts, and said the EU was on the hook to present new proposals to the Iranians "sometime this summer" -- although when exactly was still vague. The situation was sensitive, but Sawers assured Fried the EU was still sticking to its red line that Iran not be permitted to develop any fuel cycle activities. Sawers said he would consider it a success to get to the autumn with the current suspension intact. He noted that this would mark nearly two years in which Iran's work has been effectively suspended. 4. (C) The EU's strategy is to maintain a position where Europe sticks by its commitments to the Iranians, so that any violations will be clearly the fault of the Iranians. If this happens, Sawers said the EU would initiate an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and seek UNSC referral. 5. (C) A/S Fried agreed that the threat of referral to the UNSC clearly worried the Iranians. Looking at Iran strategically, he suggested there was a relationship between Iran's nuclear timeline and an internal timeline where domestic pressures for reform and democracy could build over time. He suggested the U.S. and EU should look for ways to hasten the reform timeline in Iran, reaching out to Iranian civil society and bolstering the forces for change in that country. 6. (C) EU officials agreed with the idea, but wondered about the appropriate approach. Council Director General for CFSP Robert Cooper said he was not sure the Iranians were ready for another revolution, since the last one had proven such a disaster for the nation. Sawers also said he saw a certain passivity in the Iranian people, especially among those who loathe the regime, while those who support the current regime have sustained their activism. The real challenge, in his view, was to strengthen those who want gradual change in Iran without stigmatizing those who receive the support of the west. The modernizing pressures of WTO membership was one such approach, he suggested. Commission DDG Karel Kovanda noted that the eighth round of the EU's Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations (taking place the week of July 12) and the EU's periodic human rights dialogue with Iran (next scheduled for September) aimed to bolster this segment of Iranian society. EUR/ERA Director Chase suggested experts hold U.S.-EU discussions on supporting civil society in Iran. He suggested this issue be put on the agenda for DRL AA/S Davies' next discussions with EU officials on human rights. 7. (C) EU officials expressed concerns about the recent executive order on non-proliferation which specifically added Iran's Atomic Energy Organization to the list of sanctioned entities. Sawers noted that if EU diplomacy succeeded in getting Iranian objective guarantees that their program would not support a nuclear weapons program, it is precisely this agency that would be expected to carry out the activities -- and the agency European entities would be cooperating with. He suggested it would be useful if the U.S. could state that a long-term agreement on peaceful use of nuclear energy with the IAEO would lead to de-listing that organization from U.S. sanctions. Uzbekistan --------------- 8. (C) Fried said trends in Uzbekistan were not good. Karimov has retreated into a Russia/China embrace, and is trying to use the leverage of our base usage to get the U.S. and other European nations to back down. The U.S. does not plan to withdraw from base use in Uzbekistan, but is beginning prudent planning on possible next steps. He noted the U.S. has already put in place restrictions on other military cooperation (bilateral and via NATO). But he stressed that our basing interests would not stop us from pursuing our democracy agenda in Uzbekistan either. 9. (C) Cooper suggested this was an area for possible U.S.-EU cooperation, but admitted that there were not many good options. Some EU member states share the U.S. dilemma on basing rights, and have therefore been hesitant to adopt policies currently being considered, including an arms embargo (with a time limit) or a visa ban. Cooper said he doubted the EU would be able to agree on these steps at next week's GAERC, but Sawers said the conclusions would certainly signal that these options are under consideration. Cooper noted that Germany, in particular, was already studying alternatives to its current base activities in Uzbekistan. Russia and the G-8 -------------------------- 10. (C) The EU is also placing discussion of Uzbekistan on the agenda of their consultations with Russia and China. He wondered whether Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency and their theme of focusing on the former Soviet states might be turned to our advantage. Sawers suggested there was a need for more thorough consultations among the "old G-7" on how to approach Russia's G-8 presidency. Since they could not be too obvious in this effort, Sawers suggested the G-7 countries might use the opportunity of meetings in New York on the margins of the UNGA. China -------- 11. (C) Sawers said the EU was pleased with the results of the strategic dialogue on East Asia that was launched in May. It was a good start, he stressed, but could not be considered a one-off event. Fried agreed, and said he hoped EAP A/S Hill would be able to brief European ambassadors in Washington on the results of the Secretary's recent visit to China. 12. (C) Sawers noted that an EU-China summit was one of the big meetings on the calendar for the UK presidency. The EU is currently negotiating a new Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with China, and hopes to modernize their now 25-year old agreement to include issues such as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation, and to also discuss issues with China such as energy, climate change, and market economy status. Kovanda stressed that market economy status was a key goal for Beijing. He stressed the importance of remaining on the same page on this issue with the U.S. and other OECD countries. Cooper urged the U.S. to keep an eye on the details of the TCA negotiations, suggesting obliquely that it may touch on U.S. interests. He also noted that while the arms embargo issue was not moving, it was also not dead as far as EU member states were concerned. Western Balkans ---------------------- 13. (C) Future EU Presidency country Austria (Mayr-Harting) took the lead for the EU side on the Balkans. He emphasized that the status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable, and that concerted pressure was needed on Serbian and Kosovar leadership. He suggested there might be merit in more direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU also supports the naming of a UN status envoy, but suggested that he should be assisted by a support team in including a group from the EU. 14. (C) A/S Fried agreed on the need to keep the pressure on. The Kosovo Albanians need to be told that they cannot just continue to wait and find final status dropped in their laps. They need to earn it through action. Belgrade, for its part, needs to hear that attempting to play the nationalist card is a losing game, and not a viable option. For both sides, Fried stressed that the prospect of EU integration had to be part of the solution. Cooper replied that the EU perspective remained viable -- even if people would not shout it from the rooftop after the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands. Sawers agreed, but noted that an EU perspective had not had as much impact on the behavior of states as the EU would have wanted. He stressed that to get Belgrade to come along, the EU and NATO had to be in a position to offer them more once final status negotiations begin. 15. (C) A/S Fried also urged the EU to continue pushing the Bosnian Serbs on police reform, Karadzic, and to continue to support Paddy Ashdown's efforts. He also urged the EU not to "give a pass" to Croatia on Gotovina. Sawers replied that the conditionality on Croatia is clear and remains: full cooperation with ICTY is necessary for to begin negotiations. Mayr-Harting agreed that full cooperation was needed, while at the same time suggesting not all countries in the region are equal, and it is clear that Croatia is far better prepared for EU membership than the rest of the region. Their progress to membership would send a signal to the others and strengthen the effect of the prospect of EU membership on the others. Sudan/Africa ----------------- 16. (C) Sawers noted the challenges in Sudan/Darfur remained huge. The EU is supporting the AU on the ground, and NATO's engagement offers a welcome complementarity. The Abuja talks were off to a good start, and he emphasized the importance of a success to help bolster the role of the AU throughout the continent. While Sudan remained a crucial test case, he said the international community also needed to put greater emphasis on the success stories in Africa, such as the overall reduction in the number of conflicts on the continent, and the recent G-8 commitments. Sawers complained that recent U.S. approaches urging the EU to do more on aid to Sudan failed to note all the EU is doing. Chase explained that the U.S. approach was targeted to the issue of food assistance in Southern Sudan, and not to the EU's overall effort in the country. Sawers suggested more needed to be done to correct the mis-impression that U.S. concerns were broader. 17. (C) Fried raised U.S. concerns about events in Zimbabwe, urged support for elections in the region, and also suggested that the EU engage more broadly in the Community of Democracies to build a useful global network of democratic countries. Chase also urged EU support for the UN Democracy Fund. McKinley .
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04