US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3001

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015 
TAGS: PINS, PREL, MCAP, MOPS, PGOV, IZ, IR, Iran 
SUBJECT: NAVIGATING THE RIFT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN - 
RUBAIE ON THE UIA,S BALANCING ACT 
 
REF: A. DIA IIR 6 847 0115 05 
     B. DIA IIR 6 847 0125 05 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Affairs Counselor David C. Litt for r 
 
easons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
THIS CABLE IS CLASSIFIED SECRET -- NOFORN. NOT 
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. 
 
1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. During a routine office call, 
National Security Advisor Mouwaffak Al-Rubaie 
discussed the development of a strategic security 
alliance with Iran to assist Iraq in combating the 
Sunni insurgency. Rubaie stated that while more right- 
wing elements of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) were 
advocating such a relationship, a more moderate 
position held sway among principal SCIRI and Dawa 
leaders who believe that movement too far in this 
direction would antagonize the U.S. The ITG, however, 
is considering legislation to establish a new Ministry 
of Intelligence to replace the Iraqi National 
Intelligence Service (INIS) possibly headed by State 
Minister of National Security Abdul Kareem Al-Anzi, 
the primary advocate for intelligence sharing with 
Iran.  Rubaie identified Iran's nuclear program and 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) 
support of Hamas and Hizballah to be the principal 
issues standing in the way of a constructive 
rapprochement between Iran and the U.S.  He confided 
that he was aware of IRGC activities in Iraq, calling 
them a "great danger". Ironically, according to 
Rubaie, the IRGC credentials of newly elected Iranian 
President Mahmud Ahmedinejad may afford him the 
flexibility to make the tough decisions required to 
overcome the mutual distrust that has characterized 
the Iran-U.S. relationship since 1979. END SUMMARY 
 
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MAINTAINING A PRECARIOUS BALANCE AS JAFARI COURTS IRAN 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (S//NF) In a conversation on 18 July with Iraqi 
National Security Advisor Mowaffak Al-Rubaie, 
POLMILOFF inquired about reports that Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Al-Jafari and State Minister for National 
Security Abdul Kareem Al'Anzi were seeking to 
establish a security alliance and intelligence-sharing 
agreement with Iran. Rubaie stated that that there was 
a spectrum of views on this issue within the cadre of 
UIA advisors to the Prime Minister. At the 
conservative end of the spectrum, the strongly anti- 
Ba'athist camps of Ahmad Chalabi, Muqtada Al-Sadr, and 
the more radical elements of SCIRI are advocating 
Iranian assistance to defeat the Ba'athist-driven 
insurgency, even if, as in the case of Al-Sadr, this 
represents a reversal of an otherwise strongly 
nationalistic agenda. At its core, their view stems 
from a frustration with the Coalition's ability to 
fathom the nature of the Sunni insurgency, and their 
lack of willingness to take the necessary steps to 
defeat it. 
 
3. (S//NF) At the other end, typified by more 
progressive elements of Dawa and other independents, 
are those voices which consider any relationship with 
Iran anathema and a threat to harmonious relations 
with the Coalition. The middle ground is held by 
SCIRI and Dawa centrists who, while predisposed to 
develop such a relationship with Iran, are hesitant to 
risk compromising any good faith thus far developed 
with the U.S.  Rubaie agreed with POLMILOFF's 
supposition that this must be a very tenuous line to 
hold, attempting to appease both Tehran and Washington 
simultaneously. 
 
-------------------------------- 
REENGINEERING IRAQI INTELLIGENCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (S//NF) Rubaie confirmed that in addition to these 
bilateral relationships, the ITG Council of Ministers 
was deliberating upon proposed legislation to create a 
new Ministry of Intelligence, reportedly to be 
anchored around the nucleus of advisors to State 
Minister for National Security, Al-Anzi.  Politically 
reliable elements of the existing INIS are to be 
salvaged and incorporated into this new organization. 
Rubaie appeared to be in opposition to the idea, 
believing that though the INIS was compromised by 
former regime elements and in need of more thorough 
vetting and organizational restructuring, it did not 
warrant the creation of a new bureaucracy in favor of 
an existing one. 
 
5. (S//NF) The Council of Ministers, according to 
Rubaie, had yet to achieve consensus on the issue, 
with the Kurds in significant opposition. The issue 
had been tabled for discussion at the Ministerial 
Council for National Security (MCNS) meeting scheduled 
for 21 July.  POLMILOFF suggested that a new 
organization revolving around Al-Anzi, the premier 
advocate for close intelligence cooperation with the 
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), 
may pose challenges for continued intelligence 
exchange between the Coalition and the ITG. Rubaie 
conceded that this could be a problem. 
 
---------------------------- 
CAN'T WE JUST ALL GET ALONG? 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (S//NF) Rubaie segued by suggesting that a U.S. 
rapprochement with Iran would help ameliorate these 
tensions and serve the mutual interests of Iran and 
the U.S. in establishing a stable and secure Iraq. He 
specified Iran's nuclear program and IRGC support for 
Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas in the Levant as the 
primary issues of contention for the U.S.  POLMILOFF 
asked if IRGC activities in Iraq should also be a 
cause of concern. Rubaie stated that he was aware of 
IRGC's introduction of advanced IED technology into 
Iraq, and their substantial financial support to the 
Badr Organization and other militant political groups 
which had a stifling effect on the development of 
other Shia political voices which were not the 
beneficiaries of Iranian patronage. These activities 
are nearly impossible to counter, with limited 
inherent capability (or will) for the ITG to interdict 
them and the limits of engagement the Coalition has 
set for itself in promoting political parties. Rubaie 
called the IRGC a "great danger". (COMMENT. POLMILOFF 
understood this to mean a general threat to 
constructive multilateral relations, and not an 
explicit military threat. END COMMENT). 
 
7. (S//NF) The National Security Advisor made clear, 
however, that the IRGC did not represent the 
'political elites' of Iran, typified by Rafsanjani and 
Khatami, who are capable of being rational, thoughtful 
interlocutors with Washington.  When asked whether 
former IRGC officer and newly-elected president Mahmud 
Ahmedinejad fit into that category, Rubaie responded 
with a flourish of rhetorical acrobatics. Citing the 
Likud party, he stated that politics in Israel are not 
entirely different from politics in Iran, and just as 
the conservatives in Israel have been able to make the 
tough decisions to effect progress, perhaps too, 
Ahmedinejad's conservative credibility may afford him 
the flexibility to take the bold steps necessary to 
overcome the residual psychological baggage of those 
hardly forgotten 444 days. 
 
8. (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO 
KIRKUK minimize considered. 
Satterfield