US embassy cable - 05HARARE982

C O N F I D E N T I A L  HARARE 000982 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, Other Political Parties 
SUBJECT: THIRD FORCE READY TO EMERGE? 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1 
.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Pearson Mbalekwa, an ex-MP who recently resigned from 
ZANU-PF, told poloff on July 14 that a "third force" was 
coalescing and expected to emerge publicly within two months. 
 The force, which so far lacked a leadership structure, would 
likely be composed of disaffected ZANU-PF elements largely 
aligned with Emmerson Mnangagwa, disenchanted war veterans, 
independent MP and former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, 
and selected MDC elements.  The group would be geared to 
contest the presidential election in 2008, and would stand on 
a platform of political moderation, economic reform, and 
rapprochement with the international community.  Mbalekwa 
gave the MDC credit for opening the political system but said 
the third force would be much better positioned to take 
advantage of this given its ties to local opinion-makers. 
Mbalekwa said Manangagwa (to whom he is related) would likely 
remain within ZANU-PF for the time being rather than join 
this third force.  However, he noted that Mnangagwa had "wide 
support" within Zimbabwe and openly wondered how the West 
would react to a Mnangagwa presidency.  End Summary 
 
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Impetus Behind Third Force 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) According to Mbalekwa, Mugabe's cynical manipulation 
of last year's presidium vote and the subsequent purges 
associated with the Tsholotsho meetings and party primaries 
had convinced many in ZANU-PF that change within the party 
would be impossible as long as Mugabe remained in charge. 
Moreover, he continued, Operation Restore Order and the 
country's continued rapid economic decline were further 
eroding public support of the party and deepening internal 
dissatisfaction with the leadership.  Accordingly, growing 
numbers of disaffected ZANU-PF had been collaborating and 
were getting prepared to launch a "third force" - an 
independent party. 
 
3.  (C) Mbalekwa was coy on who within the party was involved 
because of their purported sensitivity about being identified 
"too soon."  However, he did confide that the group included 
many loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, including five of the six 
provincial chairs dismissed over the Tsholotsho affair 
(excluding ex-Matabeleland South Chair Lloyd Siyoka). 
Mbalekwa also said Jonathan Moyo, "a very smart man", was 
playing a central role.  He added that the group had been 
reaching out to selected MDC members but not to the MDC as a 
party; he expected several prominent MDC members to join the 
group.  Many of the war veterans jettisoned by ZANU-PF in 
recent purges also were involved.  Mbalekwa said the group as 
a whole has yet to create a formal structure or to identify a 
leadership. 
 
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Timetable for Moving Forward 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Given the centrality of power in the office of the 
president, Mbalekwa said that the group was gearing its 
calendar and strategies single-mindedly for a presidential 
election in 2008.  They were going to demand elections 
immediately, but this was just a tactical ploy to stymie 
ZANU-PF plans to consolidate presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2010 by constitutional amendment later this 
year.  (Note: Jonathan Moyo publicly called for immediate 
elections at a Crisis Coalition-organized public panel on 
July 7.  End note.)  The group was not likely to field 
official candidates in next year's urban council elections, 
although some council candidates might be aligned with or 
sympathetic to the group. 
 
5.  (C) Mbalekwa said he expected the group to emerge 
publicly within two months.  He allowed that some thought 
this was too soon, given that the group was still trying to 
 
muster commitments and would quickly be targeted by 
entrenched ruling party interests once they went public. 
Several factors outweighed these concerns, however.  First, 
entrenched interests already had targeted them and stripped 
most of overt political power.  Moreover, Operation Restore 
Order and the worsening national economic decline made this a 
particularly opportune time in terms of heightened public 
resentment of the regime.  In addition, the elections were 
"only 30 months away", he noted, and developments in Zimbabwe 
had a way of taking unexpected turns that could overtake 
their plans.  Zimbabweans were conservative by nature, he 
emphasized, and needed time to be persuaded on an alternative 
path.  Finally, the ruling clique (i.e. the Mujuru faction) 
for now believed it "had won" through the past year's purges 
and sweeping election victory, and was relatively complacent. 
 
 
6.  (C) Mbalekwa reported that a Mnangagwa-aligned group had 
nearly broken away from the party six months ago over the 
ruling clique's "counter-coup" in the presidium vote.  (Note: 
Mbalekwa had told the Ambassador at that time that Karanga 
and young Turk elements were prepared to "secede" from the 
party.  End note.)  At that time, however, the group 
calculated that they lacked the focused objectives and 
organizational wherewithal to capture the public's confidence 
in time to have a significant impact on the March elections. 
Furthermore, parliamentary elections would not have changed 
the balance of political power in any event given the 
President's control of the government and all its resources. 
Accordingly, they had decided to wait for a more propitious 
time - now was that time. 
 
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Mnangagwa's Role 
---------------- 
 
7.  (C) Throughout the discussion, Mbalekwa was very cagey 
about Mnangagwa's role in the group's plans.  (Note: Just 
before last year's presidium vote, Mbalekwa published a 
lengthy letter in an independent newspaper "outing" Mnangagwa 
as a Vice-Presidential candidate and urging his election over 
Joyce Mujuru.  Mnangagwa is Mbalekwa's cousin and long-time 
political patron.  End note.)  He characterized Mnangagwa as 
a "very guarded and quiet" man by nature, but stressed that 
they were confidants.  Mbalekwa said Mnangagwa would be 
careful about his association with the group and would likely 
remain with ZANU-PF even when the group went public. 
 
8.  (C) Mbalekwa said Mnangagwa would cautiously go about his 
business within the government and party, even as the ruling 
clique continued overt efforts to marginalize him.  Even 
after "demoting" him at the Party Congress, they had cost 
Mnangagwa his parliamentary seat by shifting four key wards 
to an adjacent constituency just four days before the 
election despite Mnangagwa's personal pleas to Mugabe. 
Within the past few weeks, he alleged, Mnangagwa's strident 
urging of the Politburo to shift tack on economic policy met 
a mute response even though many present shared Mnangagwa's 
views. 
 
9.  (C) Mbalekwa reported that most ZANU-PF elements in the 
nascent third force historically had been aligned with 
Mnangagwa but many were disappointed over his passiveness as 
the ruling clique proceeded with its purges of Mnangagwa's 
senior supporters.  Indeed, Mnangagwa's influence had been 
the decisive factor in forestalling a "secession" after the 
Party Congress, he said.  Urging that Mnangagwa nonetheless 
had "wide support" within Zimbabwe, Mbalekwa asked about 
likely Western reaction to Mnangagwa as a leader in view of 
his "historical baggage" (referring to his senior role in the 
Matabeleland suppression/massacres of the 1980's). 
 
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Party Platform 
-------------- 
 
10.  (C) According to Mbalekwa, the group's platform would be 
political moderation, economic reform, and rapprochement with 
the West.  He emphasized that the group was Western-oriented 
in its approach and, given the depths to which the economy 
 
had plunged, placed high priority on re-engagement with the 
IFIs and rehabilitating Zimbabwe's investment climate.  It 
recognized the centrality of rationalizing land reform and 
intended to work out a compensation plan for dispossessed 
white farmers and possibly to adjust land distribution to 
enhance agricultural productivity.  International assistance 
would be critical in providing adequate compensation and 
developing a land use model that would gain investor 
confidence. 
 
11. (C) Mbalekwa added that for the time being, the group's 
long term objectives would only be props in its top priority: 
engineering the end of Mugabe's presidency.  Until there was 
a change in leadership, conditions would continue to 
deteriorate and fuel rhetoric to drive change.  An early task 
would be to engineer popular opposition to constitutional 
amendments designed to prolong or perpetuate the ruling 
clique's control of the presidency. 
 
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Obstacles 
--------- 
 
12.  (C) Mbalekwa said that the ruling party's patronage 
system was the group's biggest obstacle.  Key potential 
supporters in the ruling party were reticent to overtly join 
or support the group for fear that they would lose their farm 
and other perks of party favor.  The nation's economic 
implosion fueled resentment but rendered everybody more 
vulnerable.  He noted, for example, that Daniel Shumba, the 
ex-provincial chair of Masvingo and telecom magnate, was a 
pivotal player in the group but would have to avoid public 
association as long as he had key telecom license 
applications pending.  Others would be similarly timid, 
possibly undercutting perceptions of how wide the group's 
support and influence actually were. 
 
13.  (C) Financial resources and economic straits common to 
the entire populace were another handicap, Mbalekwa added. 
Petrol shortages, for example, would limit face-to-face 
interactions between players and with potentially key 
constituencies.  (Note: During the lunch, Mbalekwa took a 
returned phone call from "Jonathan" in which he pleaded that 
he was "on empty" and needed to access at least "two 
barrels".  End note.)  Myriad symptoms of the economic crisis 
absorbed everybody's attention, diverting their time and 
resources from political activities. 
 
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Whither the MDC? 
---------------- 
 
14.  (C) Mbalekwa credited the MDC with key improvements to 
the political environment that the group intended to exploit. 
 Thanks to the MDC's "forcing" the GOZ to accept SADC 
election principles in the regime's bid for international 
acceptance, public assembly was less restricted, the media 
was more accessible, and political violence was considerably 
reduced.  However, his group would be in a much better 
position than the MDC to exploit such openings because, 
unlike the MDC, most of the principals had deep roots in 
rural communities and enjoyed the confidence of chiefs, 
headmen, district administrators and other local 
opinion-makers.  Rural populations wanted change, he 
concluded, but would be more inclined to back a third force 
made up of trusted, familiar faces than the MDC, which was 
too unfamiliar or "foreign-aligned" to many rural audiences. 
 
15.  (C) According to Mbalekwa, the group was not interested 
in allying or merging with the MDC but was collaborating with 
unnamed selected members, who Mbalekwa expected would join 
them when the time came.  Among those were key Ndebele.  In 
this regard, he feared that South African President Mbeki was 
trying to foster an alliance between MDC Secretary-General 
Welshman Ncube and Politburo member Dumiso Dabengwa.  As an 
aside, Mbalekwa reported that MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai 
had recently sought a private meeting with Mnangagwa but 
Mnangagwa had demurred. 
 
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Mbalekwa's Resignation 
---------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Mbalekwa maintained that his resignation from 
ZANU-PF last month had been undertaken entirely on his own 
initiative.  He feared that prior discussion would have 
resulted in concerted party pressure to prevent his 
resignation.  He said he intended the "unprecedented" 
resignation to inspire others to leave the party, especially 
Mnangagwa.  He said the response augured well; many inside 
ZANU-PF had been supportive and were following his situation 
closely.  The GOZ already had acted swiftly in response to 
his resignation, seizing equipment from his farm.  Even then, 
the personnel who supervised the seizure were apologetic and 
supportive personally - indicative of popular sentiment 
behind his move, he argued.  The ex-senior CIO official said 
he had not been physically threatened but, as he had sold all 
of his principal assets (e.g., Harare nightclubs) to support 
his farm new near Gweru, he was economically vulnerable. 
 
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Comment 
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17. (C) The continued failures of the ZANU-PF government, 
especially its mismanagement of the economy, and a 
self-absorbed MDC,s inability to capitalize politically, 
have clearly opened the door for a "third force" in 
Zimbabwean politics.  What shape that third force takes is an 
open question.  While others, especially in civil society, 
likely have a very different conception, Mbalekwa clearly 
sees such a force as a vehicle for Mnangagwa, especially if 
the latter ultimately loses the succession struggle within 
ZANU-PF.  Mbalekwa may think that has already happened; 
Mnangagwa clearly doesn,t. 
 
18. (C) If a third force does begin to emerge from within 
ZANU-PF, the ruling Zezuru clique of Mugabe and the Mujurus 
can be expected to use every means available to suppress it, 
including the sort of financial punishment meted out to 
Mbalekwa ) and to Moyo before him.  However, given the 
continued decline of the economy, it is no longer at all 
clear that the ZANU-PF patronage system has enough resources 
at its disposal to enforce discipline, leaving only one other 
sure option ) repression.  We are frankly encouraged that 
despite the risks some here, albeit few in number so far, 
seem finally willing to stand up to the regime. 
SCHULTZ 
 
 
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