US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA6682

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 
TAGS: KJUS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: VP SANTOS SEEKS ADVICE ON EXPLAINING JUSTICE AND 
PEACE LAW TO PUBLIC 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: On July 13, Vice President Francisco Santos 
sought Ambassador's advice on how to gain support for the 
Justice and Peace Law while not jeopardizing final AUC 
demobilizations.  The Ambassador urged the GOC to show its 
seriousness, firmness, and procedural organization 
immediately.  He made several suggestions: (1) publicize a 
coherent, concise description of the law; (2) decide and then 
describe in detail implementation procedures, on an 
accelerated basis; (3) demonstrate firmness by punishing a 
notorious AUC criminal such as Don Berna or closing down the 
concentration zone at Santa Fe de Ralito and jailing AUC 
commanders; and (4) name a politically influential High 
Commissioner for Demobilization to implement the process 
objectively.  Santos said he would raise the issues with the 
President, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, Peace 
Commissioner, and others.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Vice President Santos requested a meeting with the 
Ambassador to discuss the Justice and Peace Law's 
implementation.  He sought the Ambassador's advice about how 
to address local and international doubt about the law while 
not jeopardizing the AUC peace process.  He reiterated the 
message President Uribe gave in Spain inviting the 
international community to monitor the law's implementation, 
but noted Peace Commissioner Restrepo's concerns that 
applying the tougher aspects of the law too soon would lead 
the remaining AUC blocs to abandon the process (septel). 
Santos emphasized that the government would not let 
paramilitaries guilty of major crimes go free, but that its 
first priority was to disarm and identify them and then apply 
justice. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador underscored that the GOC had to 
immediately demonstrate it was serious about the process, 
firm, and organized.  He suggested several options: 
 
-- Publicize a coherent, concise explanation of the law 
addressing international misgivings. 
 
-- Decide and explain in detail the implementation procedures 
of demobilization on an accelerated basis. 
 
-- Clearly demonstrate GOC firmness and commitment to justice 
by making an example of a notorious AUC criminal.  Ideally, 
this would be senior AUC commander Don Berna because he was 
in clear violation of the cease-fire when he murdered a local 
government official in May and had committed countless crimes 
prior to joining the AUC.  The Ambassador noted that the 
public believed, albeit mistakenly, Don Berna was in a 
luxurious confinement area and would not be punished for his 
crimes. 
 
-- Another option to demonstrate government control would be 
to close Ralito and put AUC commanders and others with 
existing criminal charges in jail and begin processing them 
under the Justice and Peace Law. 
 
-- Appoint a politically popular and recognizable person, not 
identified with the government, to manage demobilization and 
reinsertion objectively and neutrally, leaving Restrepo to 
the political task of negotiating. 
 
4. (C) Santos agreed to discuss the Ambassador's suggestions 
with President Uribe, the Minister of Interior and Justice, 
and the Peace Commissioner immediately.  Santos travels to 
Washington on July 17 with Foreign Minister Barco to explain 
the law.  The Vice President also plans to go to Santa Fe de 
Ralito to tell AUC leadership its obligations under the law. 
 
WOOD