US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA6678

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 006678 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015 
TAGS: KJUS, PTER, SNAR, PHUM, PREL, CO, AUC, Demobilization 
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPTIMISTIC ON AUC DEMOBILIZATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told the 
Ambassador on July 11 that dismantlement, security, and 
justice were key to the peace process's success.  He said his 
responsibility was to deliver AUC members, disarmed and 
identified, to the justice system and that the Peace and 
Justice Law would ensure justice.  Restrepo was optimistic 
for the first time ever that even the most militant AUC 
commanders were serious about demobilizing and that the 
entire AUC structure would be demobilized by the end 2005. 
He acknowledged that the GOC was on the defensive in selling 
the Law for Peace and Justice.  He expressed concern that 
implementing the justice provisions of the law before the 
remaining AUC blocs were fully identified, disarmed, and 
demobilized could jeopardize the peace process, but 
emphasized that he would not impede justice in any way.  The 
Ambassador warned Restrepo that the GOC could not afford to 
wait any longer to demonstrate its control over the AUC and 
capacity to implement justice.  Restrepo agreed to review 
U.S. concerns with President Uribe.  He said the GOC needed 
an estimated 262 billion pesos (USD 114 million) to increase 
police presence in former paramilitary-dominated areas and 
hoped the U.S. could provide assistance, in particular for a 
counternarcotics component.  End summary. 
 
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Ordinary Justice Takes Precedent 
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2. (C) On July 11, Peace Commissioner Restrepo acknowledged 
to the Ambassador that the GOC was on the defensive in 
selling the Law for Justice and Peace.  But he stressed that 
the law clearly stated that the ordinary justice system takes 
precedent and that the Justice and Peace Law was only the 
exception under certain conditions.  It only applied to 
crimes an ex-terrorist admitted, and only if he fully 
demobilized, cooperated with authorities, and turned over all 
illicit assets.  In the case of crimes not admitted, the case 
must be heard by to ordinary justice.  Benefits were only 
possible if the court decreed that the omission was 
unintentional and the ex-terrorist accepted guilt.  Even so, 
he would still receive a longer alternative sentence. 
Restrepo also noted that there was nothing in the law to 
prevent investigations on new evidence after the ex-terrorist 
had already begun serving his alternative sentence, or at any 
time thereafter.  He expected victims to come forward once 
AUC commanders were in jail because they would no longer fear 
reprisal.  The Ambassador urged Restrepo to explain this to 
the public. 
 
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Restrepo: The End is in Sight 
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3. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador that he was confident -- 
for the first time ever -- that the AUC would demobilize its 
remaining blocs and criminal structures by the end of 2005. 
He said his responsibility was to deliver the entire AUC, 
fully identified and demobilized, to justice.  After 
sustained pressure from Restrepo, the Central Bolivar Bloc 
(BCB) commanders and other hard-liners Ramon Isaza and "Jorge 
40" had pledged to demobilize their blocs in two public 
communiques.  Once demobilized, these units, combined with 
senior AUC commander Don Berna,s last two blocs, would mark 
the end of the AUC. 
 
4. (C) Restrepo explained that he had taken advantage of AUC 
confusion over the Law for Justice and Peace and internal 
leadership divisions to secure the commanders' commitment to 
demobilize completely.  AUC leadership and their lawyers 
believed speculation from NGOs and opposition groups that the 
law would allow for impunity.  Restrepo was rushing to 
demobilize the rest of the AUC before they realized that the 
law would make them confess, put them in jail, and take away 
all their illicit assets.  Once the commanders had 
demobilized their troops and were under government control, 
they would have little choice but to submit to authorities. 
 
5. (C) Restrepo expressed concern that implementing tougher 
aspects of the law before the remaining active paramilitary 
commanders and their blocs demobilized could make them 
abandon the process.  He said he needed until the end of the 
year to dismantle the rest of the AUC.  Nevertheless, 
Restrepo emphasized that he would not impede or try to 
influence the Colombian justice system in any way. 
 
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Ambassador: Demonstrate Justice 
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6. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that Restrepo was in a 
difficult position, but warned that the GOC had to 
immediately demonstrate it would hold AUC members accountable 
for their crimes, implement the law, and control the peace 
process.  In the face of accusations of impunity and being 
soft on paramilitaries, the GOC could not afford to wait 
until the rest of the demobilizations were complete.  The 
Ambassador suggested several options:  (1) development of a 
clear, publicly available procedure, with institutional 
responsibilities, for each step of identification, 
demobilization, renunciation, initial interview, separation 
into "non-serious cases under law 782" and "serious cases 
under the Peace and Justice law," investigation, 
incarceration, judgment, and punishment, (2) acceleration of 
judicial processing of the blocs already demobilizing and 
about to demobilize, (3) issuance of an ultimatum with a date 
certain for closure of Santa Fe de Ralito to force a decision 
to demobilize or not on the paramilitary leaders, and/or (4) 
enforcement of punishment and extradition of a few 
"demonstration cases," including Don Berna, who had violated 
the cease-fire in addition to his other crimes. 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the GOC needed to 
prevent AUC commanders and any other known serious criminals 
from going free.  These individuals needed to be put in 
confinement and processing begun under the Justice and Peace 
Law.  Otherwise, critics would jump at the opportunity to 
"prove" the GOC was allowing impunity.  The Ambassador noted 
he was not asking the government to identify every 
paramilitary guilty of a major crime immediately upon 
demobilization.  He recognized that the Prosecutor General's 
Office (Fiscalia) would need time to interrogate and 
investigate demobilized paramilitaries who did not already 
face charges, in order to determine if they needed to be 
processed under the Justice and Peace Law or could be 
pardoned under Law 782. 
 
8. (C) Restrepo agreed the GOC's three top priorities for the 
peace process were dismantlement, justice, and security.  He 
said he would review the issue from the U.S. point of view 
with President Uribe and seek a solution. 
 
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Security in AUC Territory 
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9. (C) Restrepo was concerned that guerrilla groups and 
narcotraffickers would move into former AUC territory.  As a 
result, his office, with input from the Ministry of Interior 
and Justice, Defense Ministry, and others, had developed a 
security plan that calls for the creation of police force of 
10,000 and strengthened state presence.  The police force 
would have 8,000 troops specialized in intelligence, 
investigation, judicial issues, counterguerrilla operations, 
and community outreach and 2,000 specialized in 
counternarcotics and asset forfeiture.  Restrepo estimated 
the GOC would need approximately 262 billion pesos (USD 114 
million) in funding.  Part of this could come from a "peace 
tax."  Restrepo expressed hope that the U.S. would be able to 
provide assistance, especially for counternarcotics.  The 
Ambassador offered to back the idea of a peace tax, but 
warned that additional funding, especially in the face of 
skepticism about the Justice and Peace Law, would be 
difficult. 
WOOD