US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2980

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

KURDISTAN PRESIDENT FORGING CONSENSUS AMONG SUNNIS; SAYS FEDERALISM MUST "JUSTLY DISTRIBUTE WEALTH AND POWER"

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2980
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2980 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-18 12:18:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM PTER KDEM IZ Kuristan Regional Government Sunni Arab
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, KDEM, IZ, Kuristan Regional Government, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: KURDISTAN PRESIDENT FORGING CONSENSUS AMONG 
SUNNIS; SAYS FEDERALISM MUST "JUSTLY DISTRIBUTE WEALTH AND 
POWER" 
 
REF: BAGHADAD 2780 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Kurdistan-Iraq President Massoud Barzani 
told Charge on July 14 that his regional government had 
scored recent successes against insurgents in the north, but 
felt that overall Iraqi security had witnessed only moderate 
improvement over the past year.  He said he was working to 
produce a unified Sunni leadership, but noted some elements 
of the community were working at cross-purposes with the 
Kurds.  Barzani's closest politburo confidante, Fadil Mirani, 
sketched out Kurdish desires for "historic geographic" 
federalism, and Barzani noted the Kurds and Shia would share 
oil income with the Sunnis.  Charge and NSC Senior Director 
for Iraq stressed the importance of TAL provisos that natural 
resources remain under the control of a central government in 
Baghdad.  Barzani and Mirani expected progress to unify the 
two Kurdish administrations soon; Mirani said some Kurds were 
opposing holding new regional elections in December.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Charge and visiting NSC Senior Director for Iraq 
Meagan O'Sullivan called on Kurdistan-Iraq President Massoud 
Barzani in Salah ad Din on July 14, and thanked him for the 
critical role the Kurds continue to play in forging a new era 
of peace in Iraq.  (PolCouns, RC Kirkuk, and MNFI-I director 
for policy also attended the meeting.)  O'Sullivan said there 
were many challenges still facing Iraq, we would continue to 
look to the Kurds and Barzani in particular to help achieve 
positive outcomes.  Barzani said he was committed to 
achieving a federal, pluralistic, democratic Iraq. 
O'Sullivan asked Barzani to help keep pressure on the 
political process to ensure compliance with the timeline for 
the constitution, referendum, and elections outlined in the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).  She noted that the 
constitution need not address every difficult politiQl issue 
and that some - such as the final status of Kirkuk - may best 
be dealt with outside the constitution and through the 
implementation of Article 58 in the TAL.  Barzani said he 
would do what he could to ensure the timelines were met and 
stated that he would not support any proposal that would 
jeopardize the deadlines.  He noted that the resolution of 
Kirkuk would take time and patience. 
 
Ansar al-Sunna Cell Defeated in Irbil 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Barzani said that security in Kurdistan was 
relatively good.  He and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
Politiburo Executive Director Fadil Mirani (whom charge met 
separately on July 14) both noted the KRG's recent success in 
arresting a major cell of Ansar al-Sunna that was planning 
operations in the north.  Over 200 people had been arrested, 
many with links to jihadist efforts in Afghanistan. 
 
Promoting New Sunni Leadership? 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Overall in Iraq, Barzani felt that security was not 
optimal, although there were some improvements since last 
year.  He said different groups of insurgents needed 
different solutions.  Some would only be eliminated through a 
tough response, others could be brought in through economic 
or social levers. 
 
5.  (C)  He said he was planning to convene Sunni Arab 
leaders with the idea of getting them to agree on new 
leadership.  He felt there was some chance the effort would 
succeed, as it included members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, 
National Dialog Council, the Muslim Scholars Association, the 
Fatwa Association, and the Sunni Waqf, as well as tribes and 
other leaders. (Comment:  Our sense is that such a group of 
Sunni Arabs would never allow Barzani much say in who their 
leadership would be.  End Comment.) 
 
Kurds Want Historic Geographic Federalism . . . 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (C)  Barzani said it had been good to include Sunni Arabs 
in the constitutional process, but there were still some who 
were unwilling to acccept the concept of power sharing.  He 
said these elements might blackmail the Kurds; if that 
happened, the Kurds would work to marginalize them.  Barzani 
said this was a very sensitive period, "either we stay 
together or we separate," but noted that separation would not 
be in anyone's interests.  He said that the Kurds were 
working to explain their view of federalism to the Sunni 
Arabs, one that would be based on the "just distribution of 
wealth and power."  Mirani noted that the Kurds had agreed 
that federalism would be a "historic geographic" federalism, 
not based on administratively determined borders at the 
provincial level.  (Comment:  As we noted in ref, this stance 
on "geographic" federalism could be very problematic in terms 
of securing Sunni Arab agreement.  End Comment.) 
 
 
. . . and Agree to "Share Oil" with the Sunnis 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7.  (C)  Barzani said that some Sunnis were apprehensive that 
oil income would be in the hands of Shia and Kurds.  He noted 
that "we must give them their share of oil revenues of 
Kurdistan and the south." 
 
8.  (C)  NSC Senior Director noted that the U.S. strongly 
supported TAL provisions leaving the income from natural 
resources in the hands of the central government.  This had 
reassured groups in regions that were resource-poor.  Such a 
system was also entirely consistent with the concept of 
federalism.  Charge agreed about the importance of central 
government control of resources.  He noted that the 
international community only permits sovereign entities to 
market their natural resources such as oil.  Furthermore, any 
other formula would frighten Sunnis who would feel they could 
be frozen out of any revenue stream.  The TAL formula removes 
their fear and thus keeps them engaged in the national 
political process, a critical priority for Iraq's stability. 
 
 
Kurdish Unification 
------------------- 
 
9. (C)  Barzani and Mirani both noted progress on unifying 
the Kurdish administrations of Irbil and Sulimaniya.  Mirani 
felt there might be an agreement on the cabinet before the 
end of July.  Barzani said he was working to diminish the 
role of political parties in government. 
 
Election Preparations 
--------------------- 
 
10.  (C)  Barzani told charge that he currently favored a 
province-based electoral district.  PUK and KDP politburos 
were currently discussing this issue; some in each party 
favored the retention of a single national electoral 
district.  He did not know what the final Kurdish position 
would be, but indicated that he would support movement to a 
provincial system.  Barzani felt it unlikely that new parties 
would emerge before December elections, they would not be 
able to establish credibility with the electorate.  New 
parties would likely emerge after that, he predicted. 
 
11.  (C)  Mirani said that Kurds were currently debating the 
wisdom of conducting elections again in December.  Many felt 
that the regional government should just be able to keep the 
same four year term of past assemblies, rather than adhere to 
the "transitional" concept that the TAL envisioned for the 
provincial and national governments. 
 
 
12. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO KIRKUK, REO MOSUL 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04