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| Identifier: | 05DHAKA3408 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05DHAKA3408 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Dhaka |
| Created: | 2005-07-18 10:52:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV BG BGD Elections |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 003408 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BG, BGD Elections SUBJECT: OPPOSITION UPS THE STAKES WITH AGGRESSIVE REFORM ULTIMATUM Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Awami League's 31-point electoral "reform" program proposes major changes to the caretaker government system, the Election Commission, and general election procedures and qualifications. The BNP criticized the proposals as unnecessary and divisive, and suggested the AL take to parliament its case for legal and constitutional changes. The AL responded that it would only end its parliamentary boycott if passage of the proposals was guaranteed. Demanding consensus on caretaker regime appointments and banning war criminals from elections appears geared more to solidifying opposition ranks and ratcheting up political pressure than promoting a serious reform agenda. The BDG might compromise on enhanced Election Commission capabilities, but Hasina, by making core demands she knows the BNP cannot accept, is laying the groundwork for an election boycott and, it seems, a campaign to replicate the 1996 protests that led to the de-masting the first BNP government. End Summary. 2. (SBU) On July 15, the Awami League (AL) and its 11-party coalition announced a 31-point "reform" package addressing the formation and powers of the caretaker government and the Election Commission (EC). In presenting the package, Dr. Kamal Hossain, president of the Gono Forum and an eminent constitutional lawyer recently reconciled with the AL, declared that implementation of the proposals would "bring genuine people's representation in parliament and help it get rid of the clutches of black money and muscle power." AL president Sheikh Hasina and the leaders of several of the AL's leftist partners were also present. Hasina said reforms are an essential remedy for the politicization of the caretaker government system by the BNP. 3. (SBU) Key caretaker system changes include: -- Requiring the President, as the Head of State, to consult and achieve consensus with all political parties in selecting the leader and advisers of the caretaker government; -- Prohibiting the appointment of any advisor ever affiliated with any political party (Note: This targets the Chief Adviser presumptive for the next election, who once was international relations secretary for the BNP); -- Putting the defense ministry (i.e., the armed forces) under the caretaker government instead of the president; and -- Limiting the authority of the caretaker government to non-policy actions and assisting the Election Commission with holding general elections. 4. (SBU) Key EC changes include: -- Appointing the chief election commissioner and other election commissioners in consultation with political parties, with majority rule deciding any differences (Note: consultation, not consensus). -- Creating a politically and financially independent secretariat with sufficient manpower to provide coverage down SIPDIS to the local level; and -- Granting the Election Commission control over the appointment of presiding and returning officers and the authority to discipline them as needed. -- Granting the Commission the power to schedule and postpone elections and to set time limits for the resolution of any election related litigation. 5. (SBU) Key electoral procedural changes include: -- Campaign spending limits, financial disclosure requirements, and equal access to radio and television airtime; -- Prohibitions against physical intimidation and religious and fundamentalist campaigns; -- Procedural transparency, including prior public listing of presiding and polling officers; -- Increasing the number of and providing for direct election of women's reserved seats; and -- Stricter eligibility requirements to disqualify candidates in default on a loan, in possession of illegally obtained funds, who obtain their nomination through bribery, or who opposed the Liberation War and were war criminals. 6. (SBU) BNP Secretary General Abdul Mannan Bhuyian criticized the reforms at a press conference, saying they are unnecessary, divisive, and aim to hinder the electoral process. They are also, he said, illogical since with so many political parties it would be impossible to achieve consensus on any political matter. Nevertheless, he asserted the BNP is open to dialogue, and suggested parliament as the proper forum for pursuing reforms. 7. (C) On July 17, Jamaat Islami Assistant Secretary General Abdul Quader Molla told poloff that the banning of candidates who opposed the 1971 Liberation War is not a barrier to his party members because "we were not opposed to the Liberation War, we thought we could better solve the situation without civil war." When asked about the proposal banning "religious based politics" and barring the use of religion in vote seeking, Molla said, "It's against international human rights" to prevent someone from talking about their religion. Echoing Bhuyian, Molla said that "parliament is the main place to reform any system" and that the Awami League's proposals are "not for the benefit of the common people." 8. (C) Awami League Parliament Whip Muhumad Faruk Khan told poloff that the AL would continue to pressure the government, threatening increased popular "movements" if they do not accept the proposals. When asked about the BNP's stance that the reforms should be discussed in parliament, Khan said that they plan to have initial discussions outside parliament and return there once the BNP agrees to accept the proposals. He maintained that the AL is already discussing these proposals at the standing committee level but can't discuss them in general sessions because "when we go to parliament, they don't allow us to speak." 9. (C) PMO Principal Secretary Kamaluddin Siddiqui characterized the post-package political climate to CDA as a "gathering storm" over the "stiffening" positions of both the AL and the BNP. The BNP, he said, is open to dialogue and possible compromise on minor points such as enhanced capabilities for the EC, but the idea of consensus on an important matter like caretaker adviser appointments in a land of hundreds of political parties is "stupid." He urged the USG, in partnership with the UK, to mediate the AL-BNP gulf and promote free and fair elections as it did sensitively and successfully in the last general election. 10. (C) Comment: When we asked the AL two months ago if its pending proposal would allow minor parties to veto consensus decisions for caretaker regime appointments, we were told that perhaps the proposal could be limited to parties in parliament. The AL, however, has apparently subordinated practicality to solidifying opposition ranks and setting the bar high enough for the BNP to ensure continued political stalemate. Banning religion-based politics would require a constitutional amendment, is opposed by every parliamentary party except the AL, and is another apparent sop to the AL's leftist allies; Hasina, ironically, several days ago urged Islamic scholars to help un-seat the BNP-JI government. The "war criminals" exclusion clearly targets JI leaders, including its two serving ministers, whom the AL has repeatedly denounced as war criminals. While the BNP might accept EC reforms, it cannot accept the core demands related to the caretaker system or that would effectively rob it, on nebulous extra-judicial grounds, of its key coalition partner. 11. (C) The AL is laying the groundwork for an election boycott and a challenge to the legitimacy of a re-elected BNP. More ominously and more immediately, however, Hasina may be trying to foment a confrontational climate to replicate the popular protests in 1996 that ended up de-masting the first BNP government. Confrontation seems like a risky strategy for a party that has failed to find an issue to rally popular support, especially since the AL today, unlike 1996, does not have JI or Ershad's Jatiya party as partners. The BNP's retort that the AL should pursue its agenda in parliament seems hard to challenge, while the AL's refusal to end its boycott without preemptive BNP capitulation leaves it sounding increasingly strident and undemocratic. CHAMMAS
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