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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD2972 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD2972 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-07-17 12:19:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | PREL PTER PINS ETRD IZ Iran Detainees |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002972 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2025 TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, ETRD, IZ, Iran, Detainees SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PREVIEWS IRAN TRIP, PLEDGES MOVEMENT ON DETAINEES Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Prime Minister Jafari told us July 15 that his main message in Iran would be to urge that they tighten controls over the common border while he also warned them away from interference in Iraqi internal affairs. He said he would also raise bilateral agreements on supply of essential services to Iraq, such as electricity and water, and also raise the return of Iraqi aircraft impounded in Iran. Jafari welcomed word of better coordination on intelligence issues with the Coalition, but he cautioned that he would be the ultimate decision-maker on the Iraqi side. He indicated he might let Iraqi National Intelligence director Shahwani go for political expediency. Jafari also pledged to work more closely with us to prepare the transfer of detainees from Coalition control to Iraqi control and named a lead on the Iraqi side. End Summary. ---------------------------- Iran Trip: Borders and More ---------------------------- 2. (S/NF) Prime Minister Jafari told Charge and MNF-I CG Casey over dinner July 14 that he would take a large delegation to Iran for a three-day visit starting July 15. The most important issue he would raise, he said, would be the need for Iran to control its border more tightly. Unlike Syria, he didn't think that the Iranians were intentionally facilitating anti-Iraqi forces' entry into Iraq. They had to do more however. Casey and the Charge cautioned that the Iranian Government might be consciously helping AIF elements in Iraq, and they promised more detailed information before the PM's departure. (MNF-I did deliver the information before the Prime Minister departure.) Jafari stressed that there are two "red-lines" that he will highlight to the authorities in Tehran. First, they must control the borders and stop infiltration. In addition, they must not try to interfere in Iraqi internal politics. The Prime Minister observed that he would have to deliver this message across a range of the Iranian leadership to be sure that everyone in what he called a divided Iranian government understands. 3. (C) Jafari added that he would take a long list of Iraqi requests, including agreements on essential services such as electricity and water. Jafari said he would also seek the return of Iraqi military and civilian aircraft that have long been held in Iran. (Jafari also mentioned in passing that the two sides would discuss an oil agreement.) The Prime Minister doubted he would get everything on his list, but raising the issues might start the Iranians working on positive responses later. Charge told the Prime Minister that we understand Iraq's need to have good relations with its neighbors, but urged him to be careful to secure agreements with the Iranians that were clearly in Iraq's interest - not just Iran's. Jafari agreed. ------------------------------------- Jafari Sensitive on Intel Authorities ------------------------------------- 4. (S/NF) The Prime Minister welcomed word from General Casey that the National Intelligence Committee had met for the first time on July 14 with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, National Security Advisor Rubai'e and MNF-I representatives. The Prime Minister launched into a lengthy discussion about the Iraqi side needing to coordinate with MNF-I but he was adamant that their authority to coordinate did not give them the authority to make important decisions. They would need to come to him for that, he emphasized. Jafari also emphasized that the relationship between the intelligence services and the Prime Ministry was a sensitive one; he was fielding questions from parliamentarians about it. He indicated that while he had nothing against Iraqi National Intelligence Service director Shahwani, he probably would have to let him go given concerns about him in the National Assembly. --------------------------------- Detainees - Jafari Agrees to Move --------------------------------- 6. (C) The Charge and General Casey urged the Prime Minister to appoint Iraqi officials with whom we could start planning the transfer of detainees from Coalition to Iraqi control. When he understood the issue, Jafari readily agreed. The government is under pressure to release innocent detainees but also under pressure to sternly punish those guilty of terrorist acts. The government would operate under the premise that the greater the crime, the greater the punishment. He said would have Interior Ministry Undersecretary Adnan Assadi to be the lead Iraqi contact. He would be charged with collecting the details and ensuring coordinating between the Iraqi Interior and Justice ministries and the Coalition. Jafari stressed that Assadi had his "total confidence." --------------------------------- Israel Boycott and Iraqi Politics --------------------------------- 7. (C) Charge also raised Pepsi-Cola's problem registering its trademark in Baghdad because Trade Ministry officials were imposing old Israel boycott laws against the company. Charge underlined that the CPA abolished those laws. Trade Minister Abdel Basset wants approval from the Prime Minister to issue a ministerial circular reminding the staff that the boycott laws are no longer in effect. Charge urged the PM to give the Minister that approval. 8. (C) Jafari was reluctant because it would carry heavy political risks. He pointed to the political gamemanship in the National Assembly and said his intervening could make him an easier target in an emotional debate. He opined that the Trade Minister could issue the circular without seeking permission from the Prime Ministry. "He does that everyday," Jafari quipped. Jafari told Charge to go back to the Trade Minister and get him to issue the circular. 9. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Satterfield
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