US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2959

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002959 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PBTS, PGOV, PINS, MOPS, MARR, IZ, SY, IR, Security 
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINISTER OF DEFENSE AGREES TO UNDERTAKE 
OUTREACH TO TRIBES IN RAMADI, BRIEFED ON COMING OPERATIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(a), (b), and (d) 
 
 1. (S)  SUMMARY:  In order to support upcoming military 
operations in western Iraq, Minister of Defense Dulaymi 
agreed to help obtain consent and cooperation from local 
tribes in the region, especially ar-Ramadi. He will prepare a 
meeting in ar-Ramadi, with MNF-I Commander George Casey 
accompanying, inviting 40-50 tribal notables to garner their 
support for the ITG and the coalition.  Dulaymi also 
recommended trying to work with four specific hard-line 
rejectionists, who could be very helpful if convinced to 
support the government's efforts.  The son of one of them, he 
asserted, headed a group responsible for recent diplomatic 
kidnappings. He will also help in efforts to obtain support 
from tribal leaders along the border near al-Qaim in 
preparation to return the border area to Iraq government 
control. Casey recommended additional Iraqi measures to 
secure the border, including urging Syrian cooperation. 
Dulaymi said Talabani would be traveling to Syria within 10 
days at the SARG's invitation.  The ITG is also preparing a 
way ahead for "rescuing" Tall Afar from terrorists.  As a 
first step, a delegation including TNA members will travel to 
Tall Afar to prepare recommendations to the ITG. Regarding 
Prime Minister Jaafari's upcoming visit to Iran, Min Def 
asserted that Jaafari intended to spend 7-10 days, including 
travel around the country. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S)  MNF-I Commander Casey met with MinDef Saadun Dulaymi 
July 13 to brief the minister on upcoming operations in 
Western Iraq and to solicit his assistance in engaging key 
leaders in the province to support the operations. Casey has 
accompanied by PolMil Counselor Litt, MG Rick Lynch, and IRMO 
MOD advisor John Noble.  Joining Dulaymi was BG Hatem Majil. 
Casey reviewed in broad terms the upcoming operations in the 
northern Tall Afar region, central al-Qaim/al Rawa area, and 
Ramadi/Fallujah. He stated that our objective is to restore 
Iraqi control over the border with Syria in those areas by 
November. 
 
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SITUATION IN TALL AFAR 
---------------------- 
 
3. (S)  With respect to Tall Afar, Casey recalled Prime 
Minister Jaafari's request to him for a status report on that 
area, and a determination whether it is necessary to "rescue" 
Tall Afar. Dulaymi retorted that Jaafari was responding to 
TNA pressure regarding the situation in Tall Afar, especially 
from the four TNA representatives from that area. The Min Def 
stated that Jaafari told the TNA that the ITG would "rescue" 
Tall Afar within three weeks, and make it a safe place. The 
government intends to send a delegation including the TNA 
reps to Tall Afar, and to report practical steps that might 
be taken to restore order and control by legitimate 
authorities. 
 
4. (S)  General Casey cautioned that damage in the city could 
be significant if force is required since the targets - 
especially foreign terrorists - are hiding in the city. Casey 
said the delegation's role is important since the ITG should 
demonstrate that all political means will have been exhausted 
before resorting to force. Besides, the delegation could be a 
valuable link to government activities and eventual military 
operations. 
 
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AL-QAIM AND AR-RAMADI 
--------------------- 
 
5. (S)  Regarding the al Qaim region, Casey described the 
objective of the operation to push westward from al-Rawa and 
eventually to have Iraqi security forces reoccupy the borders 
around Qaim.  With the additional construction of fortified 
outposts, the border in that region could be under Iraqi 
control by November.  Casey sought the MOD's assistance with 
local tribal leaders in support of these operations, and 
provided our assessment of which tribes might be cooperative. 
Dulaymi agreed to help, and commented that he had just met 
the shaykh of one of the tribes noted in our assessment, who 
was committed to supporting the government. The shaykh 
reportedly gave Dulaymi significant intelligence information, 
which MOD will convey to us as well. 
 
6. (S)  Casey added that it is essential that the Iraqi 
government consider other steps to help secure the border, 
for example, creating a "weapons-free" zone, imposing a 
strict curfew, and pressing the SARG regarding border 
security.  Dulaymi noted that Talabani would be traveling to 
Damascus within 10 days at Asad's invitation, and with the 
SARG's assertions that it is committed to close cooperation 
on these issues. 
 
7. (S)  Ramadi, Casey observed, requires a political 
approach. He mentioned 2 MarDiv Commander MG Huck's 
discussions with intermediaries in Ramadi that apparently are 
bearing fruit.  For example, the intermediaries seem to have 
delivered on their commitments to reduce substantially the 
emplacement of IEDs in specified areas over a period of a 
week.  This has led to a second meeting that will take place 
in a few days. Casey would now like to prepare the next level 
of engagement by following up on Dulaymi's suggestion to 
visit Ramadi and meet with leaders. 
 
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OUTREACH TO TRIBES 
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8. (S)  Dulaymi said he would like to travel together with 
Casey for such an effort. He recommended bringing together 
some 40-50 tribal leaders, to listen to what they require 
participate in the political process. If they were to argue 
for the withdrawal of coalition forces, he said, he would 
counter that they themselves would then have to assume 
responsibility to calm the city and have their sons join the 
government's security forces.  Otherwise, the departure of 
the coalition would leave a dangerous vacuum.  He observed 
that some 37 groups operate in Ramadi, most of them criminal 
organizations flaunting Islamic or political slogans, and all 
claiming to be leaders.  In fact, he said, none lead more 
than 5 percent or so of the population - and Zarqawi is 
trying to move into the real leadership vacuum. Dulaymi said 
that securing the border around al Qaim would go a long way 
toward pacifying ar-Ramadi - and vice versa.  Therefore, the 
al Qaim operations should not be delayed. 
 
9. (S)  Dulaymi also indicated that the following leaders of 
four of the 37 groups are worth talking to to bring them to 
collaborate with the Iraqi authorities:  Abd al Latif al 
Humaym, Mohammad Mahmud Latif al-Fahdawi, Mudhir Abd al Karim 
al-Kharbit, and Khalaf 'Ulyan. Perhaps by coincidence, 
'Ulayan was leaving Dulaymi's office when we arrived. Dulaymi 
politely introduced us, and after 'Ulayan's departure, 
Dulaymi explained that 'Ulayan had just informed him that he 
is ready to help the government - but MinDef did not specify 
further. Dulaymi said that 'Ulayan's son (possibly Muhammad 
Khalaf 'Ulyan al Dulaymi) headed a criminal group with 
alleged involvement in the recent kidnapping of the Egyptian 
diplomat, and the attempt on the Bahraini. He did not 
elaborate. Dulaymi also stated that al Humaym and al Kharbit 
were in Syria, after the Jordanian government asked them to 
leave Jordan. 
 
10. (S)  Dulaymi cautioned that while the four leaders named 
above might be very helpful, we should not give them any 
sense that we recognize them as local political leaders. 
Casey strongly concurred, and commented that we had had 
similar offers from Kharbit, but that both Allawi and we 
doubt his influence and ability to deliver on commitments. 
 
11. (S)  Returning to the proposed meeting with tribal 
representatives in Ramadi, Dulaymi said we should not try to 
impose any political leaders on them, but let them identify 
their own. He suggested two incentives to help such a 
gathering succeed:  release some of their sons who are in 
prison (with a guarantor), and open the two bridges whose 
closing he said has caused significant suffering in the city. 
The latter, he opined, would do more good than any economic 
project we could come up with.  These gestures would go a 
long way toward encouraging the tribal representatives to 
cooperate. Dulaymi said the MOD would make the preparations 
necessary for the conclave in Ramadi, including finding a 
safe location. (COMMENT:  MNF-I will not commit to a meeting 
before conditions in the city and arrangements for the 
gathering are secure, and prospects for success reasonably 
high.  END COMMENT) 
 
12. (S)  Casey concluded the discussion by noting that we 
will need to protect those who want to promote reconciliation 
from the terrorists and extremists who are determined to 
prevent it. To Dulaymi's repeated suggestion that local 
shaykhs themselves temporarily provide local, tribal security 
personnel, Casey warned that any protective force must be 
under the umbrella and control of the ITG, not a separate and 
independent militia. 
 
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MORE ON VISITS TO IRAN 
---------------------- 
 
13. (S)  Regarding Dulaymi's recent visit to Tehran, he 
contended, as we have heard before, that his objective was 
only to deliver a simple message that the two countries must 
cooperate as neighbors, especially at the border. He demurred 
when asked whether the Iranians had any particular message 
for him.  He volunteered that MinDef Shamkhani was "shocked" 
(he had previously told Charge that other Iranian leaders 
were similarly astounded) at Ahmedinejad's victory, partly 
blaming "the West" for having closed the window on the 
Khatami government's overtures. Shamkhani reportedly stated 
that Iran could not afford to lose reform as a strategy. 
Dulaymi also said that in his new capacity as head of a 
council on Islamic dialogue, Khatami would be traveling to 
Najaf in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and other Islamic 
countries.  The MinDef said that interfaith dialogue is a 
strength that Khatami could bring to Islam.  Finally, Dulaymi 
asserted that Jaafari intends to spend a week to ten days in 
Iran, traveling around the country (for example to Isfahan), 
in addition to meetings in Tehran. (COMMENT: Ten days would 
be an excessively long time to be away in Iran. Jaafari told 
Charge July 15 he would travel only to Teheran and that the 
trip would be brief.  END COMMENT).  Jaafari could ask 
Dulaymi to join him, but he does not want to go, and hopes 
the work ahead on the Western operations will convince 
Jaafari to leave him in Iraq. 
Satterfield