US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV4405

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004405 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KWBG, PTER, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: IDF DEPUTY COS KAPLINSKY BRIEFS A/S WELCH ON 
LATEST VIOLENCE, IDF-PA SECURITY COORDINATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) Assistant Secretary Welch, Ambassador Kurtzer, Lt Gen 
Ward and NSC Director Mustafa met with MGen Moshe Kaplinsky, 
the IDF Deputy Chief of the General Staff, BGen Yossi 
Kuperwasser, IDI Chief of Production, and BGen Udi Dekel, 
Chief of Strategic Planning Branch, in the evening of July 
14.  The previously planned meeting took place shortly after 
news came in that a Qassam rocket fired into Israel from the 
Gaza Strip had killed an Israeli woman in Nativ Ha Asara. 
 
--------------- 
Recent Violence 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) Reviewing events of the day (July 14), BGen 
Kuperwasser reported that IDF soldiers killed a wanted PIJ 
activist with ties to the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade early that 
morning in the Rafidiya neighborhood of Nablus.  The PIJ 
organization in Gaza reacted by firing a Qassam rocket that 
impacted near the Israeli city of Sderot on Thursday morning, 
causing no casualties.  PIJ cells fired additional rockets 
and mortars at Israeli targets in the Gush Katif settlement 
block.  Hamas was not active during the morning events. 
 
-------------------- 
Hamas Joins the Fray 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) Hamas cells, however, joined the attacks after 1200 
hrs, firing four mortars and/or rockets that impacted Nahal 
Oz (inside the Green Line), lightly injuring three IDF 
soldiers, Kuperwasser explained.  Cells also fired rockets 
and mortars at Israeli targets in and near the Gaza Strip. 
At approximately 1800 hrs, four rockets struck the Netiv Ha 
Asara moshav inside Israel north of Gaza, killing the 
22-year-old Israeli woman and wounding her boyfriend, 
Kuperwasser stated. 
 
4. (S) Hamas involvement in the fighting was likely due to 
two factors, Kuperwasser assessed.  First, Hamas was unhappy 
with how PA President Abbas translated the results of his 
recent meeting with Hamas leader Khalid al Mashal in 
Damascus.  Hamas believed that Abbas had agreed to allow the 
"follow-up committee" composed of representatives from the 
opposition, including Hamas, to participate in operational 
decisions in running the Gaza Strip through disengagement 
prior to the PLC elections.  Abbas, according Kuperwasser, 
may have left Mashal with that impression in Damascus, but 
when Abbas returned home to strong criticism from his own 
party, advised opposition groups that they would only have an 
advisory role in Gaza administration.  Kuperwasser said he 
believes that Hamas displayed its displeasure by "welcoming" 
Abbas' arrival in Gaza on the afternoon of July 14 with the 
attacks on Israeli targets, thus sending a strong message to 
Abbas that it would act in any matter it felt appropriate 
without consulting him.  The attacks placed Abbas under 
enormous pressure.  Kuperwasser also acknowledged that Hamas 
joined the fighting on Thursday afternoon in response to 
continued IDF operations in the northern West Bank. 
 
---------------------------- 
PA-IDF Security Coordination 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (S) MGen Kaplinsky characterized overall security 
coordination with the PA in recent weeks as very good.  He 
stated that there have been three meetings with PA MOI MGen 
Nasir Yusif's deputy, BGen Jamal Abu Zayd ) one that he 
attended, and two attended by MGen "Haki" Harel, the IDF 
chief of Planning Branch.  The meetings have been good, he 
stated, very "sincere," with wide representation from all of 
the PA security organizations.  The two sides agreed to meet 
every 10-14 days at the operational level, with each meeting 
followed up by meetings between field commanders.  Kaplinsky 
said that coordination has been good, with both sides talking 
about specifics on the map.  The two sides, he stated, have 
also agreed to conduct joint exercises (scheduled for early 
August).  Kaplinsky stated that the IDF still intended to 
meet with PA counterparts next week, despite the ongoing 
attacks. 
 
6. (S) Unfortunately, Kaplinsky stated, despite the good 
coordination, no results are apparent on the ground.  This 
led him to conclude that the PA counterparts with whom the 
IDF is coordinating do not have power over forces on the 
ground.  Nasir Yusif's influence on the ground, he stated, is 
poor.  During every meeting with the PA, he said, the IDF 
drives home the point that it will not disengage under fire. 
Disengagement, however, has begun and "we are under fire." 
Kaplinsky gave credit to the PA for its efforts against 
smuggling tunnels.  The PA's inability, however, to arrest 
Hassan Madhun, the Fatah cell leader responsible for numerous 
attacks against the Gaza crossing facilities, underscored its 
overall ineffectiveness.  The IDF, he stated, will continue 
to talk and coordinate with the PA, but it is not happy with 
the level of PA activity on the ground. 
 
7. (S) Ambassador Kurtzer asked Kaplinsky what realistic 
steps he would counsel Nasir Yusif to take if he were Yusif's 
advisor.  Kaplinsky said he would would first advise Yusif to 
take action against PIJ.  PIJ is a small group, without 
popular Palestinian support.  Nasir Yusif has the capability 
to challenge PIJ, even with his divided forces.  He should 
stop them from conducting attacks and arrest them.  Second, 
Kaplinsky continued, the PA leadership should provide support 
to commanders who undertake difficult actions against 
opposition groups on the ground.  It is critical that the PA 
leadership provide moral and verbal support to its commanders 
in the field.  Kaplinsky's third hypothetical suggestion was 
to strengthen the "determination" of PA leaders to ensure 
that orders, once given, are fulfilled.  LT Gen Ward 
concurred, stressing the need to verify that orders have been 
implemented. 
 
8. (S) Welch commended the IDF for its "huge" step forward in 
coordination with the PA, and stressed the importance of 
continuing the coordination.  Ward underscored that the types 
of attacks now occurring come as no surprise, because 
everyone expected opposition elements to attempt to derail 
disengagement.  What matters is not playing into the hands of 
these elements. 
 
9. (S) Welch asked if the PA had contacted the IDF for 
permission to transfer PIJ member Abu Nidal al Saadi from 
Tulkarm to the PA prison in Jericho.  Kaplinsky and 
Kuperwasser said they were not certain whether the PA had 
made such a request, but stated that the IDF normally 
authorized such transfers.  Kuperwasser explained, however, 
that Nasir Yusif's forces did not have control of Saadi.  PA 
Special Forces personnel under Bashir Nafiah were housing him 
and several other PIJ members in his headquarters in Tulkarm, 
to the consternation and protest of the local National 
Security Forces commander. 
 
10. (S) Turning to another PIJ figure from Tulkarm, 
Kuperwasser recounted that PIJ leader Louay al Saadi was 
released from Israeli prison in January 2004 as part of the 
Hizballah prisoner exchange deal.  Saadi returned to the 
Tulkarm area and began organizing terror attacks. 
Kuperwasser said that Saadi is responsible for the February 
25 suicide bombing at the Stage Club Tel Aviv, the car bomb 
that exploded near Mevo Dotan following the Stage Club 
attack, the killing of a Hermesh resident in a shooting 
attack on his vehicle an attempt to send two bombers into 
Jerusalem on May 31, the July 12 suicide bombing in Netanya 
and car bomb near Shavei Shomron.  Kuperwasser said that the 
PA security forces in Tulkarm had close contacts with Saadi, 
in an attempt to recruit him and his cell members into the 
security forces.  President Abbas, he said, was aware of the 
effort and was disappointed that Saadi refused to join, now 
realizing he cannot be integrated into the PA. 
 
--------------- 
Netanya Bombing 
--------------- 
 
11. (S) Kuperwasser charged that PIJ cells in the territories 
maintain close ties with PIJ headquarters in Damascus, which, 
for example, regularly provides funds, particularly following 
successful operations.  He said that Louay al-Saadi received 
two payments of $15,000 each following the Stage attack. 
Damascus also has provided operational guidance to the field. 
 There was a debate within the Damascus headquarters 
concerning whether it should support the "tahdiya," or calm, 
Kuperwasser explained, but as far as he knew no instructions 
were ever sent to the field telling it to cease operations. 
A couple of days prior to the Netanya bombing, Kuperwasser 
said that Saadi's organization provided "hints" to the 
Damascus leadership that it was planning an attack.  The IDF 
was not able to decipher the "hints", but assumes that 
Damascus did not object to the attack.  Following the Netanya 
attack, the Tulkarm-based cell admitted to the attack in 
messages to Damascus.  Damascus, he said, showed no dismay 
over the message, and in fact was pleased.  In the meantime, 
the Tulkarm PIJ took responsibility for the attack publicly 
through Reuters/al Jazira.  The Damascus-based PIJ leadership 
instructed its leaders in Gaza to "clarify" with the PA that 
it was not/not behind the attack.  Likewise, Kuperwasser 
stated, the Damascus-based PIJ headquarters ordered groups in 
Lebanon and Syria not/not to talk. 
 
12. (S) Following the attack, Kuperwasser continued, 
President Abbas attempted to convince the Damascus-based PIJ 
leadership not to admit to being behind the attack.  Abbas, 
according to Kuperwasser, made an enormous effort to reach 
the Damascus leadership, arguing that admitting to the attack 
could lead to the collapse of the "cease-fire".   PIJ 
leadership subsequently announced July 14 that it was bound 
to the "tahdiya" as long as Israel refrained from targeting 
the group, essentially stating that it was not bound to the 
cease-fire, Kuperwasser commented.  (Note: Abbas issued 
orders to arrest Saadi on the evening of July 14.) 
 
-------------- 
Sensitive Time 
-------------- 
 
13. (S) BGEN Dekel commented that we are in a sensitive 
period, as disengagement has, for all practical purposes, 
already begun.  Details are not important, he continued; the 
PA must take actions to stop the terror.  Kuperwasser pointed 
out that Abbas had used the word "terror" in his denouncement 
of the Netanya bombing, his first public use of the word in 
such a context since 2003.  No other PA leaders, however, 
have followed his lead, he commented.  The PA must treat 
these attacks as terror, if progress is to be made, he said. 
Kaplinsky closed the meeting by reaffirming the IDF 
commitment to continue to coordinate with the PA in the hope 
that the process would lead to results on the ground. 
 
14. (U) A/S Welch, Lt. Gen. Ward and Ms. Mustafa cleared this 
message. 
 
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