US embassy cable - 05PARIS4921

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004921 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DHS FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY JACKSON FROM AMBASSADOR STAPLETON 
STATE FOR EUR, EB, S/CT AND C 
CPB/NTC-TIM GAYGER AND SUSAN LANE 
FBI HQ FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DIV.--DAD JOSPH BILLY 
FBI HQ ALSO FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS--MICHAEL WELCH 
CIA FOR CTC 
BRUSSELS FOR TSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2015 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: MISUSE OF THE "NO-FLY" SYSTEM RISKS UNDERCUTTING 
U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
REF: PARIS 619 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 8, 2005, shortly after my arrival as 
Ambassador, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
directed the return of Air France flight 50 (AF50) because of 
the erroneous conclusion that a specific U.S. citizen 
manifested on the flight constituted an active terrorist 
threat to aviation and to the U.S.  This incident has raised 
questions about Washington interagency coordination, the 
credibility of the no-fly system, the costs involved, and 
communication during aviation security incidents. 
 
2. (C) As I have reviewed the events around the return of 
AF50, I have come to believe that they raise questions about 
the functioning of the no-fly system.  These appear to 
include poor interagency coordination, incomplete data on the 
lists, poor communication in Washington during diversions, 
shrinking credibility for the "no-fly" system, and 
substantial uncompensated costs for USG errors.  Repeated 
incidents obviously diminish our credibility on security 
matters.  If an unjustified flight diversion someday results 
in an accident or the inconvenience of a public figure, we 
will be hard pressed to defend the effectiveness of the 
system.  Now is the time to fix it.  END SUMMARY 
 
========== 
THE EVENTS 
========== 
 
3. (S/NF) Based on the information currently available to us, 
the series of events which appears to have led to this 
diversion is as follows: 
 
a. 1960: Subject is born in Jordan 01/01/1960 with the birth 
name of Khalifa Mustafa Khalifa Al-Aruri. 
 
b. 1984: Subject becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen, under 
the name Khalifa Abed.  He has two wives: one in the U.S. 
with one child, and one in Jordan with two.  He settles in 
Chicago, with wife and one child, born in the U.S. 
 
c.  Subject is the brother of Al Zarqawi lieutenant Khalid 
Mustafa Khalifa Al Aruri.  He is investigated by the FBI, and 
interviewed by them in October 2004. He was reportedly 
forthcoming and openly acknowledged his brother, 
characterizing him as a shame to the family.  The FBI 
subsequently designated him as a selectee on 6/21/05, with 
the concurrence of ICE and the CIA through Chicago JTTF and 
NCTTF at FBI HQ. 
 
d. July 2005: USG learns that Subject will fly to U.S. on 
July 8 from Jordan.  According to Legatt, JTTF Chicago and 
FBI HQ Washington determine that Subject should be listed as 
a selectee, allowed to fly, and be subject to questioning on 
arrival in U.S. 
 
e. 7/7/05: Subject is nominated for the no-fly list, 
apparently by NORTHCOM, and entered as such by TSC, but only 
under birth name of Khalifa Mustafa Khalifa Al-Aruri.  Known 
"alias" Khalifa Abed was not entered into list. 
 
f. 7/8/05: Subject boards AF50 under name he has used as U.S. 
citizen since 1984, Khalifa Abed, using U.S. passport 
#206327686.  Air France had no reason to see a match based on 
no-fly listing of birth name, or selectee listing of similar 
name with different DOB.  After take-off, APIS data 
apparently triggers link between "alias" and birth-name 
no-fly listing. 
 
g. 7/8/05 Washington interagency decision is reached to order 
return of AF50 to Paris.  It is unclear to post how earlier 
JTTF Chicago/FBI HQ discussion figured in this decision. 
 
h. 7/8/05: Subject and family members are publicly asked to 
identify themselves and escorted off the flight by French 
police.  At request of FBI HQ, Legat and ICE interview 
subject and two accompanying persons upon return to Paris 
Charles de Gaulle Airport, in the presence of French National 
Police.  They recommend to Washington that Subject be allowed 
to fly to U.S. Washington agrees. 
i. 7/9/05: Subject authorized to depart Paris for Chicago on 
Air France flight 50. 
 
========== 
THE ISSUES 
========== 
 
4. (S/NF) Poor interagency co-ordination: The JTTF 
Chicago/FBI HQ decision on subject's travel seems not to have 
been taken into account by Washington agencies responsible 
for No-Fly enforcement.  NORTHCOM apparently nominated him 
subsequently for the No-Fly list, with NCTC concurrence. 
Were earlier deliberations (subsequently validated by the 
decision to allow him to return to the U.S.) taken into 
account in this decision? 
 
5. (C) Incomplete listings: Even if the listing had been 
proven justified, why weren't known aliases (figuring on his 
U.S. travel documents) listed in addition to the subject's 
birth name? 
 
6. (C) Communication: The no-fly system is set up to 
facilitate direct communication between airlines, the TSA 
operations center, TSA representatives, and other government 
agencies involved in the origination of no-fly list entries. 
The GOF and the USG have previously agreed that the Embassy 
would be the key intermediary in managing aviation security 
incidents.  Washington agencies have shown no inclination to 
consult with overseas posts to resolve inconsistencies in 
ongoing No-Fly cases.  Moreover, the bifurcation of TSA 
responsibilities between TSA IPSI in Brussels and the TSA 
representative in Paris serves us particularly poorly in 
incidents such as this.  It illustrates once again the need 
to improve the delivery to Embassy officials of timely, 
reliable information that can be used to respond credibly and 
rapidly to our GOF interlocutors. 
 
7. (S/NF) Credibility: The credibility of our No-Fly system 
has been called into question with a government that is 
critical to the success of the program.  Post has yet to see 
a no-fly case or France-origin flight diversion that made 
practical sense, as previous reporting has noted (reftel). 
In some cases (like this one), individuals who have provoked 
USG concern on flights from France to the U.S. had previously 
been allowed to board and fly on flights originating in the 
U.S.  The French have done the math on no-fly entries: they 
are far too numerous, and in many cases do not figure on 
France's own intelligence service lists of terrorist 
suspects.  Decisions such as the one to include Al Aruri only 
highlight weaknesses in U.S. interagency anti-terrorism 
coordination, and the arbitrary nature of many of the 
decisions to include people on our no-fly list. 
 
8. (C) Cost and Inconvenience: Air France has suffered tens 
of thousands of dollars of losses, and the GOF was forced to 
scramble fighters to escort the returning AF50.  We are told 
that Air France's legal department is studying possible 
recourse against the USG for compensation.  French sources 
have also told us that the issue would be raised in the EU 
context.  In addition, hundreds of passengers have been 
inconvenienced, and several U.S. citizens have been 
needlessly harassed and humiliated. 
 
 
================== 
HOW DO WE RESPOND? 
================== 
 
9. (S/NF) This case underlines the need for scrupulous 
interagency monitoring of entries in the No-Fly list.  I 
cannot credibly make the case to the GOF that all of the 
approximately 38,000 names currently on the list represent a 
threat to aviation with repeated, public demonstrations to 
the contrary, including not flagging those names when they 
depart the U.S.  We need to develop a plan to coordinate 
better with overseas governments and airlines, in order to 
make our system more effective and to provide earlier warning 
of potential no-fly cases. 
 
10. (C) The GOF expects a detailed description of what 
happened, in properly classified form, with assurances that 
we are making progress on fixing the problem.  It is not in 
our interest to leave the GOF with the impression that we are 
ignoring these issues if we wish them to take our no-fly 
lists seriously.  Washington should also decide what actions 
are appropriate to take regarding the affected U.S. families. 
 More broadly, we need to look at how we respond to mistakes 
we make in administering the no-fly system and prepare for 
them in advance.  Future errors of this sort are virtually 
inevitable, and will only be compounded if we appear to 
ignore legitimate complaints from our foreign partners. 
 
11. (C) State needs to take a closer look at its own role in 
no-fly diversions.  Was it aware of JTTF Chicago-FBI HQ 
information?  Did it play a role in the interagency decision 
to turn back AF50?  Better access during crises to existing 
interagency information and better communication between 
Washington decision points and overseas posts is necessary. 
The Department seems increasingly invisible in cases that 
have the potential to do serious damage to bilateral 
co-operation on airline security, and that are extremely 
unhelpful to our overall relations with the GOF. 
 
12. (C) Events such as our action-over-substance diversion of 
AF50 undermines the serious intent behind our No Fly/Selectee 
Emergency Amendments (EAs).  Major corrections are needed to 
make our EA lists more credible, to improve Washington 
anti-terrorist coordination, and to ensure that the 
Department and Post is fully and rapidly informed of 
developing situations. 
 
STAPLETON 
STAPLETON