US embassy cable - 05DUBLIN884

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IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

Identifier: 05DUBLIN884
Wikileaks: View 05DUBLIN884 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dublin
Created: 2005-07-15 14:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: EAID PREL UN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: EAID, PREL, UN 
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE 
 
REF: STATE 124856 
 
Classified By: DCM Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: On July 14, Post delivered reftel demarche 
to Gerard Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU 
Foreign Correspondent.  According to Keown, the GOI was 
optimistic that EU accession talks for Turkey would begin 
October 3.  He noted that Ireland would favor referring any 
Iranian breach of the Paris Agreement to the IAEA Board of 
Governors to discuss whether to report Iran to the UNSC. 
Regarding the UN High-Level Event, Ireland had not taken a 
position on the G-4 proposal because it did not wish to 
compromise Foreign Minister Ahern's position as one of five 
regional envoys appointed by UNSYG Annan to promote UN 
reforms.  On Uzbekistan, Keown said that EU Member States 
wished to take a firm stance on the Andijon incident, while 
avoiding an isolationist approach that, as with Belarus, 
might be unproductive.  End summary. 
 
Turkey 
------ 
 
2.  (C) Ireland is hopeful that EU accession talks for Turkey 
will begin October 3, according to Keown.  He noted that the 
decision to commence talks depended on two issues: 
continuation of Turkey's reform process and progress in 
normalization with Cyprus.  On the first issue, Ireland 
acknowledged Prime Minister Erdogan's stewardship of the 
reform process, but was concerned that the rapid pace of 
reforms might make their full implementation difficult. 
Regarding normalization with Cyprus, Ireland and the Member 
States were awaiting the Turkish Government's decision to 
sign the Protocol extending the Ankara Agreement (on the 
EU-Turkey customs union) to the new Member States -- a step 
that would entail recognition of Cyprus to a degree.  Keown 
remarked that the EU was finalizing the negotiating framework 
that would be used if the October 3 GAERC approved the start 
of accession talks. 
 
HLE 
--- 
 
3.  (C) Keown commented that the GOI's approach to the UN 
High-Level Event (HLE) would seek to be as faithful as 
possible to recommendations in UNSYG Annan's report, "In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human 
Rights for All."  Ireland supported a global recommitment to 
the Millennium Development Goals and the establishment of a 
Peacebuilding Commission, given the perceived lack of 
international follow-on to post-conflict situations.  Keown 
pointed out that UNSYG Annan's report had not used the word 
"package" in reference to UN reforms and that a separate 
track was emerging to address possible changes in UNSC 
membership.  He stressed that Ireland did not wish to see 
debate on UNSC reform "contaminate" discussions on other 
needed reforms.  Keown added that the GOI had not yet taken a 
position on the G-4 proposal, mainly because Ireland did not 
wish to complicate Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern's 
consultations with European governments as one of five 
regional envoys appointed by UNSYG Annan to promote proposals 
made by "In Larger Freedom." 
 
 
Syria/Lebanon 
------------- 
 
4.  (C) The GOI was pleased with the Lebanese elections and 
would be willing to work within the EU to support the new 
Lebanese Government and its proposed reforms, said Keown. 
Ireland, however, would be watching the way the new 
Government acts, especially its efforts to improve 
inter-community relations.  Keown commented that the GOI 
shared USG concerns about continuing Syrian influence in 
Lebanon, the flow of foreign fighters entering Iraq through 
Syria, and the operation of Palestinian rejectionist groups 
within Syria's borders.  He added that there was currently no 
movement within the EU to finalize the Syrian Association 
Agreement. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
5.  (C) Keown said that the EU-3 talks were on hold, pending 
clarity on the reported resignation of chief Iranian 
negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, following Mahmood Ahmadinejad's 
election as Iran's president in June.  Ireland shared U.S. 
concerns about the legitimacy of Ahmadinejad's election, 
while noting that his margin of victory in the second round 
of voting was substantial.  Keown pointed out that EU policy 
toward Iran would not change regardless of possible personnel 
changes with the new Iranian administration.  Specifically, 
the EU would continue to insist through the EU-3 process that 
Iran abandon sensitive nuclear fuel pursuits, while offering 
measures to address Iran's legitimate energy needs.  Keown 
added that Ireland would view any Iranian breach of the Paris 
Agreement as "extremely worrying" and would favor referring 
the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss whether 
to report Iran to the UNSC. 
 
Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
6.  (C) Ireland supports calls for an independent, 
international investigation into the Andijon incident, but 
Member States have not yet reached consensus on an overall EU 
approach to Uzbekistan, according to Keown.  He said that 
Member States wished to take a firm stand on Andijon, while 
avoiding an isolationist posture that, as with Belarus, might 
be unproductive.  Keown expected the EU to ratchet up 
pressure on Uzbekistan following the July 18-19 GAERC, to 
include support for invoking the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (to 
open an OSCE investigation into Andijon without the Uzbek 
Government's concurrence).  Ireland would favor such a move, 
he added.  Keown also related Ireland's hope that the USG and 
Russian Government would be "tough" with Uzkekistan, drawing 
on diplomatic leverage related to their military facilities 
in the country. 
KENNY 

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