US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4125

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, CY, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY, UK PRESIDENCY AGREE ON ANKARA AGREEMENT 
EXTENSION PROTOCOL MODALITY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 3890 
 
     B. 14 JULY 2005 BLAHA E-MAILS 
     C. ANKARA 1856 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  According to the UK Embassy. the GOT and 
the UK Presidency agreed July 15 on the modality by which 
Turkey will sign the Ankara Agreement extension protocol. 
The UK will announce the agreement on modality at the July 18 
GAERC and expects the signing process to begin shortly 
thereafter.  The text of the declaration the GOT will issue 
that its signature does not constitute recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) remains unknown, and could trigger a 
sharp reaction from the EU if it is not moderate.  End 
Summary. 
 
Agreement on Modality 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) The last roadblock to Turkish extension of the Ankara 
Agreement to the ten new EU members was the modality by which 
it would occur.  UK PolChief Miller and MFA Northeast 
Mediterranean A/DDG Bilman both told us the GOT wanted an 
exchange of letters without an actual signing in order to 
blunt domestic criticism that a signature constitutes 
recognition and to keep the event as low-key a possible.  The 
UK Presidency was firm that the enough members states would 
insist that the December Summit conclusions require an actual 
signature to make the GOT's proposal non-viable. 
 
3.  (C) According to Miller, following July 14 meetings in 
Ankara between Turkish MFA officials and FCO Med/Europe 
Director Chilcott, the two sides came to a compromise 
agreement that the GOT will sign the protocol (the text was 
agreed to in March - see ref C) through an exchange of 
letters.  FM Gul personally approved the modality July 15. 
The UK EU PermRep (and perhaps a Commission official) will 
sign the protocol and send it with a cover letter to Turkey; 
the Turkish PermRep will send back the protocol with his 
signature as well, attaching a GOT declaration that the 
signature does not constitute recognition of the ROC. 
 
4.  (C) The UK will announce the agreed mechanism at the July 
18 GAERC.  Miller told us the UK will finesse the timing so 
that the letter exchange commences after the GAERC.  The UK 
wants the GOT declaration to become public only after the 
GAERC in order to avoid the GAERC getting wrapped up in a 
discussion of it. 
 
Now, the Other Shoe: Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
5.  (C) While agreement on the modality clears the way for 
the GOT to sign the protocol, the accompanying Turkish 
non-recognition declaration poses the next problem.  Domestic 
criticism is pushing the GOT toward tough non-recognition 
language that could cause members states to question whether 
the GOT intends to implement the protocol, or even whether 
the GOT's signature has meaning (ref A). 
 
6.  (C) The GOT still has not shared its proposed declaration 
text with anyone, not even the UK.  Miller told us that 
during the July 18 meetings, MFA Europe Deputy U/S Bozkir 
told the UK the MFA Cyprus Department is keeping the text so 
close-hold that although he has seen it, even he does not 
have a copy. 
 
7.  (C) Turkish MFA officials assure the UK -- and us -- that 
the declaration text will contain no surprises, "nothing that 
has not already been said."  They say it will contain 
positive elements, including expression of the GOT's 
willingness to find a comprehensive Cyprus solution. 
Nevertheless, they continue to hint it will refer to the 
GOT's May 2004 statement upon the accession of the ten new 
members, including the ROC, a statement that Commission 
officials here view negatively. 
 
8.  (C) Depending on the language of the GOT declaration, 
Miller tells us the UK Presidency may be compelled to issue a 
counter-declaration.  The Turkish MFA is worried the ROC 
could use a counter-declaration to argue "back door 
recognition" by Turkey. 
 
Negotiation Framework for Turkey 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The GOT and UK also discussed on July 14 Cyprus and 
Aegean-related portions of the Negotiation Framework for 
Turkey.  Among other things, Bilman said the MFA argued that 
saying that Turkey should "support...steps to contribute to a 
favorable environment for comprehensive (Cyprus) settlement" 
turn Cyprus settlement into a condition for membership and 
place all the onus on Turkey, paving the way for endless 
Greek Cypriot demands.  FM Gul will have difficulty defending 
the Framework text, the MFA asserted. 
10.  (C) Chilcott told the MFA officials they are misreading 
the text and overplaying concerns.  He reminded the Turks the 
Framework is a list of EU demands on a candidate, not a 
Turkish document.  Chilcott warned the MFA not to expect any 
improvement in the text; indeed, the UK will have to expend 
effort to prevent the text from becoming too much tougher. 
 
FM Gul Feels Disillusioned, Isolated on EU 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C) Miller told us that FM Gul was downbeat on the EU 
during a July 13 plane ride from London to Ankara with UK 
Ambassador Westmacott.  Gul claimed he is disillusioned with 
the EU process and what he views as excessive EU demands on 
Turkey.  Bozkir told Westmacott July 14 that Gul feels 
isolated in the cabinet on EU issues, implying he is the only 
one doing the heavy political lifting.  Bozkir pointed noted 
that PM Erdogan has not attended an EU-related meeting since 
the December EU Summit. 
MCELDOWNEY