US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2955

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JULY 2 MEETING OF CHARGE MNF-I CG WITH IRAQI INTERIOR MINISTER

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2955
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2955 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-15 09:50:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINS IZ Reconstruction Human Rights
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINS, IZ, Reconstruction, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: JULY 2 MEETING OF CHARGE MNF-I CG WITH IRAQI 
INTERIOR MINISTER 
 
 
Classified By: Charge D' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) At a July 2 meeting with Minister of Interior Baqr 
Jaber, the Charge raised reports of human rights abuses by 
the Wolf Brigade.  Jaber agreed on the need to respect human 
rights, voiced interest in visiting the U.S., and expressed 
concern about media reports that the U.S. was negotiating 
with the insurgents.  The MNF-I CG emphasized that media 
reports notwithstanding, the U.S. is not negotiating with the 
insurgents.  Jaber suggested that Secretary Rice give a 
speech clarifying the U.S. role within a sovereign Iraq. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
PRINCIPAL ATTENDEES 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The principal attendees at the July 2 meeting were 
 
-- Minister of Interior Baqr Jaber, 
 
-- Charge d'Affaires David Satterfield, 
 
-- Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Commanding General 
George Casey, and 
 
-- IRMO-MOI Senior Advisor James Yellin. 
 
--------------------- 
TRIP TO UNITED STATES 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Jaber stated he would like to visit Washington in 
September to meet with Secretary Rice and Attorney General 
Gonzalez.  The Charge encouraged the Minister to limit his 
trip to the United States to a few days so that he spend as 
little time out of Iraq as possible.  The Charge further 
recommended the minister travel after the Labor Day holiday. 
 
------------ 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------ 
 
4.  (C) The Charge noted reports that Wolf Brigade commandos 
were acting on behalf of the Badr Corps, and that the 
commandos had mistreated detainees and used excessive force 
during arrests.  The Charge emphasized the need for the 
security forces to respect human rights and conduct 
themselves in way that is beyond reproach. 
 
5.  (C) Jaber denied the Wolf Brigade was acting on behalf of 
the Badr Corps.  He agreed on the need to respect human 
rights.  He added that he welcomed Embassy and Coalition 
information that would enable the MOI Inspector General to 
conduct investigations and file charges.  He also said the 
Wolf Brigade is the most effective of the special police 
forces. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
MEDIA REPORTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH INSURGENTS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The MNF-I CG emphasized that media reports 
notwithstanding, the U.S. is not negotiating with the 
insurgents. 
 
7.  (C) Jaber said media reports that Secretary Rumsfeld had 
said the U.S. was negotiating with the insurgents had 
negatively affected the morale of the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) and the general public.  Jaber suggested that Secretary 
Rice give a speech clarifying the U.S. role within a 
sovereign Iraq. 
 
8.  (C) The MNF-I CG pointed out that Secretary Rumsfeld had 
not said the U.S. is negotiating with the insurgents. 
 
----------------- 
OPERATION AL BARQ 
----------------- 
 
9.  (C) Jaber also made the following remarks. 
 
-- There is a need to build upon the success of Operation al 
Barq (a joint counterinsurgency operation in Baghdad 
conducted by the Iraqi ministries of Defense and Interior in 
conjunction with MNF-I's execution of Operation Squeeze 
Play). 
-- A follow-on joint operation should focus on routes feeding 
into Baghdad, especially west of Abu Ghraib and east of 
Mada'in. 
 
11.  (C) Jaber said the success of al-Barq justified a 
reduction of the curfew from 10:00 p.m.-4:00 a.m. to 12:00 
a.m.-4:00 a.m.  The MNF-I CG expressed his support for a 
reduction of curfew hours. 
 
------------------------- 
OTHER OPERATIONAL MATTERS 
------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Jaber said the following about other operational 
matters. 
 
-- Recent attacks by the insurgents reflect a strategic 
decision by them to place greater emphasis on targeting 
infrastructure as a way of weakening the government. 
 
-- It would be useful to use tribal forces to help control 
the borders.  He recently appointed a new Director General of 
Department of Border Enforcement, Major General Muhsan. 
 
-- Potential areas for future joint operations include Mosul 
and Taji.  (Jaber accepted an invitation by MNF-I CG to 
travel to Mosul regarding such operations.) 
 
-- Police training by France would be welcome, provided it be 
conducted in Iraq.  (Jaber noted that he resented past French 
support of the Saddam Hussein regime.) 
 
13.  (C) The MNF-I CG emphasized the need for coordination 
between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense.  He 
welcomed the recent formation of a joint planning group to 
prepare for future operations, such as security for 
elections.  Jaber agreed on the need for coordination and on 
the utility of the joint planning group. 
 
----------------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH ARAB NEIGHBORS 
----------------------------- 
 
14.  Jaber said the Syrians claim to be helping on border 
control, but have not demonstrated that they are doing so. 
The Charge encouraged Minister Jaber and his colleagues to 
keep pressure on Syria to work with the Iraqi government. 
 
15.  (C) The Charge also said the Embassy and MNF-I can help 
to establish a dialogue with the Saudi Interior Minister. 
Jaber replied that he would welcome such help. 
 
16.  (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, REO KIRKUK 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield 

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