US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI3030

C O N F I D E N T I A L TAIPEI 003030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, TW, Military Issues, Cross Strait Politics, Foreign Policy 
SUBJECT: NSC OFFICIALS DOWNPLAY "OFFENSIVE WEAPONS" IN 
UPCOMING NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT 
 
REF: A. A) TAIPEI 2745 
     B. B) 2004 TAIPEI 3002 
 
Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR DOUGLAS PAAL, REASON 1.4(B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Taiwan National Security Council (NSC) 
officials dismissed recent press reporting that the upcoming 
National Security Report (see Ref A) will include references 
to "offensive weapons."  They did, however, acknowledge that 
the report will very likely include a passing reference to 
developing a "counterstrike capability."  NSC officials 
assured AIT that they will coordinate with the USG prior to 
the publication of the report in August.  End Summary. 
 
Developing "Counterstrike Capability" 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) NSC Deputy SecGen Henry Ko told AIT that the initial 
draft of the National Security Report as presented at a 
presidential-chaired NSC meeting on June 29 made no reference 
to "offensive weapons."  He did note, however, that 
Presidential Office Secretary-General Yu Shyi-kun argued at 
the meeting that the National Security Report should mention 
the need for Taiwan to develop a counterstrike or deterrent 
capability.  (Note:  Yu, long an advocate of Taiwan 
developing offensive weapon capabilities, made provocative 
statements last September regarding counterstrike capability 
(Ref B).  End Note.)  Ko and other NSC officials told AIT 
that the Report, still a work in progress, will very likely 
include reference to a counterstrike capability (fanzhi 
nengli) without going into specifics over weapons systems 
that could provide such a capacity.  When pressed on whether 
the Report would discuss specific indigenous missile 
development programs, such as the Hsiung Feng, NSC defense 
policy researcher Su Szu-yun assured AIT that it would not. 
 
"Deterrence" Across the Strait 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Elaborating on the meaning of "deterrence" in the 
Taiwan context, Su explained that recent developments in 
Taiwan,s indigenous missile programs were primarily aimed at 
attempting to prevent Mainland air superiority in the event 
of a cross-Strait armed conflict.  Su noted that this was in 
contrast to irresponsible Taiwan press reporting on missile 
developments, which often suggests that Taiwan missiles could 
be used to strike Mainland population centers in the event of 
a conflict.  Su stressed this was not Taiwan military 
doctrine. 
 
Keeping the USG in the loop 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Ko assured AIT that AIT would receive a full briefing 
prior to the public release of the Report, and that the NSC 
would welcome USG input.  Furthermore, Ko noted, the Ministry 
of National Defense (MND) would be in contact with the U.S. 
Department of Defense to ensure that the report does not 
conflict with the upcoming U.S. report on Peoples Liberation 
Army (PLA) capabilities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5. (C) AIT will continue to press Taiwan interlocutors to 
exclude references to offensive weapons and minimize 
references to the development of a counterstrike capability 
from the National Security Report.  Nevertheless, there are 
strong voices within Taiwan's national security and defense 
apparatus which support the inclusion of "counterstrike" 
language.  These voices have two different advocacy groups: 
those who support offensive weapons and/or counterstrike 
capability for purely military and strategic purposes, and 
those who want Taiwan to develop a feel-good but ineffectual 
limited capability to strike at Mainland population centers 
in the event of cross-Strait armed conflict.  This latter 
group is seeking to exploit an emotional sense among Taiwan 
identity and Taiwan independence supporters that an offensive 
capability will better enable Taiwan to stand up to China. 
PAAL