US embassy cable - 05QUITO1645

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001645 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015 
TAGS: SNAR, PTER, MASS, PGOV, PREL, EC, CO 
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SEES CN, CT GAPS IN ECUADOR 
 
Classified By: CDA KEVIN HERBERT, REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY:  Use of Ecuadorian territory by narcotics 
and alien smugglers dominated discussions during Staffdel 
Walker, which visited Ecuador July 4-9.  A DEA briefing 
revealed that agency,s eavesdropping weaknesses, exacerbated 
by Ecuadorian cellular carriers migration from analog to 
digital technologies.  DEA also lamented Ecuadorian state oil 
company PetroEcuador's neglect and/or outright collusion in 
petroleum ether trafficking.  A subsequent visit to an 
Ecuadorian counter-narcotics (CN) checkpoint uncovered a 
motivated police force.  Unfortunately, they appeared unable 
to identify opium latex, whose trafficking from Peru through 
Ecuador, en route to Colombia, is reportedly on the rise. 
Our Congressional visitors pledged to explore options to help 
resolve these CN deficiencies. 
 
2.  (C) Migrant (or alien) smuggling also took center-stage, 
with Defense and Homeland Security attaches informing the 
Staffdel that Ecuador led the world in sending seaborne 
migrants to the United States.  All agreed terrorists could 
easily exploit the Ecuador-Guatemala-Mexico-USA route, since 
USG maritime assets in the eastern Pacific concentrated 
primarily on intercepting narcotics smugglers.  To provide 
greater and better-focused resources to reduce the migrant 
flow, our visitors expressed interest in revising a pending 
authorization bill to request a cost-benefit analysis of 
current USG interdiction efforts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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A Busy Week in Quito 
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3.  (U) Staffdel Walker, led by House International Relations 
Committee Professional Staff Member Mark Walker, visited 
Quito and its environs July 4-9.  Their first two days 
focused on "softer" USG assistance to Ecuador -- support for 
rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, political 
decentralization, and aid to the indigenous -- and on calls 
on GoE and Ecuadorian Congress officials.  Subsequent 
sessions delved into security matters, focused mainly on 
narcotics and aien smuggling in Ecuador. 
 
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Staffing, Technology Woes Don't Help 
------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Increasing amounts of cocaine and heroin traversed 
Ecuadorian territory, DEA agents asserted.  About half of the 
former was Europe-bound, nearly all Colombia-produced, 
Ecuador-routed heroin quenched the eastern United States 
market.  Refuting the Staffdel's Colombian and Peruvian 
contacts' allegations, DEA staff claimed Ecuadorian police 
and military were not ignoring narcotics trafficking.  USG 
vetted units, in particular, had enjoyed some interdiction 
success, although numbers were down in 2005.   Part of the 
blame lay in DEA's own staffing woes -- medical emergencies 
and tour curtailments left the agency bereft of agents 
necessary to prod Ecuadorian police into action. 
 
5.  (S) Signal intelligence quality/quantity too had 
diminished, responsible for perhaps half the drop in 
seizures.  Agents explained that Ecuadorian cellular 
telephone, until recently analog, had migrated to digital 
platforms, mainly GSM.  Existing interception equipment had 
proven useless against state-of-the-art, encrypted messaging. 
 While high-tech eavesdropping tools were available, USG 
export controls prohibited their acquisition for the 
Ecuadorian police.  Similar technology, produced in Israel 
and Poland, would work, but USG procurement regs appeared to 
rule out that option.  With the current government accusing 
the former of utilizing military and police intelligence 
assets for political spying, the future of police phone 
tapping was in doubt. 
 
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Nor Does Company Collusion 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) DEA staff also raised precursor chemical smuggling. 
Vast quantities of petroleum ether, aka "white gas," fed 
cocaine processing laboratories in southern Colombia; most 
came from PetroEcuador pipelines.  The quantities involved, 
plus the expertise and labor necessary to tap and transfer 
the volatile chemical, seemed to indicate the company,s 
neglect, if not outright collusion.  Recent DEA-funded 
operations, conducted mainly by the Ecuadorian Army, had 
interdicted thousands of gallons of white gas, yet the trade 
continued. 
 
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Our Guests Pitch In 
------------------- 
 
7.  (S) Staff members agreed that combating Ecuador's drug 
problem required a robust DEA presence; a half-staff team 
practically presented traffickers a green light.  While not 
empowered to add agents, lead staffer John Mackey offered to 
investigate increased TDY support from DEA offices in Bogota 
and Lima.  Mackey and colleague Nick Coleman were troubled by 
the "cellular gap."  Export control and procurement 
regulations were vital, but must also be attentive to allied 
nations, needs.  Avoiding offer of immediate solutions, they 
nonetheless promised to investigate the feasibility of 
securing up-to-date interception technology. 
 
8.  (C) Efforts to counter the precursor trade were bound to 
fail without PetroEcuador cooperation, Mackey reasoned.  If 
neglect/collusion by its executives and labor leaders was 
such public knowledge, he continued, did it not amount to 
tacit assistance to drug traffickers?  He posed the idea of a 
harshly worded letter, authored by U.S. Congress committee 
chairmen, threatening PetroEcuador with sanctions under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  Embassy officers agreed the 
letter could spur positive movement on petroleum ether, but 
expressed concern it might provoke negative side-effects for 
PetroEcuador such as further legal action against U.S. oil 
company Occidental Petroleum (Oxy). 
 
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On The Road 
----------- 
 
9.  (C) Emboffs accompanied Mackey and Walker to Baeza, two 
hours east of Quito.  There, at the convergence of major 
north-south and east-west highways, Southcom dollars had 
funded construction of a police checkpoint, while Narcotics 
Affairs Section (NAS) funding had refurbished it.  It 
currently houses a specialized, mobile CN force, the GEMA. 
Ably commanded by Col. Fabian Solano, GEMA forces, numbering 
160, fan out to various checkpoints nationwide, based on 
expected trafficking patterns.  Troops appeared motivated and 
skilled, checking a large bus and its 30-odd occupants in 
barely five minutes. 
 
10.  (C) In his command brief, Solano highlighted drug and 
precursor flows linking Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.  He also 
noted recent discoveries of small-scale coca plantations in 
Sucumbios and Esmeraldas province.  Mackey questioned the 
Colonel on opium latex, which he had heard was flowing from 
production sites in northern Peru, through Ecuador, en route 
to refining labs in southern Colombia.  Solano replied he 
could remember no latex interdictions, doubted his men could 
identify it, and asserted his canines were trained only in 
cocaine detection. 
 
11.  (C) Colombian CN police were among the world,s best, 
Mackey responded.  They were also capable of training 
friendly forces.  Would Ecuador accept a Colombian contingent 
providing instruction in opium latex detection, he asked? 
Solano welcomed the idea, and offered to bring the entire 
GEMA force to Baeza to take part.  Mackey also offered 
support in ramping up a "1-800 program" to attract snitches. 
Such initiatives had generated excellent leads in neighboring 
nations, he revealed.  Again, Solano responded positively. 
 
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Migrant Smuggling An Equivalent Problem 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) No nation sends more migrants by sea to the United 
States than Ecuador, DAO and DHS attaches explained to the 
staffdel.  The total flow, conservatively estimated at 30-42 
K/year per year, exceeds the total number of Haitian, 
Dominican, and Cuban migrants.  Yet USG maritime assets in 
the eastern Pacific, working under the Joint Inter-Agency 
Task Force-South (JIATF-S) umbrella, focus on narcotics, not 
alien smuggling.  Most migrant interdictions are 
happenstance, or the product of trafficker vessels, SOSes. 
And they've brought the Embassy black eyes of late, boat 
owners and migrants alike telling tall tales of mistreatment. 
 
13.  (C) In contrast, the COAC, the Ecuadorian National 
Police's anti-migrant smuggling unit, has proven effective 
and cheap.  Established three years ago with special NAS 
funding, COAC elements nabbed five of the NSC,s top-ten 
Ecuadorian migrant smugglers in 2003, all on a budget of 
$225,000.  That money had evaporated, however, and neither 
NAS nor DHS has been able to replenish this year's coffers. 
NAS has obtained modest funding for next fiscal year, but 
seeks to establish steady, long-term funding for the unit. 
 
14.  (C) Such migrant flows presented catastrophic risks to 
national security, Mackey assesed.  Owing to security 
improvements at legal ports of entry, the next 9/11 bombers 
would not pass through JFK, but rather south Texas, New 
Mexico or Arizona.  U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets were 
both tasked and better suited to drug interdiction; migrant 
work was both time-consuming and costly (a recent 
repatriation of 90-odd Ecuadorians from Guatemala cost the 
USG $43,000 in airfare).  Mackey therefore considered 
continued funding for the COAC imperative, and began drafting 
a proposed amendment to the pending State authorization bill, 
tasking the Secretary with preparing a cost/benefit analysis 
on current USG anti-migrant smuggling operations in Ecuador 
and the eastern Pacific. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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15.  (C) USG security assistance to Ecuador, which enjoyed a 
bump-up in recent years, has begun to drop.  The GoE's 
unwillingness to sign an Article 98 agreement merits blame as 
well, of course.  Yet drastic cutbacks threaten U.S. CN 
interests in the Andes could even harm our efforts in 
Colombia.  Staffdel Walker seemed attuned to the "balloon 
effect," in which Colombian Army success in Putumayo and 
Narino could drive the FARC south into Ecuador.  END COMMENT. 
HERBERT