US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI5445

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IN, CH, UNSC 
SUBJECT: GOI WORKING TO MANAGE DISAPPOINTMENT AT US G-4 
POSITION AS PM VISIT APPROACHES 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5354 
     B. NEW DELHI 2758 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: US opposition to the G-4 UN Security Council 
expansion proposal was badly received in India, but the GOI 
is doing damage control to preserve the positive atmospherics 
of the PM's July 18-20 Washington visit, including working to 
ensure the resolution will not come up for a vote while the 
PM is in Washington.  End Summary. 
 
Today, We're the Bad Guys 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Neglecting all other comments made during the course 
of the General Assembly debate, Indian media reported only 
the US statement on the G-4 framework resolution, emphasizing 
that the US "strongly opposes," "rejects," or "blocks" the 
proposed expansion.  Newspapers stated that the US decision 
was prompted by Congressional skepticism of the UN system and 
claimed that "anti-India" interests in the US had highlighted 
India's frequent opposition to US positions in the UN to 
lobby against support for the G-4.  The "Times of India" 
suggested that Washington's opposition would take UNSC 
expansion off the agenda for the PM's visit. 
 
Damage Control 
-------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Foreign Secretary Saran used a July 13 press 
conference to deny GOI discouragement over US opposition to 
the G-4 UNSC resolution, pointing out that India meets U/S 
Burns's publicly expressed criteria for permanent membership 
and that Washington's opposition to the G-4 approach had been 
known for "quite some time."  Noting that "there is not much 
we can do about" the US decision, he reaffirmed that the G-4 
would continue to consult on its plans to move the resolution 
forward.  His positive response contrasted with that of 
India's UN PermRep Nirupam Sen, who appeared surprised that 
the US would not merely abstain, and bitterly criticized P-5 
exclusivity and the UFC counter-proposal. 
 
Trying to Insulate the PM's Washington Visit 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) FM Natwar Singh's Chief of Staff Vikas Swarup told 
PolCouns on July 14 that one of the GOI's biggest concerns 
now for the PM's visit is managing how the US position on the 
G-4 plays out publicly.  New Delhi understands the political 
reasons behind Washington's opposition, and is now working to 
ensure the resolution does not come to a vote while the PM 
will be in Washington (the FM goes to London on July 15 and 
then New York for July 17 G-4 consultations on voting plans). 
 
5.  (U) In addition to playing down the impact of US 
opposition to the G-4 during his press conference, FS Saran 
gave a positive assessment of US-India relations, praising 
the US-India defense framework agreement, and leaving open 
the possibility of Indian participation in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative.  India was hopeful that Washington will 
lift remaining nuclear-related sanctions, and hoped to 
increase bilateral high-tech trade, he told reporters. 
 
6.  (C) In a parallel effort to lay the groundwork for public 
acceptance of the outcome of the July 18 visit, the PM met on 
July 13 with BJP leaders AB Vajpayee, LK Advani and Jaswant 
Singh to drum up Opposition support for the deepening 
US-India relationship in the face of dissension from the 
UPA's Left Front partners, who were especially critical of 
the defense agreement (Ref A).  Notably absent from this 
meeting with the PM and Natwar Singh were former NSA Brajesh 
Mishra and former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, who has 
found himself on the wrong side of the BJP leadership tussle. 
 BJP Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee member Vijay Vir 
told us that the BJP leaders broadly welcomed the warming 
trend in US-India relations, but cautioned the PM that 
improved ties with the US should not be at the expense of 
other countries (meaning China).  The BJP wondered what 
concrete results would come out of the visit since the US had 
opposed the G-4 resolution. 
 
It's a No-Brainer 
----------------- 
 
7.  (C) Jyoti Malhotra, diplomatic correspondent for the 
widely-watched Hindi-language Star TV News, told Poloff on 
July 13 that the UNSC issue resonates most strongly with the 
man in the street.  While New Delhi's pundits focus on 
nuclear cooperation, the common man does not know how fuel 
for the Tarapur nuclear reactor would affect his life, but he 
does care about the prestige associated with a permanent UNSC 
seat.  Malhotra commented that while US backing would not 
ensure success for India's UNSC campaign, a gesture of 
support would win praise across India.  Besides, she said, 
China would never permit India to join the UNSC, so US 
rhetorical support would cost little but yield rich rewards 
in India. 
 
Comment: GOI Balancing Public Interest and Expectations 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8.  (C) The GOI is engaged in a delicate balancing act over 
how much it can manage down expectations of US support for 
the UNSC seat during the PM's Washington trip without 
publicly appearing to betray its long campaign.  While 
pundits have focused on hoped-for nuclear cooperation as the 
prime issue for the PM's visit, the average Indian appears 
more aware of, and interested in, the UNSC campaign, and 
Washington's position on India's candidacy will certainly be 
attacked in the Parliament monsoon session which begins 
shortly after Singh returns from the US. 
 
Comment Continued: The US Is Not as Devious as China 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
9.  (C) Political observers from across the spectrum have 
commented on how astutely the Chinese have managed the 
gullible Indian public on the UNSC question: despite 
Beijing's determined but private opposition to the G-4 
efforts, the public in India only remembers Wen Jiabao's nod 
to Indian membership during his April visit, and the Chinese 
Ambassador's subsequent reaffirmation of Chinese support (Ref 
B).  In contrast, most Indians see the US position as simply 
opposed to UNSC expansion and, by extension, Indian 
aspirations.  The aftermath of our UN statement could have 
been a public relations train wreck given its proximity to 
the PM's departure, but MEA has stepped in to minimize the 
effect on the overall message from the visit.  China's deft 
(and duplicitous) handling of India's UNSC ambitions, 
considering China still occupies conquered Indian territory, 
reflects creative albeit misleading diplomacy by Beijing. 
BLAKE