US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI3018

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, TW, Foreign Policy 
SUBJECT: EU MISSIONS IN TAIWAN ENCOURAGING MODERATE STANCE 
ON ARMS EMBARGO 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Representatives of EU member states in Taipei 
have begun to coordinate their efforts to convince EU and 
home country officials that Europe must look beyond economics 
in its ties with the PRC, particularly with regards to the 
arms embargo.  Beginning in 2004, EU missions in Taipei set a 
precedent of drafting common policy messages to capitals that 
went beyond trade and highlighted cross-Strait ties, regional 
security, and aimed to moderate the EU's Beijing 
centric-policies.  EU representatives say they were compelled 
to take coordinated action because individually they had 
little impact on EU policy making.  European representatives 
also argued that EU priorities were too focused on EU-PRC 
trade and that EU officials had little understanding of 
Taiwan or the regional security implications behind Beijing's 
growing military prowess.  The representatives assert that 
their policy messages give EU foreign policy officials an 
alternative to Europe's prevailing pro-PRC policies and, 
combined with Washington's lobbying campaign and Beijing's 
Anti-Secession Law (ASL), played a role in the June decision 
not to lift the arms embargo.  The representatives also noted 
that Taiwan itself was largely absent in the EU's decision to 
maintain the embargo and contend that Taipei lacks an 
effective EU foreign policy.  End summary. 
 
A Bold Step by EU Missions 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (C) With most European governments predominantly focused 
on economic ties with Beijing, Dutch Representative Menno 
Goedhart told AIT that he and his EU colleagues in Taipei 
decided to take coordinated action early last year because EU 
missions in Taipei were being ignored.  Goedhart said that in 
contrast, EU missions in Beijing enjoyed increasing influence 
on policies being formulated in Europe.  He said that the 
EU's East Asian policies showed that Europe had little 
institutional knowledge of Taiwan or of Taipei's relationship 
with Beijing.  In agreement with Goedhart, Political Officer 
Den Moore from the UK's office added that most EU offices in 
Taipei have traditionally focused on economic and commercial 
policy because EU nations typically assigned economic 
officers to serve in Taiwan.  Moore also pointed out that 
most EU East Asia policy makers had served in the PRC, but 
few had visited Taiwan, were knowledgeable about cross-Strait 
ties, or understood the importance of regional security in 
Asia. 
 
3. (C) Under Goedhart's leadership, the EU missions in Taipei 
held their first meeting in the Spring of 2004 to discuss the 
impact Taiwan's 2004 presidential election controversy could 
have on the PRC and cross-Strait stability.  Goedhart said 
initially some of the EU offices were reluctant to 
participate in the meeting, but in the end they all agreed to 
attend.  He also told AIT that at first the policy messages 
were ignored by EU ministries because the messages went 
against conventional EU-PRC policies.  However, Goedhart 
explained that the process evolved quickly into a forum for 
Taipei-based missions to provide EU capitals with reliable 
information and noted that the messages became bolder and are 
now distributed among foreign ministries throughout Europe. 
He characterized this as a break-through because an 
alternative point of view is now included in EU policy 
discussions concerning the PRC.  Hungary's Representative, 
Sandor Matyus, added that the Taiwan EU messages have an 
impact because they offer a broader view of Asia and 
highlight the importance of political and security policy in 
the region. 
 
Influencing the Arms Embargo Debate 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) As the common messages evolved, the EU missions 
increasingly addressed issues such as balance of power, 
cross-Strait ties and in early 2005, turned to the EU arms 
embargo debate.  Goedhart acknowledged that there were many 
factors in the June decision to maintain the embargo, but he 
contends that the policy messages from EU representatives in 
Taipei played a role in the debate.  Goedhart explained that 
the representatives hoped to convince Brussels and EU 
capitals that the security balance in Asia cannot be altered 
without consequences, and that increased tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait can affect security around the world.  The 
messages advised the EU to play a more active role in 
cross-Strait issues and encouraged the EU not to lift the 
embargo solely for the sake of trade without at least 
requiring cross-Strait dialogue or other conditions from 
Beijing first. 
 
5. (C) Goedhart noted that in comparison to one year ago, 
Taiwan is more relevant in EU-PRC policy discussions and that 
cross-Strait issues are considered to be intertwined with PRC 
policy.  Czech Republic Representative Michal Kral told AIT 
that the common messages have highlighted how Taiwan will 
impact EU relations with the PRC, which helped Europe realize 
that the issues and problems related to Taiwan and the PRC 
are more complicated and significant than they realized. 
Kral asserted that the messages also helped the EU understand 
that Europe was not getting human rights concessions or real 
tangible trade benefits from Beijing that would warrant 
lifting the embargo. 
 
US Lobbying and ASL Also Important 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The representatives acknowledged other factors were 
important in the decision to maintain the embargo including 
Washington's lobbying efforts and Beijing's ASL.  Hungary's 
Matyus said that Washington's efforts, which began in earnest 
earlier this year, have made Europe aware of the USG's 
security interests in Asia.  Goedhart argued that American 
pressure was instrumental in the EU's delay in lifting the 
embargo.  He said the pressure from the Bush administration 
and Congress's threat of sanctions surprised European 
leaders.  Goedhart argued that America's lobbying campaign 
combined with the efforts of EU offices in Taipei to moderate 
Europe's PRC policies have been very effective.  The EU's 
Economic and Trade Office Director in Taipei, Brian McDonald, 
offered a similar assessment, but he did tell AIT that while 
the EU's decision to maintain the embargo was a complex 
matter, USG intervention was the most crucial factor. 
 
7. (C) Sweden's Representative, Henrik Bystrom, said the 
PRC's passage of the ASL also played a vital role in 
derailing momentum to lift the embargo and he characterized 
the ASL as Beijing "shooting itself in the foot and providing 
a gift for Taiwan." Bystrom maintained that the ASL has drawn 
considerable global attention to Taiwan's plight and 
highlighted cross-Strait issues including concerns about 
Asia's balance of power.  Italy's Deputy Representative, Dino 
Sorrentino, told AIT that with the March passage of the ASL, 
it appeared that the PRC was playing on many international 
tables because the PRC does not seem to care if the EU lifts 
the embargo.  The Czech Republic's Kral added that the ASL 
did not make any sense because until this year, momentum had 
been gaining to lift the arms embargo. 
 
Taiwan's Ineffective EU Foreign Policy 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Despite the EU's decision to maintain the embargo, EU 
diplomats in Taipei noted that Taiwan itself did very little 
to influence the decision.  According to the EU's McDonald, 
most EU nations are reluctant to deal with Taiwan and as a 
result, Taipei is unable to get its message across as it 
should since Taipei has considerable sympathy in EU 
Parliaments.  Sweden's Bystrom added that Taiwan often 
focuses too many of its limited resources on initiatives that 
have little chance of success such as Taipei's bid to join 
the UN.  He also remarked that Taiwan lacks a real strategy 
and typically relies on the USG for its European foreign 
policy.  While Bystrom suggested this may work in the short 
term, he opined that Taipei needs a viable long term strategy 
to deal with the EU.  Finally, the UK's Moore described 
Taiwan's lobbying as "unsophisticated" and lamented that 
Taiwan officials had as yet been unable to offer him a 
compelling argument that the embargo should not be lifted. 
 
Comment: Setting a Precedent 
---------------------------- 
 
9. (C) While there were certainly many factors in the EU's 
June decision to maintain the arms embargo, the willingness 
of EU missions in Taipei to seek an alternative and proactive 
means of influencing EU East Asian policies to ensure their 
voice is heard in Brussels and in other EU capitals is 
precedent setting.  The initial effort was primarily driven 
by Goedhart, but each of the EU representatives AIT met with 
were unanimous in their praise for the common messages and 
their belief that the monthly EU meetings will continue after 
Goedhart departs Taipei. 
 
10. (C) More troubling for Taiwan, however, is the EU 
representatives' assessment of Taipei's EU foreign policy 
strategy.  Taipei appears to have gotten lucky over the 
recent EU decision on arms sales.  However, Taiwan cannot 
afford to always rely on sympathetic European diplomats and 
USG intervention to effectively advance its interests in the 
EU. 
PAAL