US embassy cable - 05ROME2348

S E C R E T  ROME 002348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MOPS, IZ, IT, UNSC, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALIANS FOCUSED ON UN MANDATE, TROOP 
PARTNERSHIP, NOT EMBEDDING 
 
REF: A. STATE 111092 
     B. ROME 2115 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Jonathan Cohen for reasons 1.4 (a), (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq 
Policy Ambassador Richard Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Commander 
LTG Lance Smith led a delegation to Rome July 6-7 to discuss 
the way forward in Iraq with senior Italian diplomatic and 
military officials.  The Italians stressed that Italy's 
continuing presence in Iraq is a political decision 
conditioned on the request of the Iraqi government and an 
international legal framework, preferably in the form of a 
new UN Security Council resolution, and domestic Italian 
politics.  They will not embed troops in Iraqi units, but 
will continue to mentor them.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith led an interagency 
delegation to Rome July 6-7 as follow-up to the Ref A 
"Engaging the coalition" demarche.  The delegation met with 
senior diplomatic and military officials from Prime Minister 
Berlusconi's office, the Italian General Defense Staff, 
Defense Minister's Martino's office, and the MFA.  At the 
Prime Minister's office, Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith met 
with Berlusconi's Military Advisor LTG Alberto Ficuciello, 
Deputy National Security Advisor equivalent Gianpaolo 
Scarante, and Diplomatic Advisors Francesco Talo and Marco 
Carnelos.  At the MOD, the delegation met with CHOD Admiral 
Giampaolo Di Paola, Vice CHOD LTG Fabrizio Castagnetti, 
Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister, Achille Amerio, Vice 
Chief of the Department of Planning, Rear Admiral Rino Me, 
Vice Chief of the Joint Operational Command, Major General 
Tommaso Ferro,  CHOD Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Luigi 
Binelli Mantelli, and Joint Special Operations Commander, 
Brigadier General Marco Bertolini.  At the MFA, the 
delegation met with Deputy Political Director Giacomo 
Sanfelice, NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi, and Iraq 
Task Force Director Luigi Maccotta.  Ambassador Jones also 
participated in a separate meeting chaired by Maccotta 
focusing on political and economic developments (septel). 
Acting Political Minister Counselor, PolOff, and Defense 
Attache also attended the meetings. 
 
Seeking a New International Legal Framework 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) In each of the meetings the Italians stressed the need 
for a UN "umbrella" to help legitimize Italy's continuing 
presence in Iraq.  Defense Minister Martino's Diplomatic 
Advisor Achille Amerio was most direct, stating that a new 
legal structure in the form of a new UN mandate would be 
"very helpful" in view of Italian national elections next 
spring.  The new mandate would be most useful if it were more 
than a reiteration or extension of UNSCR 1546, he said, 
taking into account the progress that has been made. Vice 
CHOD Castagnetti (soon to become the Commander of the Joint 
Operational Command) echoed these views, asking what the US 
envisions (what is "Plan B?") should the political process 
get derailed, a question raised in each meeting. 
 
4. (C) At the PM's office, Deputy National Security Advisor 
Scarante, stressing that Italy's presence in Iraq is a 
political decision, said that PM Berlusconi is focused on two 
points:  demonstrating to the public that the Italian 
presence is making a difference and that the situation is 
improving -- and winning the Italian elections next May. 
Italy's continuing presence therefore has two conditions: 1) 
a specific request by the Iraqi government and 2) an 
international legal framework, preferably in the form of a UN 
resolution.  General Ficuciello (who lost a son in the 
November 12, 2003 Nassiriyah bombing) echoed these 
statements, noting that public opinion drives politics, and 
that the closer Italy gets to its own elections, the more it 
needs an international political umbrella to cover its 
presence in Iraq. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Jones responded that the Iraqi government 
has already on several occasions (most recently at the June 
Brussels conference) made statements expressing the value of 
the Coalition's presence and requesting that the mandate be 
continued.  For planning purposes, he said, we need to start 
working on a solution by September to bridge the gap between 
 
 
the end of the current resolution's mandate (the end of the 
political process -- presumably the December elections) and 
the time at which the newly elected Iraqi government will be 
in place and capable of making a new request for continued 
coalition presence (which could be weeks after the actual 
elections).  LTG Smith agreed that it was very likely the new 
government would ask the Coalition to stay, but recognized 
that Coalition partners might make decisions based on 
domestic political considerations and therefore needed a 
justification for staying beyond the December elections. 
 
6. (C) Responding to the question of "what is Plan B," 
Ambassador Jones explained that UNSCR 1546 remains valid 
through the end of the political process, whether that be in 
December or delayed by several months or longer (as provided 
for in the TAL).  He expressed "cautious optimism," however, 
that the process was moving ahead on schedule, with greater 
representation of the Sunni population, and fully expected 
the drafting committee to complete the new constitution 
before the August 15 deadline. 
 
Embedding vs. Partnership 
------------------------- 
 
7. (S) The Italians were firmly opposed -- on legal grounds 
-- to the concept of embedding their troops with Iraqi 
troops.  Under the current parliamentary mandate, CHOD Di 
Paola explained, Italian troops in Iraq cannot participate in 
"intentionally offensive operations" that may be required by 
Iraqi troops. (Comment: The Italian mission in Iraq, 
Operation Antica Babilonia, is a "humanitarian" mission. 
Attempts to change the mission would not only enflame an 
already hostile public but would require a new parliamentary 
mandate, something Berlusconi probably would be unwilling to 
risk in the current political environment.  End comment.)  Di 
Paola noted, however, that Italian troops are effectively 
"semi-embedded" since they work and plan with the Iraqis, 
though they are not physically located with them.  This 
seemed a satisfactory approach in the areas where Italian 
forces are located, he said.  General Smith agreed, saying 
that partnership is the concept that matters, and that he had 
seen personally that it works well in the Italian case in 
Nassiriyah. 
 
8. (S) General Ficuciello reiterated Admiral Di Paola's view, 
explaining that Italy has a different approach 
("partnership") that is working quite well:  train the Iraqi 
forces and then let them do the job.  LTG Smith agreed that 
this approach contributes to our goals of mentoring and 
promoting leadership, though it does not give the Iraqis the 
access to intelligence or communications abilities that 
embedding would.  The important thing, both sides agreed, was 
that the Iraqis take control of their own security forces. 
Italian partnership with Iraqi forces in their AOR was 
contributing satisfactorily to that goal. 
 
Troop Withdrawals 
----------------- 
 
9. (S) LTG Smith opined that MNF-I Commander General Casey 
probably would ask for more forces as the December elections 
near, but that after that there would be a potential to 
reduce forces.  Admiral Di Paola asked if a 30-40 percent 
reduction in 2006 was reasonable.  LTG Smith replied that it 
might be, but withdrawing too soon would leave a vacuum 
liable to create a situation like that of 1980s Afghanistan 
that allowed the Taliban took over.  (Comment: Apart from the 
CHOD's question, none of the Italian interlocutors spoke of 
numbers or deadlines.  All agreed with the US strategy of 
condition-based withdrawal, and were visibly relieved to hear 
LTG Smith mention potential reductions in 2006.  At the G-8 
Summit in Gleneagles, PM Berlusconi reiterated his intention 
of withdrawing, in coordination with Coalition partners, 300 
troops in September, a move that would still leave Italy with 
approximately 3,000 troops in Iraq.  End comment.) 
 
Insurgency 
---------- 
 
10. (C) The Italians also were eager to hear US views on the 
Iraq insurgency, both in terms of numbers and tactics.  LTG 
Smith said he expected violence to be volatile and probably 
to grow as the December elections near, noting that though 
 
 
fewer in numbers, the insurgents are developing more 
sophisticated techniques.  Ambassador Jones added that the 
insurgents' new strategy of intimidation is aimed at the 
Iraqi people and other Arab nationals (such as the Egyptian 
Ambassador whose murder became publicly known during these 
meetings) whose countries were supporting the Iraqi 
government.  Ambassador Jones argued that such attacks might 
cause some countries to pull back in the short-term, but that 
in the long-term it would hurt the terrorists own interests. 
Both sides agreed that the election of a new, permanent 
government and decreased visibility of coalition forces would 
help stem the violence. 
 
11. (S) To counter the insurgency, LTG Smith said the US 
strategy is to turn over more and more of the responsibility 
to the Iraqi security forces, who have a better idea of what 
is going on in their own cities, and to consolidate coalition 
bases to areas outside of the cities, lowering the visibility 
of the coalition forces.  In response to General Ficuciello's 
question about whether the Iraqi people's perception of the 
coalition forces was improving, General Smith cited the 
increased number of tip-offs received as evidence that the 
Iraqi people are tired of the insurgency and willing to help 
the coalition in their efforts to defeat it.  However, he 
noted, the perception varies from province to province; in 
al-Anbar, for example, we will always be considered 
occupiers. 
 
Regional Actors 
---------------- 
 
12. (C) Several of the Italian officials inquired about the 
role of regional actors such as Syria and Iran.  Both 
Ambassador Jones and LTG Smith responded that the US is 
watching Iran carefully, though so far there have been no 
overt attempts to oppose our efforts.  They expressed more 
concern about Syria and its role in allowing foreign fighters 
to cross into Iraq.  Ambassador Jones said the US is urging 
all of Iraq's neighbors to be supportive of the political 
process and not to view it in terms of a Shia-Sunni problem, 
and is encouraging countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to 
forgive Iraq's debt to help improve the economic situation. 
 
NATO Training Mission 
--------------------- 
 
13. (C) Both the MFA and MOD stressed Italy's strong 
commitment to the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I), including 
leadership of the war college, staff college and junior 
officers college in Ar-Rustamiyah, as well as bilateral 
training conducted in Italy.   Force protection, however, 
remains a concern for Italy.  MFA Deputy Political Director 
Sanfelice urged the US to enlist other Coalition members in 
protecting the NATO forces, and MFA NATO Office Director 
Brauzzi suggested that some of the countries that are 
withdrawing from the Coalition might be persuaded to 
contribute to NTM-I's force protection. 
 
14. (U) Ambassador Jones has cleared this cable. 
 
BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME02348 - Classification: SECRET