US embassy cable - 05HOCHIMINHCITY739

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CAO DAI: PRIEST OR PUPPETS?

Identifier: 05HOCHIMINHCITY739
Wikileaks: View 05HOCHIMINHCITY739 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Created: 2005-07-14 00:36:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PGOV PINS SOCI KIRF VM RELFREE HUMANR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

140036Z Jul 05

ACTION EAP-00   

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      NSCE-00  OMB-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    GIWI-00  PRS-00   
      ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  
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FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1770
INFO AMEMBASSY HANOI 
ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS  HO CHI MINH CITY 000739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV and DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, SOCI, KIRF, VM, RELFREE, HUMANR 
SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CAO DAI: PRIEST OR PUPPETS? 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Leaders of the GVN-recognized Tay Ninh Cao Dai 
sect, a once anti-Communist, autonomous religious and social 
organization, maintain that they have an excellent relationship 
with the GVN.  They praised the GVN for its support of the Cao Dai 
religion and said the new legal framework on religion was a 
significant step forward.  Former Cao Dai leaders turned 
dissidents argue that the 1997 charter that is the basis for the 
group's legal recognition imposes GVN control over the 
organization and distorts key tenets of the religion.  GVN policy 
towards the Cao Dai mirrors that of the Government toward the Hoa 
Hao and Buddhists, and is an outgrowth of the Party's desire to 
monitor all aspects of Vietnamese society and maintain one-Party 
rule.  End Summary. 
 
Who are the Cao Dai? 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) The Cao Dai religion was established in southern Vietnam by 
Ngo Van Chieu in Tay Ninh Province in 1926.  The faith is a fusion 
of secular and religious philosophies from both the east and west, 
combining Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism with Vietnamese 
spiritualism, Christianity, and Islam.  One of the central tenets 
of the Cao Dai is the use of spiritual mediums including seances. 
At the outset, the wealth and popularity of Cao Daism gave the 
organization significant political and military autonomy in Tay 
Ninh until the 25,000-member Cao Dai army was incorporated into 
the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam.  Like the Hoa Hao in 
the Mekong Delta, the Cao Dai were nationalistic, but strongly 
anti-Communist.  Following the war, all Cao Dai lands in Vietnam 
were confiscated, though the Holy See compound in Tay Ninh and 400 
temples were later returned in 1985. 
 
3. (U) The Cao Dai claim six million adherents worldwide including 
34 provinces in Vietnam.  (Note: The Government Committee for 
Religious Affairs puts the number at 2.4 million. End note.) There 
are six different forms of Cao Daism that are officially 
recognized by the GVN, with another six that are unrecognized. 
There is little doctrinal difference between the groups, however. 
The principal Cao Dai organization with the majority of followers, 
upwards of 700,000, is centered in Tay Ninh and Ho Chi Minh City. 
As part of its formal GVN recognition in 1997, the Tay Ninh Cao 
Dai adopted a new charter, which established a 72-member Central 
Executive Council.  The Cao Dai also have a parallel religious 
structure with bishops, cardinals, and a Pope.  The last Cardinal 
died in the mid-1980s.  The positions of Pope and Cardinal, which 
are historically filled through spiritual mediums, remain vacant 
as a result of a GVN prohibition on seances.  The Pope and 
Cardinals serve as the executors of religious doctrine that is 
promulgated by the Executive Council.  In the absence of a Pope, 
the Chairman of the Council, Archbishop Thuong Tam Thanh, acts as 
the religious executor.  Tam Thanh has been Chairman of the 
Executive Council since 1999. 
 
The Official Cao Dai Church Praises the GVN 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) In separate meetings, Chairman Tam Thanh and HCMC Cao Dai 
representative Thuong Minh Thanh portrayed their relationship with 
GVN officials at the national and local levels as excellent.  The 
two leaders claimed that even before Vietnam adopted its new legal 
framework on religion, the Cao Dai never had a problem with GVN 
interference in internal issues such as ordination or promotion of 
clergy.  The new legal framework will only improve conditions for 
the church as it provides more specificity for government 
officials in regulating religious activity.  Minh Thanh also 
lauded GVN support for the ongoing effort to repatriate the 
remains of the Holy See Conservator, Pham Cong Tac, who died in 
Cambodia during the war.  Despite GVN support since April 2004, 
the Cambodian government has not yet agreed to the repatriation. 
 
5. (U) In May 2005, the Executive Council expelled five senior 
members of the Cao Dai church in HCMC because, according to 
Chairman Tam Thanh, the adherents failed to follow the 
instructions of the Cao Dai leadership when participating in 
burial ceremonies.  The expelled members placed the deceased in 
caskets according to religious rules that existed prior to 1997. 
Minh Thanh added that the followers were expelled because they 
accused the Executive Council of changing the Cao Dai's religious 
rites and for sending "inciting, critical, insulting, and 
disrespectful" letters to Chairman Tam Thanh. 
 
Dissidents Protest GVN "Control" 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) In a series of meetings in his church, Cao Dai dissident 
Le Quang Tan (strictly protect), who serves as mentor to the 
ousted five, said that the expulsions were designed to cement GVN 
control over the Cao Dai church.  Le stated that the GVN "borrows 
the Executive Council to deal with the people they don't like." 
The five expelled church leaders were protesting that the 
 
Executive Council and the HCMC Cao Dai leadership had bowed to GVN 
authority on matters of internal church administration and 
religious practice.  He and the five were demanding that Cao Daism 
return to its original charter, which would permit seances, dilute 
the power of the Chairman of the Executive Council and allow for 
the selection of a Cao Dai Pope and Cardinals.  The GVN 
prohibition on seances does not allow adherents to gather 
religious doctrine from a supreme being.  Now, the Executive 
Council decides religious doctrine and leadership.  Separately, 
Tay Ninh dissident Archbishop Thuong Nha Thanh (also strictly 
protect) expressed similar beliefs on the 1997 charter and argued 
that the original religious structure would prevent GVN control 
over the Cao Dai. (Nha Thanh was the highest-ranking Archbishop 
prior to 1975.  He had the authority equivalent to the current 
Executive Council Chairman.) 
 
7. (U) Tam Thanh and Minh Thanh rejected arguments that the 1997 
Charter fundamentally changed the precepts of Cao Daism, 
explaining that the only changes were administrative.  While the 
titles of certain clergy were changed, they retained similar 
functions and responsibilities.  They also stated that the GVN 
prohibition on seances is immaterial because the major principles 
of the religion have been passed down by spiritual mediums already 
and continuous use of spiritism has the potential for abuse.  Minh 
Thanh described the change in the burial ceremony as "a small 
change" but stated that it still required strict compliance. 
Archbishop Nha Thanh agreed with this assessment that the 
ceremonial change was small but considered the action of the 
Executive Council harsh for the infraction of ceremonial 
procedures. 
 
8. (SBU) Le also discussed his concerns about his deteriorating 
relationship with the Executive Council and Ho Chi Minh City 
authorities.   Members of the Executive Council routinely monitor 
his visitors.  After a visit by ConGen officers last month, 
Ministry of Public Security officials interviewed him on seven or 
eight occasions.  Although very frail, the 80-year old cleric 
remained firm in his demand for greater autonomy, despite police 
pressure and threats from the Ho Chi Minh City Cao Dai Executive 
Council to expel him from the church where he now resides.  (Le 
was previously the legal inspector and religious historian of the 
church.  His position was "suspended" in 1997, when the Cao Dai 
adopted its new charter.) 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
9. (SBU) Unlike other religious communities with a similar history 
of opposing the Communist Party, the official Cao Dai enjoy a 
somewhat more amicable relationship with the GVN.  This is in 
large part due to the open dialogue that they have cultivated on 
the national level and the lack of a compelling dissenting leader. 
It is clear from meetings that the GVN has a quiet control over 
the administrative bodies of the official Cao Dai and makes it 
difficult to express true dissent.  While the call for a pre-1997 
Charter appears at first blush to be disagreement on semantics as 
the Executive Council Chairman represents, it can be more 
accurately described as a call for religious autonomy by 
dissenters.  GVN policy towards the Cao Dai mirrors their 
treatment toward other organizations - establishing and monitoring 
its leadership - and is an outgrowth of the Party's desire to 
monitor all aspects of Vietnamese society and maintain one-Party 
rule. 
 
KELLEY 
 
 
NNNN 

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