US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2944

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PHUM, PTER, PINS, XF, IZ, Detainees 
SUBJECT: US-IRAQI DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION 
DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE, DESPITE ITG'S BEST EFFORTS 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2858 
 
Classified By: This cable was classified by Ambassador 
David Litt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Embassy and MNF-I representatives held a 
second meeting with ITG detainee-transition point-of- 
contact Sharwan al-Waely on July 11, 2005.  As noted 
in Reftel, Mr. al-Waely was reluctant at our July 5 
meeting to concede that security internment played a 
valuable role in the fight against the insurgency 
inside Iraq; as a result, we presented a detailed 
briefing on the demographics and threat profile of 
Coalition detainees at this second meeting. 
 
2.  (C) Mr. al-Waely was quiet throughout the brief, 
and showed little interest or confidence in MNF-I's 
assessment of the current detainee population. He did, 
however, note that it was the position of the ITG that 
MNF-I was "releasing detainees too slowly".  Mr. al- 
Waely did not veto our proposal that we return at the 
next meeting to the discussion of Iraqi legal 
authorities for detention, but showed no enthusiasm at 
the prospect. 
 
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AVOIDING THE SUBJECT 
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3.  (C) Iraqi participation in this second meeting of 
the joint US-Iraqi working group tasked with 
determining possible legal authorities for Iraqi 
security detention upon the expiration of UNSCR 1546 
was limited, largely because Mr. al-Waely, who had 
agreed previously to identify and invite appropriate 
Iraqi interlocutors, telephoned MNF-I shortly before 
the meeting to ask that MNF-I do so instead. 
 
4.  (C) Mr. al-Waely arrived an hour-and-a-half late, 
explaining that he believed the meeting had been 
scheduled for four o'clock that afternoon.  (The same 
misunderstanding caused the cancellation of our July 4 
meeting, despite the fact that both meetings were 
arranged and confirmed for nine o'clock in the morning 
by a native Iraqi linguist.) 
 
5.  (C) Mr. al-Waely suggested that this second 
meeting be cancelled as well, noting that it was 10:30 
and that he had other appointments; however, he agreed 
to stay for a short briefing by MNF-I Detainee 
Operations, in which MNF-I presented release 
statistics, legal procedures, and threat profiles of 
the Coalition's 10,000-strong, increasingly dangerous 
detainee population. 
 
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COMPLAINTS ABOUT SPEED OF DETAINEE RELEASES 
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6.  (C) At the conclusion of the brief, Mr. al-Waely 
sighed and said it was the position of the Iraqi 
government that detainee releases were "too slow".  He 
did not respond to PolMilOff and MNF-I's review of the 
expedited release processes for low-threat detainees, 
nor to the presentation of statistics showing that 
over 2,500 detainees had been released from local and 
theater-level facilities in June. 
 
7.  (C) Mr. al-Waely commented he had received "many 
reports" that "the Americans" were seeding Wahhabi 
extremists amongst Shi'a detainees in Coalition 
facilities.  PolMilOff explained MNF-I's practice of 
identifying and isolating extremist detainees, to 
which Mr. al-Waely responded "still, there are 
reports".  PolMilOff asked if Mr. al-Waely could pass 
us specifics which could be investigated. He shrugged. 
 
8.  (C) Mr. al-Waely appeared to concede in the brief 
ensuing conversation that some detainees were 
unsuitable for immediate release, saying he did not 
object to the detention of individuals "when there is 
real evidence against them".  However, his demeanor 
indicated that he gave little credence to MNF-I's 
assessment that 86% of those detained since January 
2005 pose an extreme or high threat to Iraqi security 
if released today. 
 
9.  (C) Throughout the conversation, Mr. al-Waely 
demonstrated a striking isolation from other Iraqi 
governmental bodies. He was unaware that MNF-I 
presented the Ministry of Justice with monthly 
detainee rosters, that the Ministry of the Interior 
was informed of detainee releases, and that Ministry 
of Human Rights employees were present as advisors 
inside Coalition detention facilities. 
 
10.  (C) Mr. al-Waely was also dismissive of the 
security assessments and release-and-retain judgments 
of the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB), 
saying "we need a better system".  He did, however, 
repeat his inquiries as to the names and identities of 
the CRRB's Iraqi members, for which PolMilOff referred 
him to the ministries which staff the Board. 
 
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THE WAY AHEAD 
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11.  (C) While Mr. al-Waely is clearly reluctant to 
engage seriously on this topic, he remains the Prime 
Minister's designate.  Moreover, his unwillingness to 
accept the security implications of the unilateral 
release of detainees assessed as dangerous by 
the Iraqi-majority CRRB is not uncommon amongst 
senior ITG leadership. 
 
12.  (C) We plan to schedule another meeting for July 
18, and will again encourage Mr. al-Waely to invite 
appropriate Iraqi interlocutors.  We intend to return 
in the next meeting to the subject of current or 
potential Iraqi legal authorities to hold security 
internees upon the expiration of Coalition detention 
authorities, and will report the results. 
Satterfield