US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2938

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, MOPS, PL, IZ, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ INDICATED DIMINISHED 
ROLE FOR POLISH FORCES 
 
REF: WARSAW 2786 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(a) 
(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Polish Ambassador to Baghdad Ryszard 
Krystosik told Charge d'Affaires July 10 that Poland will be 
phasing down its participation in MNF-I after December.  The 
decision is not so much because of the expiration of UNSC 
resolutions as it is because the duration and scope of the 
deployment is beginning to strain the Polish military, 
particularly at a time of great change to the military.  In 
addition, he confirmed that Poland's prime minister plans to 
visit Iraq later this month, and requested support for the 
visit.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
POLES PLAN TO REDUCE PRESENCE IN IRAQ 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Poland's Ambassador to Iraq Ryszard Krystosik, 
recently returned to Baghdad from a Polish chiefs of Mission 
conference in Warsaw, called on Charge d'Affaires on July 10 
to discuss Poland's continued engagement in Iraq.  He began 
by saying that Poland intends to change the nature of its 
military posture in Iraq.  He recounted how Poland has been 
with the U.S. in Iraq since the beginning and is proud that 
the situation has been improving gradually in the sector it 
commands, Multi-National Division - Central-South (MND-CS). 
However, the Polish government believes it is time to begin 
to slowly reduce its presence in Iraq. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador Krystosik hastened to point out that this 
change does not mean that the Poles will withdraw completely. 
 Rather, they prefer to see the focus of their mission 
change.  At first, it was to stabilize the situation.  Now it 
is shifting more toward an emphasis on training the new Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF) to do the job themselves.  The Poles 
would rather concentrate on this training mission, which they 
believe will mean the commitment of fewer troops.  The 
Ambassador assured Charge that although the Poles may 
ultimately be here in smaller numbers than before, their 
commitment will remain strong and the mission will continue. 
He estimated that there are 1,700 Polish troops in Iraq and 
speculated that the number will decrease to 1,500 by 
September.  A further downsizing is likely to follow. 
 
4.  (C)  Charge asked Ambassador Krystosik if the impending 
expiration in December of UNSCR 1546 is the reason for this 
change in approach, and whether the Polish view would be 
different were the resolution to be extended.  The Ambassador 
replied that the plan to reduce Poland's presence would be 
the same.  He explained that Warsaw's decision is not based 
solely on the status of the mandate, but mainly on the fact 
that it is becoming more and more difficult for Poland to 
maintain command of MND-CS.  Some of its troops have served 
multiple tours of duty and the continued deployment is making 
it increasingly difficult to maintain the army's equipment. 
This is happening at a time when the Polish military is 
undergoing far-reaching and necessary reforms and changes due 
to its NATO commitments.  Once a military force dependent 
heavily on conscription, it is now becoming an all-volunteer 
armed force.  In addition, the Polish military has 
commitments elsewhere, such as Afghanistan.  Its men and 
equipment simply cannot stand the strain of continued 
deployment in Iraq. 
 
5.  (4) Ambassador Krystosik added his own personal view that 
Poland's continued role in Iraq is likely to be influenced by 
domestic politics.  He believes that the government in Warsaw 
may possibly change later in the year, and observed that the 
opposition parties are dissatisfied with the country's 
engagement in Iraq.  In short, social ideals in Poland do not 
support the war.  Nevertheless, said Krystosik, Poland is 
sending some very good units and an excellent commander this 
month to relieve the forces that are in Iraq.  And, of 
course, he could not predict with certainty the outcome of 
elections.  Krystosik made it clear that Poland's commitment 
remains strong, even if its future role will focus on 
training than is now the case. 
 
------------------------------ 
VISIT OF POLISH PRIME MINISTER 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Krystosik confirmed that Polish Prime 
Minister Belka will lead a high-level delegation to Iraq on 
July 26 (reftel).  The purpose of the visit is to further 
develop political and economic relations with Iraq and also 
to bolster the Iraqi leadership.  Other members of the 
delegation tentatively include the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, National Economy, Finance, and Culture.  In 
addition, the government spokesperson, journalists, and a 
number of businessmen primarily from the power and oil 
sectors will also accompany the delegation.  The itinerary 
for the visit matches the one outlined reftel. 
 
7.  (C)  The Prime Minister plans to meet with Iraqi PM 
Ja'afari and then engage in a plenary session focusing on 
broader issues to cement the Polish-Iraqi relationship.  The 
ministers will meet with their counterparts.  The Prime 
Minister also hopes to meet with the speaker of the 
Transitional National Assembly, President Talabani, and to 
hold a joint news conference.  In the afternoon, the 
delegation plans to fly to Diwaniyah to witness the MND-CS 
change of command ceremony.  On July 27, they will return to 
Baghdad, then fly on to Irbil where the PM Belka will meet 
with President Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government. 
They will then depart Iraq. 
 
8.  (C)  Charge advised Krystosik that PM Belka should press 
the Iraqi government officials he meets to increase their 
public outreach activities.  With Barzani, PM Belka should 
counsel him against taking any provocative steps in Kirkuk. 
Krystosik confirmed that the accent of the visit will be on 
affirming Polish support for a unified Iraq and its 
territorial integrity.  He renewed the request made reftel 
for logistical support for the visit, and Charge assured him 
that the U.S. Mission in Iraq will do everything possible to 
help. 
 
9.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield