US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2933

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IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER'S IRAN VISIT: AN OLIVE BRANCH

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2933
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2933 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-12 20:30:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: MARR PREL IR IZ Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2025 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, IR, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER'S IRAN VISIT: AN OLIVE 
BRANCH 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2874 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary:  Iraqi Defense Minister Al-Dulaimi 
confirmed to Charge on July 10 that he had signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran during his 
official visit to Tehran on July 5.  Al-Dulaimi told Charge 
that his discussions with Iran centered on the need for Iran 
to monitor its borders with Iraq. It was an initial effort to 
establish better relations with an important neighbor.  The 
planning for the trip appears to have been haphazard.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C/NF) Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi confirmed 
to Charge at a dinner hosted by General Casey on July 10 that 
he had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran 
during his official visit to Tehran on July 5, and provided a 
copy of the signed document.  The MOU comprises five main 
points: 
 
-- formation of a joint committee to ensure border security 
and prevent terrorist infiltration; 
 
-- exchange of information on location of minefields on both 
sides of the Iran-Iraq border; 
 
-- cooperation in searching for remains of war victims; 
 
-- an Iranian offer to set aside a portion of Iranian 
reconstruction donations to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense(MOD); 
 
-- and a proposed conference with Iraq's neighbors on 
regional coordination and cooperation on security and 
trust-building. 
 
3. (S/NF) Planning for al-Dulaimi's trip appears to have been 
haphazard and it appears may not have been fully coordinated 
with PM Jafari, who told Charge he had originally planned to 
take al-Dulaimi with him to Iran July 16, but al-Dulaimi "had 
decided to go on his own separately."  Al-Dulaimi changed his 
mind several times on whether he would take a large group 
with him to Iran, and eventually decided to bring the Chief 
of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy, a member of the Joint Staff, a bodyguard, a member of 
the media, and his private secretary.  Even the travel 
arrangements were uncertain. The Iranians sent a plane to fly 
the Minister and his party to Tehran, but when it came time 
for al-Dulaimi to return home he was informed that the plane 
was no longer available.  He requested that an Iraqi Air 
Force C-130 be sent to retrieve him, but this was not 
possible due to the fact that the Iraqi aircraft are still 
crewed by U.S. military instructor pilots.  As a result, his 
return home was via Amman and took two days. 
 
4. (C/NF) Al-Dulaimi told Charge that his discussions with 
the Iranians focused mainly on the need for "practical, 
non-political" arrangements to control the border and take 
home small Iraq-Iran War-related CBMs. This is in line with 
what he told Charge and General Casey on July 2 when he 
informed them of his intention to visit Tehran (REFTEL). 
Al-Dulaimi underscored that the MOU's scope was very limited, 
and asserted that some small steps were necessary to break 
the ice with Tehran before tackling more difficult issues, 
including concerns over Iranian interference in Iraqi 
affairs.  Al-Dulaimi assured Charge, however, that the Iraqis 
had no intention of allowing Tehran to "train Iraqi forces," 
as the Iranian MinDef had claimed to the press. 
 
5. (C/NF)Al-Dulaimi recounted to Charge his meetings in 
Teheran with President Khatami and FM Kharazi, claiming they 
and others in the current government were "stunned" at the 
outcome of the presidential elections. The new President, 
whom al-Dulaimi did not meet, was said by Khatami to "be very 
tough". Charge cautioned this only underscored our repeated 
counsel for the ITG to be very careful in how it approached 
expanded relations with Iran. 
 
6.  (C//NF)  A copy of the MOU has been electronically sent 
to NEA/I. 
 
7.  (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield 

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