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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD2933 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD2933 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-07-12 20:30:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | MARR PREL IR IZ Security |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002933 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2025 TAGS: MARR, PREL, IR, IZ, Security SUBJECT: IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER'S IRAN VISIT: AN OLIVE BRANCH REF: BAGHDAD 2874 Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Iraqi Defense Minister Al-Dulaimi confirmed to Charge on July 10 that he had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran during his official visit to Tehran on July 5. Al-Dulaimi told Charge that his discussions with Iran centered on the need for Iran to monitor its borders with Iraq. It was an initial effort to establish better relations with an important neighbor. The planning for the trip appears to have been haphazard. End Summary. 2. (C/NF) Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi confirmed to Charge at a dinner hosted by General Casey on July 10 that he had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran during his official visit to Tehran on July 5, and provided a copy of the signed document. The MOU comprises five main points: -- formation of a joint committee to ensure border security and prevent terrorist infiltration; -- exchange of information on location of minefields on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border; -- cooperation in searching for remains of war victims; -- an Iranian offer to set aside a portion of Iranian reconstruction donations to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense(MOD); -- and a proposed conference with Iraq's neighbors on regional coordination and cooperation on security and trust-building. 3. (S/NF) Planning for al-Dulaimi's trip appears to have been haphazard and it appears may not have been fully coordinated with PM Jafari, who told Charge he had originally planned to take al-Dulaimi with him to Iran July 16, but al-Dulaimi "had decided to go on his own separately." Al-Dulaimi changed his mind several times on whether he would take a large group with him to Iran, and eventually decided to bring the Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, a member of the Joint Staff, a bodyguard, a member of the media, and his private secretary. Even the travel arrangements were uncertain. The Iranians sent a plane to fly the Minister and his party to Tehran, but when it came time for al-Dulaimi to return home he was informed that the plane was no longer available. He requested that an Iraqi Air Force C-130 be sent to retrieve him, but this was not possible due to the fact that the Iraqi aircraft are still crewed by U.S. military instructor pilots. As a result, his return home was via Amman and took two days. 4. (C/NF) Al-Dulaimi told Charge that his discussions with the Iranians focused mainly on the need for "practical, non-political" arrangements to control the border and take home small Iraq-Iran War-related CBMs. This is in line with what he told Charge and General Casey on July 2 when he informed them of his intention to visit Tehran (REFTEL). Al-Dulaimi underscored that the MOU's scope was very limited, and asserted that some small steps were necessary to break the ice with Tehran before tackling more difficult issues, including concerns over Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Al-Dulaimi assured Charge, however, that the Iraqis had no intention of allowing Tehran to "train Iraqi forces," as the Iranian MinDef had claimed to the press. 5. (C/NF)Al-Dulaimi recounted to Charge his meetings in Teheran with President Khatami and FM Kharazi, claiming they and others in the current government were "stunned" at the outcome of the presidential elections. The new President, whom al-Dulaimi did not meet, was said by Khatami to "be very tough". Charge cautioned this only underscored our repeated counsel for the ITG to be very careful in how it approached expanded relations with Iran. 6. (C//NF) A copy of the MOU has been electronically sent to NEA/I. 7. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Satterfield
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