US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2922

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, IZ, Elections 
SUBJECT: ANBARI BUSINESS AND TRIBAL LEADER CHARTS A 
POLITICAL COURSE 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Abdullah Kharbit, a prominent businessman 
from an influential Anbar tribal family, described the 
Sunni Arabs as leaderless and unorganized as compared to 
the Shia and Kurds.  He noted a few leaders have begun 
creating a Sunni political movement to prepare for the 
elections in December.  Abdullah said some of these men 
have received permission from insurgents to enter the 
political process.  While tribal leaders will command 
limited support at the polls, the popular new Governor and 
leader of the Anbar Iraqi Islamic Party will poll well with 
more educated voters, he opined.  Kharbit emphasized that 
the real power in the province belongs to insurgents rather 
than tribes or political leaders.  Abdullah believes some 
insurgents may help facilitate Sunni political 
participation, but the extremists will go to great lengths 
to prevent it. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On July 7, Ramadi PolOff and 2MarDiv FAO met with 
Abdullah al-Kharbit, a contractor from a prominent Al-Anbar 
family who serves as the clan's informal liaison to the 
Coalition.  Abdullah characterized the Sunnis as 
leaderless.  The last Sunni leader was Saddam Hussein, and 
Hussein had effectively eliminated all competition. 
Abdullah contrasted this with Shia and Kurds, who have 
established leaders, and a far more organized body politic. 
 
3.  (C) Abdullah identified two main players in the drive 
to create a Sunni political movement: Khalaf Al-Ayan and 
Salah Mutlak.  Abdullah claimed that the insurgency has 
approved these two men's participation in the political 
process, and they had recently organized a political 
conference in Ramadi.  Ironically, the conference was 
cancelled at the last minute when rival insurgents 
threatened attendees, to which Abdullah attributed to 
tribal rivalries.  He described the aborted conference as 
"an Albu Fahad tribal show", given key organizers, Sheikh 
Nasser and Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, are from the tribe. 
(Comment: Talal al Gaoud, an Amman-based Sunni political 
organizer from the Albu Nimr tribe told SET officer in late 
June in Amman that a more diverse conference was planned 
for the week of July 11, but it appears to have been 
cancelled as well.  Mutlak has been an active Sunni 
negotiator all spring, with multiple and evolving 
affiliations, most recently as spokesman for the National 
Dialogue Council.  Khalaf Alayan, also from the National 
Dialogue Council, is a former senior military officer with 
alleged strong connections to the insurgency.  End 
Comment.) 
 
4.  (C) Abdullah claimed his cousin, Hamad al-Kharbit, is 
influential behind the scenes.  He said Hamad remains well 
connected to the events of Al-Anbar, although he is based 
in Amman.  (Note:  In the January elections, Hamad won a 
seat on the Provincial Council but told SET officer he 
would not participate.  He said he only registered as a 
candidate to please the Coalition.  Hamad's slate received 
a sufficient number of votes for seven or eight seats, but 
there were only three candidates on his provincial list. 
End Note.)  Abdullah, meanwhile, was a candidate for the 
National Assembly, in January, but in the skimpy Anbar 
voter turnout failed to secure a seat.  Undaunted, he plans 
to runs again and desires nothing less than a Ministership. 
He said he considered forming a political alliance with 
Minister of State for Provincial Affairs, Sa'ad Naif al- 
Hardan, but he now believes Hardan will have too much 
baggage from his participation in the ITG.  Abdullah also 
debated an alliance with Minister of Defense Sadoun al- 
Dulaymi but regards Dulaymi as "too cozy" with Prime 
Minister Jafari. 
5.  (C) In general, Abdullah expects the tribes to do well 
at the polls.  He observed, the "simple people" will vote 
along tribal lines.  However, he believes the 
intelligentsia vote will probably go to the Iraqi Islamic 
Party.  In fact, Abdullah views Anbar Governor Mamoon Sami 
Raseed (the local IIP leader) as a rising star.  "He is 
astonishingly honest and simply unbuyable and believe me, I 
know."  Mamoon is proving to be a popular and effective 
manager, said Abdullah.  Mamoon does more work with less 
money but he still spreads the projects around so everyone 
feels they are getting something.  "For the next election, 
bet on Mamoon.  He will be the winning horse."  Abdullah 
observed Mamoon has survived in Anbar's deadly (literally) 
politics because he is regarded as an able administrator. 
Insurgents want water and power, too, Abdullah quipped.  He 
postulated that the insurgents think the Coalition hates 
the IIP, so Mamoon automatically gets some street credit. 
In Abdullah's view, the only other non-tribal Sunni 
candidates who would do well in an election are Abd Al- 
Latif Humayem, Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, and Muslim Ulema 
Council leader Harith Al-Dari. 
 
6.  (C) On security matters, Abdullah believes that the 
real power in the province rests with the insurgency.  He 
identified the following people as key insurgent leaders: 
Mohammad Daham in Ramadi (who is currently in Coalition 
detention); Sheikh Nou'fel of Khaldiyah; Mohammed Mahmoud 
Latif who operates in the region between Ramadi and 
Khaldiyah; Sheikh Saqr of Abu Ghraeb; and Abu Mu'ath 
(possibly an alias for Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri) in Al Qaim. 
Abdullah confessed that the tribes have very little control 
over these figures.  He also dismissed the notion that the 
tribes have begun to fight foreign and extremist elements. 
For example, over the past six weeks there has been 
sporadic fighting in the town of Al Qaim (near the Iraqi 
border with Syria) between the Albu Mahal tribe and members 
of Abu Musab al Zarqawi's Tanzim Qa'idat al Jihad fi Bilad 
al Rafidayn (QJBR).  However, Abdullah contends this is 
just the most recent chapter in a traditional tribal feud 
between Albu Mahal and the Al-Karabouli - many of whom have 
aligned themselves with QJBR.  (Note: The fighting is 
likely an effort to control the border and the lucrative 
smuggling opportunities there.  End Note.) 
 
7.  (C) Although Abdullah downplayed the tribe vs. 
extremist dynamic, he identified a potential fault line 
between the local insurgency and the foreign fighters.  In 
order to prevent a repeat of the dismal voter turn-out in 
Anbar on January 30, Abdullah believes some insurgent 
leaders will encourage active participation in the upcoming 
political process and may participate themselves.  He 
predicts some insurgent leaders will be divided: some will 
shelter the political process from the extremists while 
others will discourage the Sunnis from voting.  He said the 
insurQnts seek to establish a "legitimate" militia and see 
themselves performing the role that Pesh Merga and Badr 
Corps serve in their respective communities. 
 
8.  (C) Abdullah explained that Zarqawi has announced the 
creation of a new organization called the Omar Corps to 
counterbalance the alleged persecution of Sunnis by the 
Badr Corps.  (Note: Omar was the third Islamic Caliph after 
the death of the Prophet Mohammed and let the great 
expansion of the Islamic Empire.  End Note.)  Abdullah 
fears such a move will resonate with all sectors of the 
Sunni community who fear Shia control of the government and 
the instruments of state power.  For example, Abdullah says 
his biggest fear -- as a Sunni -- is the Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior.  "It might as well be the Iranian MOI," he 
exclaimed.  He told stories of Sunnis being abused at the 
hands of MOI personnel.  (Note:  Many Sunni contacts from 
Anbar now make such allegations.  End Note.)  If the 
concept of armed revenge finds resonance with the Anbar 
electorate, Abdullah observed the Sunnis' problems will be 
compounded. 
 
9.  (C) Comment:  Abdullah is an excellent 
conversationalist who speaks fluent English and approaches 
many issues from a Western mind-set which gives him access 
to many Coalition actors.  His pedigree and his family's 
connections to the previous regime also give his access to 
insurgent circles.  However, it is not clear if he has 
entree to the insurgent inner clique, and he is not above 
telling fiction if it serves his personal interest. 
Nevertheless, he is usually pretty good at taking the pulse 
of the street, he supports the legitimate political 
process, and his business interests put him on the side of 
Iraqi stability and progress. 
 
10.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield