US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4037

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR JSCHWARTZEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2015 
TAGS: ENRG, IZ, KNNP, OTRA, PARM, TRGY, TU, JO 
SUBJECT: REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN DOE INTERNATIONAL THREAT 
REDUCTION PROGRAM AND TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY (JUNE 
28, 2005) 
 
Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reason 1.4 b/d. 
 
1.  (U) Summary: Members of the DOE Office of International 
Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara 
June 28, 2005 to discuss with officials of the Turkish Atomic 
Energy Authority (TAEK) shared concerns for the security of 
radioactive materials in the region and to explore 
opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of 
radiological threat reduction. Following detailed discussions 
it was agreed that the initial area of Radiological Threat 
Reduction cooperation with Turkey should focus on the problem 
of radiological safety in Iraq and the high volume of 
radioactive contaminated material that is stopped at Iraq's 
borders. DOE would explore the possibility of involving 
Jordan as well. (Comment: Concurrent independent activities 
by DOE (IRTR) and State complement this meeting in gaining 
further regional cooperation with Iraq.) End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Members of the DOE Office of International 
Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara 
June 28, 2005 to meet with officials of the Turkish Atomic 
Energy Authority (TAEK).  The purpose of the visit was to 
conduct initial meetings with TAEK to discuss shared concerns 
for the security of radioactive materials and to explore 
opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of 
radiological threat reduction. Joseph Schwartzel from the DOE 
HQ, Stephen Musolino from Brookhaven National Laboratory and 
EXBS Advisor comprised the U.S. delegations which met with 
TAEK officials.  Schwartzel outlined IRTR's responsibilities 
and accomplishments.  These include ongoing projects with 
over 40 countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally with 
IAEA or Interpol, across a spectrum of radiological threat 
reduction activities including: regional partnerships, 
technical exchanges, cooperation projects with Interpol and 
the IAEA, and physical security work at a variety of 
facilities, like medical clinics, irradiation facilities, and 
storage facilities in over 30 countries. 
 
3.  (U) The primary Turkish interlocutor was the TAEK 
President Mr. Okay Cakiroglu.  Cakiroglu explained TAEK's 
active approach towards radiological threat reduction in 
Turkey with numerous activities under the Turkish National 
Security Strategic Plan for Vulnerable Radiological Sources, 
including radiological source inventory, increased facility 
security measures, regional seminars conducted with IAEA, 
national training courses, installation of radiation 
detectors and an independent Security Committee at TAEK. 
Cakiroglu also explained steps Turkey has taken to control 
radioactive materials within their borders, including 
regulations, laws, licensee compliance inspection, training, 
and cooperation with police and customs officials.  Cakiroglu 
concluded his remarks by commenting that while the United 
States is now seeking Turkey's assistance in the area of 
Radiological Threat Reduction within the region and is 
acknowledging Turkey's position as a leader in the Region, it 
is strange that the United States does not appear to be 
interested in being involved in the development of Peaceful 
Nuclear Energy in Turkey due to the lack of effort to ratify 
the 5-year old Agreement with Turkey for the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy. 
 
4.  (U) Cakiroglu then moved on to discuss Turkey's primary 
radiological concern: the lack of control of radiological 
materials by its neighbor, Iraq.  Turkey has experienced a 
significant number of radioactive contaminated shipments 
arriving at it's border crossing with Iraq since June 2003. 
This most frequently involves contaminated scrap metal 
shipments originating in Iraq.  Turkish authorities detect 
the radioactive material contained in truck cargo, and then 
deny the vehicle entry into Turkey.  Frequently the 
contaminated materials are simply dumped along the side of 
the road inside Iraq, creating both a radiological security 
and safety problem.  This situation has probably resulted in 
radioactive sources being left in an uncontrolled manner in 
these debris piles or elsewhere in Iraq.  While, TAEK 
recognizes this problem, they have not been able to establish 
any communications with the relative nuclear authority in 
Iraq. 
 
5.  (C) EXBS Advisor inquired about the relationship that 
TAEK has with other neighboring government Nuclear 
Authorities.  Cakiroglu responded that he has been encouraged 
by the Turkish government to establish communications with 
the Armenia Nuclear Authority, mainly due to close proximity 
of an Armenia nuclear power plant to the Turkish border. 
Although, he has attempted to establish communication both 
through Georgia and the IAEA, none of his attempts have 
succeeded. Cakiroglu added that he has been instructed not to 
attempt to establish communication with the Iranian Nuclear 
Authority, due in large part to the suspicion that Iran could 
be involved in violations of IAEA and UN mandates against 
non-proliferation and uranium enrichment and Turkey does not 
want to appear to condone this activity.  Finally, Cakiroglu 
stated that Turkey's relationship with Greece, Syria, 
Bulgaria and Georgia are good and that they do share 
information when appropriate.  Turkey also has worked 
cooperatively with authorities in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations concerning nuclear 
safety. 
 
6.  (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu agreed that the first 
efforts of radiological threat reduction cooperation should 
focus on ways to assist the Iraqi government to achieve 
better control of radioactive materials in Iraq.  Cakiroglu 
stated that TAEK has resources, facilities and expertise to 
train Iraqis in the principles of radiological safety, 
security, regulation and control.  TAEK is also willing to 
host or assist in organizing conferences, seminars and 
training courses for Iraqis to share expertise in security 
and control of radioactive material. 
 
7.  (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu concluded the meeting by 
agreeing that IRTR and TAEK would cooperatively develop a 
plan of action and milestones to assist the Iraqi government 
to achieve positive control of radioactive materials within 
Iraq, prevent contaminated shipments from leaving Iraq or 
being dumped close to their borders.  DOE would also 
investigate the inclusion of the Jordanian Nuclear Authority 
in these activities, in hopes that a regional effort would be 
more successful in Iraq.  Once this issues with Iraq has been 
brought under control, Cakiroglu stated, it will be easier 
for TAEK to focus its attention on more regional activities 
to reduce the radiological threat. 
 
8. (U) DOE/IRTR cleared this message. 
MCELDOWNEY