US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI3068

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NP/RA, NP/CBM, NEA/ARPI, AND NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KNNP, MNUC, ETTC, TC 
SUBJECT: MTCR REGIME OUTREACH MISSION TO THE UAE 
 
REF: STATE 109232 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison. 
Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Given the UAE's strategic geographic 
location, booming economic activity, and outstanding shipping 
facilities, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
identified the UAE as a priority country for outreach.  South 
Korea, as current MTCR Chair, led a June 7-9 mission to the 
UAE with a delegation from the South Korean and French MFAs 
and Japanese and Canadian Embassy representatives.  In Abu 
Dhabi, officials from both MFA and Ministry of Interior were 
briefed on MTCR and provided the country's positions on 
non-proliferation issues.  In Dubai, the meetings focused on 
the practical aspects of counter-proliferation, with 
briefings, exchange sessions, and a port visit organized at 
the General Headquarters of the Dubai Police and at the Dubai 
Port Authority (DPA). The mission was informative and 
successful in identifying areas of future cooperation.  Both 
sides expressed a keen interest in information-sharing, and 
agreed on the need for enhanced technical assistance, 
training, and exchanges at the legal and logistical levels. 
A full report will be presented by the Chair to the upcoming 
MTCR Plenary, to be hosted this fall in Madrid.  However, the 
UAE has yet to adopt a specific export control law that 
regulates the flow of trade in multilaterally controlled 
items.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) In July 2004, the UAE had contacted the MTCR chair to 
inquire about the terms and requirements for MTCR membership. 
 That request, in conjunction with Dubai's heavy 
transshipment business, led to the MTCR's outreach visit to 
UAE.  The MTCR delegation's first meeting on June 7 was 
hosted in Abu Dhabi by an MFA panel headed by Assistant Under 
Secretary for International Cooperation Abdul Rahim Mohamed 
 
SIPDIS 
Abduljalil.  After expressing the UAE's commitment to a 
WMD-free world and a willingness to cooperate with MTCR, he 
acknowledged that due to its free market economic policy, the 
UAE was vulnerable to people who wanted to exploit its free 
trade policies.  Abduljalil assured the delegation that all 
concerned authorities were aware, able and - so far - 
successful in countering that threat.  He claimed that the 
government had stopped the operations of "many" dubious 
companies operating in the country, and had intercepted 
material while it was being transshipped through Dubai.  He 
enumerated the international non-proliferation related 
treaties the UAE has signed, and the country's internal legal 
framework.  Abduljalil cited the national level players: the 
National Federal Committee for Control of Radiation Material; 
the Federal Customs Authority (which establishes and controls 
norms and regulations to control 
exports/re-exports/end-users); a National Committee on 
Counter-Terrorism; a National Programme that was established 
to deal with the "aftermath" of WMDs; Federal Decree 119 
(2004) on the Use of Sources of Radiation; and a Law on 
Export Control that has been drafted but remains under 
review.  He also said that a series of seminars, workshops 
and training sessions have been organized, mainly in 
cooperation with the IAEA, the US and the UK. 
 
3. (SBU) Abduljalil expressed hope that the "efforts and 
achievements made until now would be recognized" by MTCR.  He 
added that effective support and help should be offered to 
help the UAE find the right balance between its free market 
economy and its potential exploitation for proliferation of 
WMD.  With Pakistan and Iran as key trading partners and as 
main sources of the UAE's expatriate workforce, the potential 
for missile and weapons proliferation could not be 
underestimated.  He requested greater information-sharing, 
technical assistance, and training. 
 
4. (SBU) The following session was held at the Ministry of 
Interior and consisted of information briefings by the MTCR 
delegation to a UAE law enforcement panel.  UAE participants 
asked about the extent of technical assistance (training and 
equipment) that could be offered; the relationship between 
members and non-members of MTCR; and the link between MTCR 
and the UN, the IAEA and other proliferation-related 
treaties, agreements and organizations. 
 
5. (C) On June 8, the delegation traveled to Dubai to meet 
with Mohamed Al Dalil, Head of the newly created 
Counter-proliferation Team (CPT).  The meeting was held at 
the Dubai Police GHQ and focused on the practical aspects of 
the team's activities more than on the legal framework under 
which it operates.  The CPT provided detailed information 
about interceptions, arrests, and detentions on a number of 
cases (including the AQ Khan network related Dubai-based 
front companies).  According to Al-Dalil, the CP Team's 
vision is a region free of WMD trafficking; its official 
message is total cooperation with regional and international 
partners and improved border control.  Its stated objectives 
are to improve the international image of the UAE; to prevent 
exploitation of legitimate businesses for proliferation 
purposes; to review, improve and implement trafficking laws 
and regulations; to conduct intensive training through 
workshops, seminars, exchange visits; to establish a 
licensing mechanisms for import/export and re-exports; and to 
provide consultations and advice services to local 
interlocutors - private and public - on counter-proliferation 
activities. 
 
6. (C) The last event was hosted by Sultan Bin Sulayem, 
Executive Chairman of the Dubai Port Authority (DPA) followed 
by a visit to the Jebel Ali Free Zone.  During the 
discussion, DPA expressed interest in improving 
information-sharing with MTCR. Dubai Port representatives 
highlighted the fact that they were one of the 20 ports 
worldwide that fully implements the US Department of Homeland 
Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI).  Port 
officials stated that they screen 100% of the manifests, 
which are required 48 hours in advance, and x-rayed 420,000 
containers last year alone. (Note: Although Port Officials 
stated that they used the MTCR and the UN's export control 
list as a basis for their operations, it should be noted that 
there is no actual and specific export control list issued by 
the UN. End Note.)  They maintain 24/7 on-site intelligence 
team and inspection team which constitutes 65% of all the 
DPA's staff.  The US, UK and Australia were cited as 
countries with which they cooperate on a regular basis. 
Finally, DPA underlined that they also complied with norms 
set by the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  Embassy's assessment is that the UAE's lack 
of an export control law has prevented the UAEG from 
institutionalizing a regulatory and compliance process that 
could be used to detect and interdict shipments and prosecute 
violators.  The UAE has not yet formally adopted any of the 
multilateral control lists as the controlling mechanism. 
Nonetheless, excellent law enforcement cooperation on 
proliferation cases exists, in part reflecting the fact that 
the UAE's anti-terrorism law, enacted in 2004, allows for 
criminal prosecution in such cases -- but only for the import 
of controlled goods. 
 
8. (C) The USG has been working since early 2002 to encourage 
the UAE to enact such a law and a control list.  We have held 
five cooperative events on legal and operational issues for 
export control and the UAE has also sent delegations to a 
number of international events on export control and 
trans-shipment.  We have also provided the UAEG with a 
template for an export control law in English and Arabic in 
early 2004 and, although the UAEG reported to the UN in 
December 2004 that an export control law could be expected in 
the very near future, the law has not yet been promulgated. 
End comment. 
 
SISON