US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2642

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 002642 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: CUTTING THROUGH THE NATO-EU KNOT 
 
REF: USNATO (04) 1117 
 
Classified By: USEU CDA Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) This is a joint USEU-USNATO message. 
 
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Summary 
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2.  (C) It remains in the interest of the United States to 
continue to lead in NATO while building an ever-stronger 
partnership with the EU, notwithstanding recent tensions 
between the two organizations.  Doing so is the best way to 
promote U.S. interests in Europe.  Both organizations are 
critical to achieving our objectives -- from effectively 
waging the global war on terrorism to achieving international 
consensus on the democracy agenda.  NATO continues to be the 
only organization capable of robust military action and 
global transatlantic strategic reach.  The EU is the locus of 
decision-making on much of what Europe will do in the 
diplomatic field, and in the past six months this has paid 
dividends on a sustained basis for the US on controversial 
issues like Iraq, China, the Middle East peace process, 
democratic reform in the Arab world, homeland security, and 
Iran.  The continuing strains between NATO and the EU over 
defense and security policy cloud what should be a new era of 
cooperation on the international stage as the Europeans 
become less timid about the worldwide democracy agenda.  The 
purpose of this message is to identify the problem, define 
the European context, and present a menu of options which can 
reinforce the primacy of NATO while exploiting the benefits 
of a strategic relationship with the EU in light of current 
European ambitions which affect both institutions.  End 
Summary. 
 
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The Problem 
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3. (C) Relations between NATO and the EU have been 
characterized by grudging cooperation punctuated by bouts of 
suspicions.  NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer and EU High 
Representative Solana do not get along, and are unlikely to 
do so anytime soon, but resistance to closer cooperation by 
some EU member states lies at the heart of the problem.  In 
recent weeks, disagreements over the nature of the NATO-EU 
relationship have resulted in failure to agree on a US-EU 
summit declaration regarding cooperation in crisis response, 
a scuttled NATO-EU Foreign Ministers' dinner, and discord 
over the communiqu for the Iraq Conference.  Meanwhile, 
lingering resentments over negotiations on the handover of 
the SFOR mission have spilled over into protracted debate 
over assistance to the AU Mission in Darfur. 
 
4. (C) France and a shifting alliance of states (usually 
including Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Greece, and Germany) 
regularly frustrate USG objectives in NATO whenever these are 
seen as a challenge to EU defense and security ambitions. 
Even Atlanticist Allies, such as the UK and Netherlands, seem 
ambivalent on how to balance their support for NATO and for 
European integration and the EU.  Thus, France and other 
EU-centric NATO Allies speak up in NATO to defend the EU's 
interests, but there is no "pro-NATO" block in the EU willing 
to consistently defend NATO's.  The French clearly see 
NATO/EU relations as a zero sum game, and fear that 
cooperation between the two organizations comes at the EU's 
expense.  Their efforts to keep NATO and the EU apart have 
been aided by the entry of Malta and Cyprus into the European 
Union in 2004, which led Turkey to block meaningful 
consultations between the two organizations.  In effect, the 
EU's own limitations and contradictory ambitions in the 
security arena will bedevil work inside NATO for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
5. (C) There will be times when we need to resist EU appeals 
for cooperation on security and defense matters in order to 
protect our equities in NATO.  Moreover, we can increase the 
range of political issues discussed inside NATO, as we have 
seen since the President's visit to Brussels in February.  In 
the context of the war on terrorism, the conflict in Iraq, 
and tensions elsewhere in the globe, our natural tendency is 
to gravitate towards an institution that is more hospitable 
to US interests and where we have a seat at the table.  As 
the most recent debates over the extent of the Iraq training 
mission have demonstrated, however, and because decisions are 
made on the basis of consensus, European cooperation through 
NATO cannot be taken for granted.  The reality is that the 
Europeans are unlikely to agree to transfer the locus of 
dialogue on the Middle East or Iran to NATO, and the French 
and others will continue to limit cooperation with the United 
States inside NATO if doing so is perceived as endangering 
the EU's role on these issues or undermining their efforts to 
build a credible European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP). 
 While the French can be seen as ringleaders, they are far 
from the only country with an ESDP agenda. 
 
6. (C)  Europe, both in the alliance and the EU, continues to 
have problems translating its political ambitions into the 
military capabilities needed for action.    European Defense 
Ministers, High Representative Solana, and most recently 
European Defense Agency head Nick Whitney continue to make 
the eloquent case for larger defense budgets, streamlining, 
interoperability, and out-of-area projection.  The reality is 
defense budgets continue to fall, the European defense 
industry looks more to the United States and overseas than 
inside the European Union, and the vaunted battle-groups are 
little more than boutique variations on the NATO Reaction 
Force.  Timid proposals, like the peace mission to Aceh, are 
not a harbinger of greater things to come at this stage, and 
the EU's only military mission launched from a standing start 
-- Operation Artemis in the Congo -- was conceived and 
implemented by overwhelmingly French troops.  That said, 
there will continue to be enough Europeans committed to the 
development of a parallel military capability to make life 
difficult inside NATO, however we choose to interact with the 
EU.  We can expect a number of member states to continue to 
look for operations to support under a EU umbrella as a 
mechanism to force the evolution of ESDP. 
 
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The Context 
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7. (C) EU member states are committed to using their 
organization to project European leadership in the world.  In 
European minds, the EU's legitimacy requires a degree of 
autonomy on defense and security issues.  As long as it does 
not damage NATO or duplicate the Alliance's capabilities, 
this is not inconsistent with U.S. interests.  Furthermore, 
the climate surrounding ESDP is shifting in favor of 
practical cooperation with NATO.  EU enlargement, the French 
and Dutch "no's", and the likely change of government in 
Germany are creating a more Atlanticist dynamic inside EU 
deliberations, with the French less likely to prevail on 
openly obstructionist responses to American initiatives in 
the security and political arenas.  The British Defense 
Minister on July 1 set out UK EU Presidency priorities as 
directly addressing NATO-EU cooperation, noting "sound 
EU-NATO cooperation is an evident condition of using our 
limited resources effectively and avoiding wasteful 
duplication."  The London bombings of July 7 are a reminder 
that Europeans must improve security cooperation. 
 
8. (C) Moreover, messy as it was, the debate over Darfur 
resulted in French endorsement of an Africa mission for NATO. 
 Inside the EU, and since the beginning of the year, we are 
leveraging EU influence on political, developmental, 
economic, and homeland security issues of interest to us as 
we have seen on Iran, the China arms embargo, and the 
convergence of American and European approaches to biometric 
and supply chain security.   The European political context 
is in flux; the drive towards deeper European integration is 
stalled.  Talk of the EU as "counterweight" is less prevalent 
than it once was, and we have a British EU Presidency 
committed to improving NATO-EU cooperation over the next six 
months. 
 
9. (C) In this environment, there is a real opportunity for 
the United States to tackle the difficulties we face in 
making the NATO-EU dynamic work in a manner which would 
strengthen NATO and make the EU a partner rather than a 
competitor.  NATO remains the transatlantic key to any 
meaningful effort by Europe and the United States to jointly 
address global instability, with the global reach, the 
practical experience, and the human depth necessary for most 
tasks because of US strategic engagement.  The EU, 
conversely, has the political and resource muscle to 
reinforce our common goals -- to include collective planning 
through NATO.  The key, given the political dynamics of an 
evolving EU containing 19 of NATO's members, is pocketing EU 
ambitions to capitalize on EU comparative advantages which 
remain largely if not exclusively political, civilian-based, 
and financial. 
 
10. (C) We agree with the concept of taking a single, 
fully-integrated approach to the two major institutions we 
and Europe work through -- NATO and the EU -- but in the 
context of combining European comparative advantages with 
American ones to greatest effect.   Member state views in the 
EU and NATO are not monolithic, but membership in both 
organizations creates gravitational forces on the 19 that can 
complicate decision-making.  It is therefore important on 
given issues to work with individual member states in 
capitals (and with regional blocs) as well as working through 
the EU and NATO.  Europe is not yet fully capable of being a 
global strategic partner (a point conceded by senior EU 
officials).  Our challenge is to continue to provide 
effective collective defense and global reach while the 
architecture is evolving to meet new challenges in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
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Solutions 
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11. (C) The following are a number of thoughts on how we can 
build a more effective NATO-EU relationship, and put the 
development of ESDP on a path that strengthens a transformed 
and truly transatlantic NATO while bringing more European 
resources to bear on our global agenda. 
 
-- Committing USG Resources at Crunch Point:  As the recent 
debate over Darfur clearly demonstrated, US hesitancy to 
clearly and quickly commit defined resources to Alliance 
projects opens the door to the French to argue ESDP as an 
alternative, and to dampen enthusiasm among the majority of 
European nations who would prefer to participate in NATO 
operations where U.S. involvement is assured.  Where visible 
U.S. commitment to NATO is lacking, the inclination for 
Allies to work via the EU for other political and economic 
imperatives becomes more compelling. 
 
-- Break the Cyprus-Malta Deadlock:  Signs are that the 
Turkish government is re-thinking its position on NAC-PSC 
cooperation.  It is unclear how far they are willing to go, 
but they need continuing encouragement to move along this 
positive path. Prior to the 2004 EU expansion, NATO-EU 
discussions took place on a number of strategic questions. 
Although these were not particularly substantive, reviving 
them would allow NATO deliberations and perspectives to 
filter back to a wider audience inside the EU. 
 
-- Revive Berlin Plus Consultations:  The Berlin Plus 
documents, which established the consultation mechanisms, 
also set out the possibility of a review of procedures in the 
light of changed circumstances.  Events have shown that there 
are contingencies that Berlin Plus did not envisage, such as 
Darfur, where NATO and the EU were asked to carry out 
missions in the same crisis zone in order to assist a third 
organization.  As we work through the logjam on NATO-PSC 
dialogue, we can also pursue parallel lanes for consultation 
and confidence building.  The Secretaries-General of the two 
organizations should meet monthly on an informal basis, with 
more frequent contacts between their top advisors. 
Staff-to-staff discussions and lower-level intergovernmental 
contacts (e.g. PCG-PMG) also need to be regularized, as 
should cross-briefings by senior officials to each 
organization. Lessons learned from Althea could be a starting 
point. 
 
-- Creating the Conditions for Our Own Success:  NATO Reform, 
the Comprehensive Political Guidance and NRF-driven 
transformation are a result of our analysis of how things can 
work better at NATO.  Success in these areas supports 
long-standing USG objectives.  A similar analysis needs to 
underpin our efforts to deal with ESDP and with allies who 
find themselves bridging both organizations.  For example, 
NATO's joint and combined exercise program, setting NATO 
standards and certification by NATO, and NATO strategic and 
operational education all give NATO a distinct advantage over 
ESDP in terms of producing usable forces.  We should work to 
ensure these areas in particular remain NATO-only core 
competencies. 
 
-- Political Legitimization:  Informal meetings of Foreign 
Ministers are possible, given a political commitment, 
notwithstanding our recent negative experiences.  Proposing 
two or three a year on the margins of already scheduled 
Council or NATO ministerial sessions would not be difficult. 
Formalizing a decision to institutionalize this kind of 
consultation does require direct political discussions at the 
most senior levels -- EU Presidency, Solana, de Hoop 
Scheffer, and targeted Allies who would be amenable to moving 
in this direction.  The EU has long relied on ministerials to 
make difficult decisions or to have strategic discussions, 
and a joint forum is the one place where the not entirely 
overlapping memberships of the two organizations could meet. 
 
-- Intelligence Sharing:  A common assessment of the 
challenges we all face will help us determine possible common 
approaches.  Such a discussion would facilitate the 
consideration of which institution is best suited to support 
US interests, with the conclusion more often than not likely 
to be NATO.  A more active exchange of analytical viewpoints 
with both NATO and the EU would contribute to that common 
assessment.  The EU SITCEN fusion cell produces analytical 
intelligence for the highest echelons of the EU, and its 
director has traveled to Washington seeking a broader 
information exchange. In the absence of a strong 
relationship, the US analytical view is conspicuously absent 
from the debate. 
 
-- Strategic Dialogue:  The Europeans are receptive to 
strategic dialogues.  The China Arms Embargo, North Korea, 
and Iran in particular, are examples of the Europeans 
aligning and sometimes subordinating their agenda to the 
broader needs of the transatlantic relationship.  Beginning a 
strategic dialogue on security (beyond the semi-annual PSC 
troika) through informal but regular and comprehensive 
meetings would be an important first step in working through 
the lingering suspicions on both sides.  We should have a 
full conversation without pre-judging outcomes.  The first 
goal of this dialogue must be agreement on the nature of the 
challenges we face.  When the time comes to see what is on 
offer, the EU in ESDP is more likely to offer what it can 
rather than seek to challenge or block NATO's response or 
deployment of assets. 
 
-- Working with ESDP:  If we want to expand engagement with 
our European allies at NATO, we need to partially address 
their security ambitions within the EU as well.  All 25 EU 
member states to a greater or lesser degree believe in ESDP 
in principle, although there are clear debates about its 
acceptable scope.  Prime Minister Blair restated the 
importance of this recently.  A willingness to accept -- or 
even encourage -- EU action in some areas without invoking 
NATO's  "right of first refusal" would permit a fuller 
discussion of possible responses to crises without leaving 
the impression the US wants to push ESDP ambitions aside at 
every stage.  In fact, ESDP is unlikely to challenge: only 
three of the 9 ESDP missions to date have been military in 
nature.  The others have been police and rule of law.  By 
making clear we, unlike the French,  do not view EU-NATO 
relations as a zero-sum game -- even on the limited occasions 
the EU tries a security operation -- we build the necessary 
confidence to expand our security dialogue and cooperation 
inside NATO.  On matters of defense, security, and foreign 
policy, the EU Council is increasingly the smoke-filled back 
room where decisions are made.  Given the inherent weaknesses 
in ESDP we have outlined, we can strengthen pro-NATO players 
inside the EU by more creatively working with the pressures 
they face bridging the organizations.  Given the progress we 
are making on strategic and political goals, we have much to 
gain on defense and security cooperation. 
 
McKinley 
.