US embassy cable - 05CAIRO5272

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EGYPT: AN ASSESSMENT OF KIFAYA - THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE

Identifier: 05CAIRO5272
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO5272 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-07-11 15:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM KDEM EG Democracy Reform
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, EG, Democracy Reform 
SUBJECT: EGYPT: AN ASSESSMENT OF KIFAYA - THE POPULAR 
MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 3424 
 
     B. CAIRO 2516 
     C. CAIRO 1413 
 
Classified by Charge Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The Kifaya (Enough) protest movement has made a 
significant impact on Egypt's internal political scene in the 
first half of 2005.  Kifaya is an umbrella movement 
encompassing groups and individuals spanning a broad range of 
tendencies and ideologies, united by opposition to the 
Mubarak regime.  Many observers have been surprised and 
impressed by the group's resilience in organizing a series of 
small but well publicized demonstrations (lately interrupted) 
which feature unusually bold and pointed criticism of both 
the regime and the president himself.  The GOE has reacted 
with dismissive public statements, innuendos about foreign 
interference, and occasional arrests and beatings, sometimes 
through proxies.  Some observers believe Kifaya's impact has 
begun to wane, as the group struggles to reconcile the widely 
differing ideologies of those gathered under its banner. 
While writing Kifaya's obituary would be premature, its long 
term viability is uncertain at best.  End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
A New Actor on the Stage 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) The emergence of the Egyptian Popular Movement for 
Change, better known by its slogan "Kifaya," has been one of 
the most significant aspects of Egypt's evolving political 
climate in the first half of 2005 (reftels).  Kifaya is not 
to be confused with a political party - it lacks both a 
cohesive political program and even a discernible 
organizational structure beyond a loosely-knit and apparently 
erratic leadership.  Kifaya is instead an umbrella movement 
encompassing elements of widely differing ideologies and 
affiliations.  Communists, "revolutionary socialists," 
Nasserists, liberals, and Islamists have all identified 
themselves as Kifaya members, united in agreement that "Egypt 
has had enough" of the Mubarak regime and its vices. 
 
------------------ 
No Wiring Diagrams 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) Though Kifaya lacks a clear hierarchy, several 
prominent personalities play key leadership/organizational 
roles.  George Ishaq, a retired Catholic teacher, is probably 
the most-quoted Kifaya member, and his downtown Cairo 
apartment is often the venue for the group's organizational 
meetings and media appearances.  Abdel Halim Qandil, editor 
of the Nasserist weekly Al-Araby (who was abducted, beaten, 
and left naked on a desert highway in an obviously political 
incident in November 2004) is often described in media 
reports as a spokesman for the group.  Kamal Khalil, a former 
student activist and director of Egypt's Center for Socialist 
Studies, is also a conspicuous Kifaya member, often seen 
leading chants at demonstrations.  Other important players 
often mentioned in discussions of Kifaya are Mohammed Sayyed 
Said, the Deputy Director of the semi-official Ahram Center 
for Strategic Studies, who brings to the table a more 
pragmatic but still intellectual perspective and Hany Anany, 
a wealthy businessman thought to underwrite many of the 
group's expenses. 
 
------- 
Origins 
------- 
 
4. (C) Most trace Kifaya's roots back to the summer of 2004, 
when 300 intellectuals and other public figures issued a 
founding statement outlining the group's opposition to what 
they described as the GOE's corruption, hypocrisy, 
exploitation, and autocracy.  The founding statement also 
singles out the GOE's failure to confront threats to national 
security, including "Zionist aggression" against the 
Palestinians, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and "plans to 
redraw the map of the region," such as the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative.  Other Egypt watchers note 
that Kifaya origins may be traced back even further - to a 
late 2003 dinner hosted by Abul Ela Madi -- a former MB, 
founder of the proposed "Wasat" (Center) party, and now 
Kifaya activist -- at which two dozen activists agreed on the 
need for a flexible and broadly based protest movement that 
could bridge the gap between intellectuals and the average 
"man on the street." 
 
5. (C) It was not until a demonstration in front of Egypt's 
court of cassation in late 2004 that Kifaya became a noted 
public entity.  The demonstration, though small, was the 
first time Kifaya's distinctive yellow and red placards, 
banners, and stickers, with simple slogans such as "Enough 
hypocrisy," "Enough corruption," and "Enough oppression," 
were displayed in public.  Local and international 
journalists immediately took note of the group's simple, 
direct, and bold approach, and of the diversity of those 
gathered under the Kifaya banner. 
 
------------- 
GOE Reactions 
------------- 
 
6. (C) GOE and NDP figures have tended to dismiss Kifaya as 
an "elitist" movement and a superficial "photo-op" opposition 
without a real base of support.  In late April, an NDP 
supporter drew nationwide attention (and not a little 
bemusement) when he announced the formation of a group called 
"Mish kifaya" (not enough) that would advance the argument 
that Egypt has not yet had its fill of President Mubarak and 
his excellent governance.  In a late May newspaper interview, 
President Mubarak even accused Kifaya of being a tool of 
foreigners, claiming to "know" that the group gets its 
funding from abroad.  Mubarak's accusation prompted angry 
denials by Kifaya, which threatened to sue the president for 
defamation.  (Note: Kifaya leaders, frequently asked about 
their funding sources, generally respond that the costs of 
organizing and staging demonstrations are minimal, that all 
Kifaya members are volunteers, and that many print signs and 
stickers at their own expense.  End note.) 
 
------------------ 
A Climactic Moment 
------------------ 
 
7. (C) Kifaya has surprised many observers with its 
resilience and energy in the spring of 2005, with a series of 
relatively small but well publicized and bold demonstrations 
that featured sharp, personalized criticism of Mubarak 
previously considered beyond the pale of "acceptable" dissent 
in Egypt.  Kifaya may have peaked in impact with its 
demonstrations on referendum day, May 25, urging citizens to 
boycott what they perceived as a sham political reform. 
Counter demonstrations, featuring thugs widely believed to 
have been hired and organized by the ruling NDP who roughed 
up Kifaya supporters in the glare of the regional and 
international media, backfired spectacularly.  The ensuing 
backlash included unprecedented local and international 
criticism of the GOE's actions on referendum day and spurred 
several new offshoot movements by citizens outraged by the 
actions of the alleged NDP thugs.  With the GOE at least 
temporarily on its heels, several protest groups staged 
demonstrations in late May and early June without the usual 
obstructions from police. 
 
---------------------- 
Has the Ending Begun ? 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Kifaya lost momentum, however, later in June, when 
after widely publicizing a popular "organizational 
conference" that would be open to the public and the media, 
they failed to secure a venue for the event.  Subsequently, 
Embassy contacts report, a major split emerged within the 
group over whether and how it should cooperate with the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB).  The split was particularly clear 
along generational lines, with youthful members strongly in 
favor of cooperation with the MB while the older generation, 
reportedly including Qandil and Ishaq, adamently opposed. 
These Kifaya leaders pointedly and publicly declined the MB's 
late May invitation to join its own "Coalition for Change and 
Reform" (septel). 
 
9. (C) There have also been divisions within the group over 
whether and how to deal with Ayman Nour and his Ghad 
(tomorrow) Party.  A substantial number of the thousands of 
Ghad supporters who appeared at court to protest the opening 
of Nour's forgery trial (septels) brandished Kifaya placards 
and buttons.  Nour himself, entering the defendant's cage in 
the courtroom placed a Kifaya sticker on the wall behind him. 
 Many Kifaya activists, and reportedly key members of the 
Kifaya leadership, reportedly view Nour as a shallow 
opportunist and self-promoter rather than a committed fellow 
traveler, but the open-ended nature of the movement makes it 
difficult to exclude almost any regime opponent, including 
Nour and his following. 
 
10. (C) One Embassy contact who follows closely Cairo's 
"street politics" recently asserted that "Kifaya" as we know 
it is over.  The widely different ideologies and inclinations 
of its members were making internal agreement on tactics and 
strategy increasingly elusive, he asserted.  However, Abul 
Ela Madi (protect) asserted to us on July 10 that Kifaya was 
stronger than ever.  "We are growing.  We are hearing from 
more sympathizers every day."  Madi agreed that the group's 
inability to secure a venue for its "organizational 
conference" had been a setback, but affirmed that Kifaya 
would go ahead, despite anticipated GOE opposition, with a 
planned demonstration in front of Central Cairo's Abdin 
Palace on July 14. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) It would clearly be premature to write Kifaya's 
obituary.  They may yet, as Madi predicted, regroup and 
continue to serve as a potent symbol of popular opposition to 
the GOE for the rest of the 2005 election season.  Kifaya's 
long term viability is much more uncertain.  Even Egypt's 
leftists, who make up a substantial part of Kifaya's base, 
have found it virtually impossible to overcome, among 
themselves, differences related both to ideology and 
personality.  If the leftists have found it this difficult to 
agree among themselves, agreement on long term strategy and 
tactics with Nasserists, communists, right-leaning 
nationalists, and some Islamists, as well as the leftists 
currently marching under the Kifaya banner will likely prove 
a bridge too far.  End comment. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
CORBIN 

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