US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI5319

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005319 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, PHUM, PTER, IN, NP, AF, CE, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: INDIA HOPING TO LURE NEPAL MAOISTS INTO POLITICS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5048 
     B. NEW DELHI 4531 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a July 11 meeting with MEA Joint 
Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae, PolCouns emphasized the need to 
 
SIPDIS 
coordinate USG and GOI policy to prevent sending mixed 
messages to the Nepalese political parties, Maoists, and 
King, and expressed concern about the risks inherent in New 
Delhi's recent feelers to the insurgents.  Rae reassured us 
that the GOI is strongly opposed to anything that would 
facilitate Maoist gains, and is trying to press the King to 
compromise with the parties, but ultimately hopes to bring 
the Maoists into a political settlement.  He said Foreign 
Secretary Saran will provide U/S Burns with further details 
 
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on this effort.  The GOI is skeptical that the parties will 
participate in municipal elections without real concessions 
from the Palace.  Rae warned that HMGN might interpret an 
agreement to deploy RNA troops to Afghanistan as part of a 
quid pro quo for normalization of military supplies from 
Washington.  End Summary. 
 
Rationale for Engaging with the Maoists 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) PolCouns summarized the USG position that a political 
reconciliation between the Palace and the parties is vital 
for preventing a Maoist takeover in Nepal, reviewed the 
decision to delay shipment of M-16 rifles for the RNA, and 
reiterated our stance that US, UK and Indian actions should 
not in any way encourage the political parties to believe 
that their interests lie in siding with the Maoists.  He 
reminded Rae that PDAS Camp had expressed concern that 
reports of GOI facilitation of meetings between party and 
Maoist leaders could lead the parties to believe that India 
would support a united front between them (Ref A). 
Washington believes it is important to avoid allowing any 
daylight to show between the USG and GOI positions that would 
allow misinterpretation by the parties, Palace, or Maoists on 
what the way forward should be, he emphasized. 
 
3.  (C) Rae assured us that India's "bottom line" is to rid 
Nepal of the Maoist insurgency, and that the GOI will do 
nothing to legitimate the Maoists until they renounce 
violence and become a mainstream, peaceful political party. 
That being said, he added, a cold assessment reveals that the 
Maoists and the RNA are in a military stalemate, and the way 
forward is therefore to bring the Maoists into a political 
settlement, which would have "implications" for contacts with 
the GOI and other parties.  He reported that Foreign 
Secretary Saran intends to discuss further GOI actions 
 
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regarding the Maoists with U/S Burns when he meets him in 
Washington on the margins of PM Manmohan Singh's visit. 
 
4.  (C) The GOI has heard many reports of "major divisions" 
within the Maoists, Rae said, describing debates within the 
leadership over whether to seek to reconcile with the King or 
the parties, and how to view India's role in Nepal.  He 
speculated that perhaps the Maoists have realized that a 
military victory over the RNA in the face of US and Indian 
opposition would be unlikely, and emphasized that any actions 
New Delhi takes would reinforce the bottom line that the 
Maoists must renounce violence and participate in a 
democratic process.  In a separate meeting with Poloff on 
July 11, JNU Professor of South Asian Studies SD Muni, an 
advocate of political dialogue with the Maoists, reinforced 
our perception of New Delhi's caution, criticizing the GOI 
for being unwilling to engage in a substantial dialogue with 
the Maoists because it was too closely aligned with the USG 
position. 
 
Worrying Signals from the King 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Rae worried that without some conciliatory gesture 
from the King to the opposition, the parties and Maoists 
would coordinate more closely, rhetoric would harden, and 
compromise between the Palace and parties would be even less 
likely.  He commented that Vice Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers Tulsi Giri had told Indian Ambassador Shiv 
Mukherjee that India ought to choose between one of the "two 
pillars" of constitutional monarchy and representative 
democracy, as it was impossible to support both.  "My sense 
is that all the levers of government are being modified to 
allow direct control by the Palace," Rae commented, pointing 
to amendments to the Civil Service Act allowing royal 
appointment instead of merit-based promotions to 
Secretary-level positions, and rumors in Kathmandu of an 
 
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upcoming ban on political parties or a new constitution.  In 
these circumstance, he added, the political parties will not 
participate in the planned municipal elections. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador Mukherjee, who walked in on our meeting, 
is in New Delhi for consultations to prepare the message he 
will take back to the Palace following GOI meetings with 
senior Nepalese opposition representatives (Ref B).  Rae said 
that New Delhi intends to maintain pressure on King Gyanendra 
but remain engaged with him.  India's delivery of vehicles, 
protective vests and other non-lethal supplies on July 2-3 
was a signal that the GOI accepts the role of the RNA in 
fighting terrorism, but not fighting democracy, and is trying 
to strike a balance that will press the King to compromise 
without weakening the RNA. 
 
Wary of Maoists' Indian Links 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) The GOI is closely investigating allegations that the 
June 23 Maoist attack on Madhuban village in Bihar included 
Nepalese insurgents, but has turned up no evidence supporting 
that claim, Rae reported.  He added that it would be foolish 
of the Nepalese Maoists to mount operations in India while 
New Delhi is reviewing its policies.  He was similarly 
skeptical of reports alleging LTTE training of the Maoists, 
although he did indicate that the Tigers have in the past 
provided the Maoists and Indian naxalites with IED technology. 
 
RNA to Afghanistan as Part of a Quid Pro Quo? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Mentioning reports from Kathmandu that Nepal was 
considering plans to dispatch RNA units to Afghanistan, Rae 
told us that he hoped RNA service there would not have any 
implications for USG policies toward HMGN.  The GOI has heard 
that elements of HMGN and the RNA see Nepalese service in 
Afghanistan as part of a quid pro quo with the US, Rae said, 
adding that he hoped the US would be careful to avoid 
allowing service by RNA units implicated in human rights 
abuses, particularly as RNA participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations has come under scrutiny as well.  PolCouns noted 
that these are preliminary conversations that have yet to 
move into operational channels, and promised to flag Rae's 
concern about any quid pro quo. 
 
Comment: India Bringing Them Inside the Tent 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) India has successfully transformed several domestic 
insurgent groups into mainstream political parties over the 
years, and this experience gives the GOI hope that its goal 
of co-opting all but the most radical Maoists might bear 
fruit.  The GOI has backed the parties' joint platform as a 
step to compromise with the Palace, and now seeks to find a 
way to pressure the King to reciprocate with an offer of his 
own.  In the meantime, as reflected in Rae's candid 
presentation, the GOI continues to attach a very high 
priority to its Nepal partnership with Washington. 
BLAKE