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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI2968 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI2968 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-07-10 23:31:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV TW Domestic Politics Cross Strait Politics Cross Strait Economics |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002968 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2015 TAGS: PGOV, TW, Domestic Politics, Cross Strait Politics, Cross Strait Economics SUBJECT: PAN-BLUES RETURN TO BEIJING TO CONTINUE PRODUCE EXPORT TALKS Classified By: AIT Dep. Director David J. Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). 1. (C) Summary: On July 7, a joint delegation of KMT and PFP representatives began a two-day trip to Beijing to continue talks aimed at allowing Taiwan fruit growers to export duty-free into the PRC market. The PRC continues to snub the official Taiwan government entity responsible for negotiating fruit export issues, the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA), choosing instead to contact Pan-Blue interlocutors. On July 6, The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) rejected a Pan-Blue invitation to send a government representative with the delegation, and reiterated that any trade agreements reached with the PRC would be invalid without explicit government approval. KMT contacts told AIT that although the details of a duty-free agreement were reached in late June, because the PRC has not yet announced its terms, the KMT requested another visit in order to persuade Beijing to go public as soon as possible. KMT leadership is hopeful that by delivering a duty-free export agreement to Taiwan's fruit growers, they will be able to weaken support for President Chen Shui-bian among Taiwan's central and southern agricultural communities. DPP sources told AIT their candidates may suffer at the polls this December as a result of a KMT public-relations coup over any export deal, but in the long term, KMT cooperation with the PRC will hurt their presidential candidate in 2008. End Summary. Duty-Free Exports: A Means to an End ------------------------------------- 2. (C) In early May, after Lien Chan returned from the Mainland, PRC Taiwan Affairs Office director Chen Yun-lin announced that the PRC would give Taiwan a pair of pandas, loosen restrictions on PRC tourism to Taiwan, and allow Taiwan fruit to enter the Chinese market duty-free. KMT Spokesman and KMT Central Committee Mainland Affairs Department Director Chang Jung-kung told AIT that the fruit export issue was very important to KMT Chairman Lien Chan, and that since May, the KMT sent at least two teams of negotiators to China to iron out the export agreement details. Press reports state that by late June, during an unannounced visit by the Pan-Blue controlled Taiwan Provincial Farmers Association (TPFA), an agreement had been reached regarding all technical details for the export of Taiwan fruit to China, including quarantine and country of origin certification matters. Despite this agreement, to date the PRC has not formally announced the terms of the duty-free program. According to Chang, the PRC invited the TPFA delegation to return for additional talks after KMT leadership made it known it would like to continue discussions. Chang said the goal of the July 7 trip is to persuade the PRC to make the terms of the duty-free arrangement public, which he expects Beijing to do two or three days after the delegation returns to Taiwan. 3. (C) As originally announced on July 4, this trip would have been TPFA's second visit to the mainland to discuss fruit export issues. Chang explained that in order to reduce the chance of being criticized by the Chen government for conducting unauthorized negotiations, KMT leadership decided on July 5 to have KMT and PFP representatives visit Beijing in their individual capacities, and not under the TFPA banner. PFP legislator Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao), Director of the PFP Central Policy Committee, who was originally slated to participate in the July 7 visit, told AIT the reason TPFA was removed from the visit was because their leadership and KMT leadership both wanted to control the potentially lucrative duty-free export benefit. The KMT won this battle, and forced the TPFA out. KMT Spokesman Chang also noted that although PFP Deputy Legislative Speaker Chung Jung-chi was originally named as part of the delegation, after discussions with the PFP, he was later removed to avoid the appearance of high-level official government involvement. 4. (C) The KMT's Chang said there are three reasons why the PRC has thus far refused to conduct trade negotiations with TAITRA: 1) TAITRA's full Chinese name includes the phrase "Republic of China," and Hu wants to avoid conducting talks that could be construed as "state to state" level discussions with the Taiwan government; 2) TAITRA's chairman is a close personal friend of President Chen Shui-bian, and Hu is eager to avoid the appearance of close contact between himself and Chen; and 3) Hu prefers to work with Taiwan through civil, non-governmental groups. 5. (C) Chang, who participated in Lien's discussions with Hu Jintao in April, said that for the past two years, Hu was under enormous public pressure to "resolve the Taiwan problem." Following Lien's visit, popular opinion toward Taiwan improved dramatically, easing that pressure. Chang said that Hu again believes that Taiwan reunification is a real, if distant possibility, and that Hu's strategy is to avoid military conflict at least until the Shanghai Expo is held in 2010. Chang explained the current KMT strategy is to avoid conflict with Beijing, while extracting as many economic and other benefits as possible from the PRC's newfound willingness to cooperate. Chang said that if duty-free fruit exports do go forward, he is not afraid of any kind of "tit-for-tat" from Beijing; i.e. demanding access to Taiwan's produce or other markets. Chang explained that Hu wants to deprive President Chen of any reason to criticize the PRC or its motives, and is far too clever to hand Chen such a large club. 6. (C) Chang admitted that the fruit export negotiations were begun in hopes of weakening support for Chen Shui-bian among his traditional power base: agricultural communities in central and southern Taiwan. If the KMT can deliver a duty-free agreement, Chang explained, President Chen will be put in the uncomfortable position of having to reject it as an unauthorized, extra-governmental accord, denying farmers potentially valuable access to Mainland markets and alienating the farmers in the process, or acceding to the agreement, thereby handing a political victory to the Pan-Blue camp. Chang said the KMT hopes that the PRC will expedite the opening of its markets in order to boost KMT prospects in the year-end local elections. DPP Sees Short-Term KMT Gain, But Long Term Loss --------------------------------------------- --- 7. (C) On July 6, a delegation of six KMT and PFP legislators, led by Executive Director of the KMT Central Policy Committee Tseng Yung-chuan, extended an invitation to the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to include its own representatives in the July 7 visit to Beijing. (Note: Beijing had earlier stated it would not oppose the participation of a government representative. End note.) The invitation was declined. Press reports quote MAC Vice-Chairman You Ying-lung reiterating the government's position that TAITRA is the only institution authorized to discuss trade-related issues with the PRC. MAC Chairman Joseph Wu later told the Taiwan press that in conducting trade discussions with the TPFA and not TAITRA, China's intention was to undermine the authority of the Chen government. Wu added that by inviting MAC to participate in the visit, the KMT was hoping to get the government's endorsement, and to "enhance the importance" of the trip. Wu urged opposition parties to cooperate with the ruling DPP to make China respect the authority of the Taiwan. government. 8. (C) The Director of the DPP's Chinese Affairs Department Dong Li-wen told AIT that the Chen government does not oppose produce exports to China, but must insist that all trade negotiations be conducted through the designated government agency. If Beijing is unwilling to work through Taiwan's elected government, the problem lies with Beijing, and not President Chen. Dong argued that since the value of Taiwan's fruit exports to the mainland is small, the real importance of the fruit export issue is not economic, but political. (Note: AIT concurs that the economic impact any duty-free export program will be minor. End note.) The Chen government considers it to be part of a larger PRC strategy to use the KMT's desire to weaken President Chen to drive a wedge between the DPP and KMT, making cooperation between them impossible, thereby precluding Taiwan from forming a coherent response to China. 9. (C) Dong said the KMT played the China card hoping to score political gains against the DPP, but the first round ended up a tie. Dong explained that although the popularity of Lien and the KMT rose dramatically after Lien's visit to the PRC, the KMT did poorly during the subsequent National Assembly election, in which the DPP won the majority of seats. Dong conceded the KMT strategy to lure farmers away from the DPP might work in the short term, causing DPP candidates to suffer during the year-end local elections, but he remains confident that the KMT's overt cooperation with the PRC will hurt them badly come the 2008 presidential election. Dong told AIT that Beijing's policy toward Taiwan has not changed -- it will not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign, independent country, it works actively to frustrate Taiwan's international relationships, and it continues to threaten Taiwan militarily. Dong believes that in cooperating so closely with the PRC, the KMT has made itself vulnerable to claims that it too supports opposing Taiwan independence by force -- an insurmountable black mark for any presidential candidate. 10. (C) Comment: The KMT seems to lack a clear vision of where they want Taiwan's relationship with the Mainland to be twenty years from now. In response to a pointed question regarding the KMT's long-term vision for Taiwan, KMT Spokesman and Central Committee Mainland Affairs Department Director Chang was unwilling or unable to say whether the KMT wanted an economically integrated but politically separate Taiwan, complete economic and political unification with the mainland, or something in between. Chang said the KMT is now focused solely on doing whatever it takes to restore itself to power. The DPP is taking much the same approach, subordinating vision to the need for short-term political victories. End Comment. KEEGAN
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