US embassy cable - 05CAIRO5210

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 005210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015 
TAGS: KISL, PGOV, PHUM, EG, Muslim Brotherhood 
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: INTERNAL COUP REPORTS, 
KEY LEADER DISCIPLINED, STRANGE ALLIANCE FORMED 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 3941 
 
     B. CAIRO 3755 
 
Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) There have been numerous reports in early July that 
Mahdy Akef, the Supreme Guide of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), has been sidelined by an internal coup.  Akef, and his 
alleged successor, Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib, have 
denied the reports, but their denials have yet to douse the 
speculation.  There has also been significant commentary on 
the reported demotion within the organization of Abdel Moneim 
Aboul Fotouh, widely seen as the most pragmatic and "liberal" 
member of the group's leadership.  Meanwhile, an MB attempt 
to form a broadly-based "National Coalition for Reform and 
Change" appears to have fallen well short of expectations, as 
most supposed coalition members have disavowed any 
involvement in the effort.  The repudiation of most of the 
supposed coalition members was an embarassing setback for the 
MB, leaving only the "Revolutionary Socialists" and the 
Islamist-controlled Social Labor Party as coalition partners. 
 The reports of an internal coup against Akef cannot be 
discounted, but have yet to be supported by conclusive 
evidence.  Aboul Fotouh's demotion, should it stand, would 
support the contention of those who argue that the MB's 
relatively recent embrace of "reform" and "democratic values" 
was purely tactical and not indicative of an evolved ideology 
within the group.  End summary. 
 
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Akef: Out or Just Down? 
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2. (C) According to observers of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) in several leading Egyptian newspapers, the MB's 
Guidance Bureau, its senior policy-making committee, in what 
might be described as an internal coup d'etat, granted in 
early July the powers and authority of the Supreme Guide to 
Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib, while not actually 
stripping Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef of these same powers. 
Soon after the first reports, several MB leaders, including 
both Habib and Akef themselves, denied that the Guidance 
Bureau had revolted against him, and accused the GOE, through 
proxies in the media, of conducting a disinformation 
campaign.  Subsequently, on July 5, the independent daily 
Nahdat Masr published a report refuting these denials, 
including the text of a letter from Akef's secretary to an MB 
official in Giza, in which he referred matter-of-factly to 
Habib's new powers as acting Supreme Guide. 
 
3. (C) Akef has long been reputed to be unpopular with other 
key leaders in the Guidance Bureau, particularly with his 
deputies Habib and Khairat Shater, widely seen as more rigid 
in their thinking and whose public statements sometimes seem 
to contradict MB policies and positions as stated by Akef. 
Habib and Shater are also frequently described by MB watchers 
as the leaders most in touch with the sentiments and views of 
the MB rank-in-file, as opposed to Akef and other members of 
the leadership perceived as excessively pragmatic and 
malleable. 
 
4. (C) According to MB watchers, members of the Guidance 
Bureau have been uncomfortable with Akef's public "trial 
balloons," which in the recent past have included provisional 
pledges of loyalty to President Mubarak, subsequently 
retracted as GOE-MB relations took a turn for the worse this 
spring (reftels).  According to Nahdat Masr, there is also 
discomfort in the Guidance Bureau with Akef's alleged efforts 
to promote his nephew, Ahmed Akef, in a manner some MB 
members reportedly likened to President Mubarak's perceived 
efforts to advance the political career of son Gamal. 
Observers inclined to lend credibility to the coup reports 
note both the well established tensions between Akef and 
Habib, and the fact that Akef's principle ally in the 
Guidance Bureau, Mahmoud Ezzat, remains in jail, six weeks 
after his arrest (ref A). 
 
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"Liberal" MB Leader also Reported in the Doghouse 
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5. (C) Another development within the MB that has drawn wide 
comment is the reported "temporary suspension" from the 
Guidance Bureau of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh.  Aboul Fotouh, 
one of the most quoted members of the MB leadership, 
especially since spokesman Essam Erian's May 4 arrest (ref 
B), has captured significant attention for his relatively 
forward-leaning statements, which often appeared to signal 
changes of course for the MB. 
 
6. (C) Two particular positions aired recently by Aboul 
Fotouh attracted attention and enhanced his reputation as a 
"reformer" or "liberal" within the group.  First, in May, 
Aboul Fotouh was widely quoted criticizing fellow MB members 
who brandished copies of the Holy Qur'an during 
demonstrations.  The holy text should not be used as a prop 
in political demonstrations, Aboul Fotouh maintained, this 
sent the wrong message about the demonstrator's intent and 
the goals of the MB.  Second, Aboul Fotouh said in a May 
interview that the MB was prepared to accept the principal of 
a secular state "with religious terms of reference," an 
apparently fundamental change from the MB's long-standing 
(but recently downplayed) position that Egypt should be ruled 
by an Islamic Caliphate. 
 
7. (C) Aboul Fotouh is credited by observers as one of the MB 
leaders principally responsible for the changes in the MB's 
public discourse.  As discussed in reftels, the MB in the 
past year, and particularly in the spring of 2005 has seized 
on concepts such as political reform, human rights, and 
democratic values as points for public emphasis in place of 
its traditional calls for implementing Islamic Shari'a law 
and restoring Islam to its "proper" position as the hub of 
Egypt's political and social life (reftels). 
 
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A Strange Alliance 
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8. (C) At the end of June, MB leaders began to publicize the 
coming formation of the National Coalition for Reform and 
Change.  In the run-up to the July 6 press conference that 
would formally present the new coalition, MB sources told 
members of the Egyptian press that the coalition would be the 
most broadly based opposition movement Egypt had so far seen, 
and would include key opposition parties such as the Wafd, as 
well as the Kifaya movement, the "Karama" (dignity) movement, 
communists, and others. 
 
9. (C) However, on July 3, most major Egyptian newspapers 
carried statements from various political groupings 
disclaiming any involvement in the MB's initiative.  Kifaya 
spokesman Abdel Halim Qandil (who is also the editor of the 
Nasserist daily Al-Araby) affirmed that Kifaya would not 
cooperate with the MB's new coalition.  Similarly, Hamdeen 
Sabahy of Karama, and a spokesman for the Wafd Party, 
clarified that their bodies were not involved in the coaltion 
as did Egypt's tiny communist party, and even the fledgling 
movement Youth for Change, a Kifaya spin-off. 
 
10. (C) By July 6, the MB's new coalition contained only 
three members upon its formation:  The MB, the Socialist 
Labor Party (which was taken over several years ago by the 
hardline Islamist Magdy Hussein), and the "Revolutionary 
Socialists" (a tiny Trotskyite movement which first came to 
prominence with the late 2003 trial and eventual acquittal of 
its leader, Ashraf Ibrahim).  Embassy contacts report that 
the new coalition is planning a "show of force" demonstration 
on July 13 in front of Abdeen Palace, the seat of the 
Presidential Secretariat. 
 
11. (C) Some contacts have described the proposed 
demonstration as a litmus test of both the viability of the 
new coalition and the MB's resolve to resume demonstrations 
in the wake of the May arrest campaign which snared as many 
as 2400 MB cadres, most of whom have since been released. 
The GOE is unlikely to allow such a demonstration to go 
forward, especially in front of Abdeen Palace, and some 
observers are predicting that the MB will blink before 
deploying cadres on the 13th rather than trigger another mass 
arrest campaign. 
 
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Comment 
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12. (C) The reports of an internal coup against Akef cannot 
be discounted but have yet to be supported by conclusive 
evidence.  Reports of the sidelining of the "reformist" Aboul 
Fotouh are consistent with his recent absence from public 
events, including the launch of the new coalition and his 
silence in the media.  The displacement of Aboul Fotouh from 
the Guidance Bureau, particularly if it holds, will vindicate 
those who have argued that the MB's recent emphasis of 
political reform, human rights, and democracy as core 
objectives was tactical and not indicative of real evolution 
of the MB's ideology.  End comment. 
 
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