US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4012

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TURKISH MFA, TURKMEN FRONT ALLEGE KDP AND BADR BRIGADE INVOLVEMENT IN TALAFAR

Identifier: 05ANKARA4012
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA4012 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-07-10 11:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PTER TU MOPS IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101106Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004012 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, TU, MOPS, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA, TURKMEN FRONT ALLEGE KDP AND BADR 
BRIGADE INVOLVEMENT IN TALAFAR 
 
REF: A. MOSUL 79 
 
     B. ANKARA 3405 
 
Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett 
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) During a long June 30 discussion on the situation in 
the northwest Ninewah province town of Talafar, Ankara Iraqi 
Turkmen Front representative Ahmet Muratli alleged to 
PolMilOff that KDP leader Masoud Barzani was fomenting 
sectarian violence in the town through payoffs and 
encouragement to tribal leaders.  Muratli could not produce 
evidence for this claim, but outlined what he believed was 
Barzani's interest in controlling Talafar in his bid to 
stretch the KDP's influence to Sinjar and the Syrian border. 
Muratli claimed that Barzani has long wanted to extend his 
control to Sinjar, near the Syrian border, as the town has a 
large Kurdish population.  In doing so, Barzani could 
consolidate his control to the Syrian border and control 
cross-border trade.  Additionally, through controlling Sinjar 
Barzani would eliminate any advantage Turkey would seek to 
gain by opening a second border gate with Iraq at Ovakoy, on 
the extreme western side of the Turkey-Iraq border.  (Turkish 
officials have forthrightly told us they prefer Ovakoy since 
Turkish trucks would pass through only a very small patch of 
KDP-controlled territory.) 
 
2. (C) PolMilOff also discussed Talafar with MFA Iraq Desk 
Officer Hakan Cakil.  Cakil did not raise Barzani, but said 
he had seen reports that the Badr Brigade was actively 
supporting the Shia side of the sectarian conflict there. 
Cakil and PolMilOff agreed that--if these reports are 
true--this would be a serious development, but PolMilOff 
added that he had not seen such reports.  Cakil added that 
the Turks perceive significant anger and concern in the Arab 
world on the Kirkuk issue. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT: Muratli and the ITF are prone to 
exaggeration.  We suspect the ITF to be the source of much of 
the information that fed the exaggerated and downright false 
reporting during September 2004 CF counterinsurgency 
operations in Talafar.  We have made a concerted effort to 
pass on real-time, accurate reporting on the situation there 
to the GOT since then, and the official and press reaction to 
the difficult situation there now has been muted by comparison 
 
4. (C) COMMENT, CONT.: While Cakil did not parrot the ITF 
allegations to us, we are struck that both the Turks and 
local Turkmen groups have said they are worried about 
Talafar, and share the concern that the violence there seems 
to have also taken on a sectarian dimension (see refs).  END 
COMMENT. 
 
5. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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