US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2878

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002878 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KHARTOUM, PLEASE PASS TO D DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PINS, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: CHALABI DISCUSSED SUNNI INCLUSION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND ISF WITH CODEL LEVIN 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2713 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  According to Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed 
Chalabi, who met with Codel Levin and Charge July 7, attacks 
on Baghdad's infrastructure have increased.  Chalabi 
attributes these attacks to better protection of the 
Kirkuk-Fadha oil pipeline, making it less vulnerable to 
attack.  Chalabi also blames the insurgents, primarily former 
Ba'athists, for these attacks, noting that they have access 
to the security plans developed during the Saddam regime and 
are using this intelligence to implement the plan in reverse. 
 Chalabi claims that the insurgents have "better intelligence 
than we do," pointing out that the intelligence service has 
no budget and that this issue has not been raised in the 
Government.  To Chalabi, the fact that the USG entirely funds 
Iraqi intelligence is problematic.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) During a July 7 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed 
Chalabi told Codel Levin, who was accompanied by Charge, that 
attacks on Baghdad's infrastructure had increased.  Chalabi 
speculated the reason is because the oil pipeline from Kirkuk 
to Fadha is now more protected and less vulnerable to attack. 
 Chalabi said that insurgents -- primarily former Ba'athists 
-- are responsible for these attacks, noting that they have 
access to the security plans developed during the Saddam 
regime and are using this intelligence to implement the plan 
in reverse.  Chalabi complained that the insurgents have 
"better intelligence than we do," pointing out that the 
intelligence service has no budget and that this issue has 
not been raised in the Government.  Instead, he asserted, the 
USG entirely funds Iraqi intelligence, which is causing some 
problems. (NOTE: Chalabi did not clarify what he meant by 
problems.  END NOTE.) 
 
3. (C) Chalabi told Levin that the Iraqi military is a "mixed 
bag," observing that the rate of improvement could be better. 
 He said the Iraqis are unprepared to take on their own 
security and that it needs 45 individual battalions before 
Coalition Forces (CF) could be significantly drawn down. 
Until then, reasoned Chalabi, CF must partner with Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF) and endeavor to pull out of urban 
areas.  Chalabi said a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is 
necessary, insisting that the TNA would agree to this.  Such 
an agreement would make it clear that the U.S. is not an 
occupier, but an "invitee." 
 
4. (C) Chalabi emphasized that equipping the Iraqi military 
remains a "sore point" as does the issue of utilizing 
generals from the former army.  Chalabi insisted that the 
Iraqi Government should work more with these generals in an 
advisory -- not command -- capacity, saying that this would 
be politically feasible.  He also suggested that providing 
these former officers, as well as other low-level Ba'athists, 
with a pension would be helpful.  Chalabi estimated 
approximately 7,000 individuals would be eligible and that 
the annual cost of such a step would be USD 11 million. 
Regarding the disbanding of the army after liberation, 
Chalabi said the barracks had emptied and there was no army 
to speak of at that time -- many simply left their weapons 
and walked away.  Chalabi estimated that 90 percent did not 
want to be there and said nothing would have brought them 
back. 
 
5. (C) Chalabi pointed out that corruption in the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) under the previous Government had done much to 
undermine the morale of the military.  According to the 
results of an audit by the Supreme Board of Audits  during 
the period from January 2004 to February 2005, MOD let 89 
contracts worth USD 1.27 billion.  Of those contracts, 43 
worth USD 949 million went to one individual -- who was not 
named in any of them.  USD 759 million was paid in cash for 
goods and services that have still not been received. 
Current Minister of Defense Dulaimey estimates corruption 
during that period to be in excess of USD 600 million.  The 
good news, said Chalabi, is that many of these former MOD 
officials are currently under judicial review. (Comment: 
Chalabi regularly accents the real problems with procurement 
at the Defense Ministry.  The Supreme Board of Audits recent 
review and the removal of an official suspected of improper 
actions are steps forward.  Two officials are being 
investigated carefully and may well be tried for criminal 
activities.  Chalabi himself chairs a new committee that 
reviews contracts above USD 2 million.  Much more remains to 
be done, and Coalition officials are working with the Defense 
Minister to improve procurement practices.  End Comment.) 
6. (C) Chalabi said that Sunni leaders, such as the National 
Dialogue's Saleh Mutlak and Abdel Nasser al-Janabi and the 
Iraqi Islamic Party's Tariq al-Hashemi and Ayed Samarai'e, 
are a subset of the right people with whom to meet on Sunni 
issues and suggested that everyone, including the Americans, 
should meet with them more.  He described the Sunni community 
as multi-faceted and without clear leadership, saying that 
Saddam made it impossible for them to betray him and still 
maintain a power structure.  As a result, the power structure 
collapsed with Saddam. 
 
7. (C) Chalabi suggested a number of Sunni leaders with whom 
USG officials should meet, including Sheikh Razi Halish of 
the B'ai tribe, leaders from Makmudiyah, such as Amar Ali 
Lehmon of the Sheikhly tribe, and the Ulema Council's Harith 
al-Dhari.  He described al-Dhari as a significant player -- a 
person who could make the system either fail or succeed -- 
and suggested that it is necessary to establish a 
relationship with him to build rapport.  For increased Sunni 
participation, said Chalabi, several steps are necessary. 
First, he said, the Government must disassociate the Sunnis 
from the Ba'athists.  Doing this would mean making the Sunni 
community a larger part of the Government and, in particular, 
the Cabinet.  Secondly, insisted Chalabi, the Sunnis need to 
be more involved politically in the security problems in 
their communities. 
 
8. (C) According to Chalabi, part of the problem has been 
that, previously, the Sunnis had no say in the process of 
vetting security forces.  Without that commitment, he said, 
the Government failed.  What the Sunnis do not need, insisted 
Chalabi, is to feel that outsiders are "beating them up."  As 
part of the solution, Chalabi noted some government leaders 
agree on the need for reconciliation committees at the 
provincial level under the auspices of the Government with 
which to engage the locals and help maintain security in the 
'flash points.'  He argued that overall casualties -- 
including those taken by CF -- could be reduced if the 'flash 
points' were taken care of. 
 
9. (C) Chalabi noted the real need to create an integrated 
military.  It was a mistake, he said, to merge the Iraqi 
National Guard (ING), given its local orientation, with the 
army.  Charge pointed out that the logic for doing so was to 
prevent the ING from morphing into local militias, as well as 
to balance out the less well-prepared army.  The problem, 
countered Chalabi, is that now there are Sunnis in Shi'a 
areas and vice versa. 
 
10. (C) Releasing some detainees, said Chalabi, hiring former 
generals in an advocacy capacity, and re-establishing the ING 
would serve to reassure the Sunni leadership to some degree. 
Additionally, it is important to address the problem of the 
the roughly 35 mosques, that Saddam built and gave to the 
Sunnis.  According to Chalabi, the Shi'a took over these 
mosques after liberation.  Additionally, he noted that the 
property seizure bill had not been approved, recognizing that 
the Sunnis would see it as a bad idea. 
 
11. (C) Turning to the issue of detainees, Chalabi said the 
approximately 13,000 currently in custody are not moving 
through the process quickly enough and they need either to be 
charged or released.  Charge explained that MNF has the 
authority to detain individuals but not to prosecute them. 
Hence, it is necessary to identify a mechanism by which to 
transfer detainees to Iraqi custody so the judicial process 
can begin.  Chalabi suggested that up to 80 percent of the 
detainees could be released and said a mechanism needs to be 
developed to talk to detainees to determine whether they are 
releasable.  (Comment:  Chalabi clearly lacks even minimal 
familiarity with detainee issues, especially the Combined 
Review and Release board, which has Coalition representation, 
but is mostly Iraqi.  We will brief him.  End Comment). 
 
12. (C) There is little chance, said Chalabi, that consensus 
on a constitution covering all the issues will be reached. 
He suggested that a partial constitution is likely, but said 
issues such as Kirkuk, federalism, and the allocation of 
resources will not be resolved.  However, he opined, success 
is a function of U.S. pressure.  Nonetheless, he cautioned 
against haste, saying it would not help the process and 
emphasizing the need to adhere to the TAL.  Chalabi also 
advised utilizing the six-month delay provided in the TAL 
rather than risk having the constitution rejected.  Sunni 
participation, he said, is critical to this, but pointed out 
that there are no assurances that the Sunnis on the 
Constitution Committee can guarantee the Sunni vote.  Key 
players, he said, such as Nasir Chaderchi and Adnan Pachachi 
represent an Iraqi political tradition and their 
participation is necessary -- but they were not selected to 
be part of the Committee.  (Comment:  Given their miserable 
vote counts in January 2005, it is not clear that Chaderchi 
or Pachachi can guarantee much of a Sunni vote either.  End 
Comment.) 
 
13. (C) The discussion turned to the insurgency and Chalabi 
insisted that it is primarily comprised of Ba'athists who 
want to reclaim power.  "Our failure," he said," has been to 
not separate the Ba'athists from the Sunnis."  Chalabi 
alleged that the insurgency's funding is coming from Jordan 
and Syria, and that it still has access to the USD 920 
million and EU 90 million that Hussein withdrew from the 
Central Bank just prior to the fall of his regime.  Chalabi 
also told Levin that King Abudullah of Jordan should freeze 
the accounts of those helping the insurgency, adding that he 
(the King) knows who they are.  (Comment:  We cannot confirm 
the accuracy of this particular batch of Chalabi accusations. 
 End Comment.) 
 
14. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
Minimize considered. 
 
Satterfield