US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2877

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, PHUM, IZ, Security, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
MWAFAQ AL-RUBAI 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 
(a), 
(b), and (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with Charge, Iraqi National 
Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai expressed optimism that a 
constitution will be drafted and ratified on time, expressed 
his opinion that the insurgency will be long and difficult 
and must be countered with means other than security assets, 
discussed the difficulties with launching an amnesty program, 
and urged continued USG pressure to maintain high standards 
on human rights.  Rubai also addressed the hot button issue 
of de-Ba'athification.  He believes that for Iraq to defeat 
the insurgency and to construct a viable democracy with 
strong, survivable institutions Iraq's leaders must put old 
divisions aside and promote an "Iraq First" policy, a step 
that will take much courage. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Charge, accompanied by Political Counselor and 
Acting PolMil Counselor called on Iraqi National Security 
Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai at his office on July 7, 2005. 
Charge expressed the gratitude of the Mission and MNF-I for 
the role Rubai has agreed to take in the government.  He 
emphasized how critical it is for the Mission to have a 
partner in the government to deal with on political and 
security issues and expressed confidence that Rubai is the 
right person for the job.  Charge assured Rubai that he has 
our full support and told him he should not hesitate to ask 
us for any support he needs to do his job. 
 
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BULLISH ON THE CONSTITUTION 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Rubai thanked the Charge and the President for 
making the commitment, paid for dearly in blood and treasure, 
to liberate Iraq and to launch a new trend of democracy in 
the Middle East.  He acknowledged that the Iraqi Transitional 
Government (ITG) has many, many serious problems to face, but 
expressed confidence that they are on the right track.  He 
observed that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) had started 
with "less than zero", and accomplished a major victory with 
the elections of January 30.  On that day the people of Iraq 
said "yes" to the first truly elected government in the 
history of the country.  Rubai is optimistic about the 
prospects for the constitution, noting that the Sunnis have 
now been included in the process and that signs from the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) are also encouraging. 
He predicts the constitution will be ratified by October and 
is confident it will be written in a way that will make it 
impossible for anyone to veto.  When asked whether he 
believes the Sunni delegates will participate throughout the 
drafting process, he replied yes.  The Sunnis, he explained, 
are chastising themselves for not participating in the 
democratic process during the elections and realize that they 
have paid a price.  As a result, he strongly believes they 
will not desert the process again. 
 
-------------------------- 
THOUGHTS ON THE INSURGENCY 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Rubai stated that in his view the insurgency, which 
he termed "very sophisticated," will now begin to follow 
Irish Republican Army tactics.  That is, there will be a 
somewhat acceptable political arm and, at the same time, an 
active and violent military wing.  In addition, he said that 
until recently he would have described the insurgency as an 
"armed Sunni insurgency."  Now he would describe it as "an 
armed insurgency within the Sunni community." He stated the 
obvious when he told Charge that for the Sunnis, the 
insurgency is all about regaining the power they have lost, 
more so than simply destroying "traitors."   He mentioned 
that just the prior day, an arson fire had been started on 
the fifth floor of his government building in the office of 
the Director General in charge of de-Ba'athification. For 
generations the accepted paradigm in Iraq has been one in 
which it was the will of God that the Sunnis should rule.  It 
was a well-established system where one group dominated the 
other.  That has been turned on its head.  When the Sunnis 
lost their power, they lost with it all the privileges that 
flowed from it.  This turn of events is so unthinkable to 
them that the idea of ruling through partnerships or 
consensus is totally foreign. 
 
5. (C) To overcome this obstacle to democracy, it is 
necessary to change the Sunni mindset by assuring them that 
their rights will be protected by the constitution.  "If we 
can in the constitution secure the rights of minorities and 
give them a veto power over their fates they will participate 
in the process."  When asked how he thought this could be 
accomplished he replied that this might be possible by having 
a second or upper chamber in the legislature that would give 
minorities enough representation to veto laws that threaten 
their interests.  In addition, there has to be an answer to 
the question of what is Iraq.  He mused that the country has 
lost its identity, which must be redefined.  Before Saddam's 
fall, Iraq was an Arab state.  Today, there is a place in it 
for Kurds and others who are not Arabs.  This is an almost 
impossible concept for some to grasp. 
 
6. (C)  With regard to the future of the insurgency, Rubai 
believes Iraq must prepare for a long, drawn out fight.  He 
also acknowledged that it must be fought by education as well 
as by security means, and derided those in the government 
afflicted with what he termed "short-termism syndrome."  He 
said many of his colleagues are kidding themselves because 
they believe they can solve the problems laid before them in 
six weeks.  He also believes that to defeat the insurgency, 
resources must be expended in areas other than in the 
security field.  Approaching the problem on the single track 
of "security" is like having tunnel vision.  Rubai also 
observed that building institutions is just as critical as 
building a government.  The institutional framework has 
suffered because everyone is preoccupied by simply getting 
elected and holding power.  The institutions that are being 
built today by the ITG must be strong enough to remain in 
place though changes of government so that they will remain 
constant, no matter whom the Prime Minister may be.  He 
lamented that much time has been lost as, to date, almost 
everyone has tended to focus solely on the security issues. 
To defeat the insurgency, then, Iraq must have both political 
and economic development, coupled with politicians brave 
enough to make tough choices, a commodity in short supply. 
 
-------------------- 
THE ISSUE OF AMNESTY 
-------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  With regard to amnesty, Rubai acknowledged the ITG 
is working on a comprehensive plan to address this issue.  In 
the short term the purpose of amnesty would be for political 
gain, in the long term for peace.  He is considering an idea 
whereby detainees would be released immediately in return for 
a written promise.  This process would be watched and 
evaluated to see what impact it has on altering the behavior 
of others.  Rubai explained that one big problem for Iraqis 
with the idea of amnesty is defining who is being talked 
about.  For example, in the insurgency the fighters are 
either Iraqis, Arabs from other countries, or other 
foreigners.  However, in Iraqi culture it is ingrained in the 
mind that there is no distinction between an Iraqi and an 
Arab from elsewhere.  Therefore, to Iraqis, when one says 
"foreign fighters" Arabs from other nations are not included. 
 The terms therefore need to be carefully defined, a step, 
Rubai opined, that will take great courage. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE NEED TO SHOWCASE SUCCESS 
---------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Charge advised Rubai that the people of Iraq need to 
be shown that progress is being made, specifically that the 
Iraqi security forces are being trained and are gradually 
taking over from Coalition Forces.  Rubai acknowledged that 
lack of confidence in Iraqi forces is a real problem that 
causes insecurity among the public.  He confided that 
everyone involved with the imminent return of the Convention 
Center and other portions of the International Zone to the 
Iraqis and the Red Zone is nervous about this prospect, 
including the Prime Minister.  The fact remains, however, 
that there are cities under Iraqi control where relative 
peace prevails.  And the plan is to stand up more and more 
Iraqi units in the next year so that Coalition Forces can be 
pulled out of cities.  Charge emphasized this must be done in 
a manner that makes it loud and clear to the population that 
the Iraqi government is successfully taking responsibility 
for its own people. 
 
-------------------------------- 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DE-BA'ATHIFICATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Charge pointed out that as Iraqi security forces 
begin to assume more responsibilities on their own, the Sunni 
population must be assured that they are being protected from 
the government and the Shias.  Many Sunnis are convinced that 
purges of their people are taking place in government 
ministries and steps must be taken to alleviate these fears. 
In addition, Sunnis feel that the MNF-I and ISF are directing 
their campaigns at the Sunni community as a whole.  Rubai 
agreed and urged the USG to continue to emphasize respect for 
human rights as the Sunnis must gain confidence that the old 
way of doing things are gone.  The Charge responded that he 
agrees, but pointed out there is no single contact in the ITG 
for us to address our human rights concerns. 
 
10. (C)  With regard to de-Ba'athification, the Charge 
emphasized to Rubai that this program is causing such 
distrust and anxiety in the Sunni community that it must be 
moderated.  Rubai responded that the TNA is leading this 
effort and that feelings are quite strong.  However, he had 
three major modifications to suggest.  The first is to 
suggest that de-Ba'athification be pursued by province, and 
that the three Sunni provinces be exempted.  His second 
proposal would be to declare the Ba'ath Party a terrorist 
organization as of a certain date.  Those who remain active 
members beyond that date will be held accountable for 
provable individual acts, not mere membership in the 
organization.  Those who were simply members before the date 
would not have a problem.  He believes this idea can be sold 
in the south, but acknowledges that the Kurds would have a 
difficult time accepting this plan.  His third suggestion is 
to look at the Ba'ath Party in a different way.  Many of the 
basic tenants of the party focus on Arab nationalism, which 
in and of itself may be a legitimate political inclination. 
Stripping away or declaring illegal ideologies that people 
have spent most of their lives believing in will only serve 
to alienate them further.  So what needs to be done is to 
draw the distinction between acceptable ideologies that were 
part of the Ba'ath platform and the perverted, extremist 
version that Saddam perpetuated.  In other words, people 
should be punished for specific bad acts, not mere 
membership.  Whether his suggestions are adopted or not, 
Rubai believes that the message must be unmistakably made 
that the Ba'ath Party of Saddam Hussein is a thing of the 
past. 
 
----------------- 
LEADERSHIP COUNTS 
----------------- 
 
11.  (C)  Rubai concluded the meeting by emphasizing that in 
his view the leadership of the country must be able to 
clearly enunciate an "Iraq First" message that will reassure 
all factions that the days where one group dominates another 
are over.  He acknowledges how difficult this will be and 
that brave steps will be necessary to transition Iraq into a 
democratic and peaceful society. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (C)  Rubai is an engaging interlocutor who shows the 
intellectual abilities to think outside the normal Iraqi box. 
 The question is, can his views be appreciated by his 
contemporaries in the government and by the public at large? 
His appeal for brave leadership to advance an "Iraq First" 
policy may ring hollow among his countrymen who do not have 
the ability to put historic ethnic and religious strife 
behind them.  Another possible concern is Rubai's tendency to 
alienate colleagues and superiors who find his style 
challenging or overly ambitious.  He fell from grace with IIG 
Prime Minister Allawi, who found him overreaching.  He plans 
to attend the Joint Commission on Reconstruction and Economic 
Development meetings in Amman in the coming days and deliver 
a speech on economic matters, a subject not necessarily 
directly related to his portfolio as National Security 
Advisor, a fact that might raise the eyebrows of his critics. 
 Nevertheless, Rubai is forward thinking and well placed to 
move the ITG forward on the security front.  He has developed 
very good working relationships with Embassy staff and with 
GEN Casey and the MNF-I leadership. We are hopeful that he 
will energize the Ministerial Committee on National Security 
(MCNS) process for which he is responsible and that Prime 
Minister Ja'afari is capable of delegating the necessary 
powers to give him a running chance at success.  End Comment. 
 
13. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO KIRKUK, REO MOSUL 
minimize considered. 
 
Satterfield