US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2610

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CIVCOM: ITS PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES

Identifier: 05BRUSSELS2610
Wikileaks: View 05BRUSSELS2610 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2005-07-08 15:39:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL SOCI MOPS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

081539Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND S/CRS 
PASS USAID FOR PPC/DCO, DCHA/CMM, AND DCHA/OFDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SOCI, MOPS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: CIVCOM: ITS PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Lee Litzenberger for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C)  Summary: A June 29 meeting between USEU officials and 
a group of counselors from the EU Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) clarified the role that 
the committee plays within the ESDP structure and the 
challenges it faces inside and outside the EU. A relatively 
new committee, CIVCOM,s major responsibility is to provide 
technical advice and other support on civilian crisis 
management operations to the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC). CIVCOM,s guidelines for future operations include a 
preference for missions that provide quality if not quantity, 
priority for regional conflicts with direct security 
implications for Europe, and emphasis on operations that 
either support regional organizations or have a definite and 
identifiable end date. End summary. 
 
2. (C)  On June 29, USEU officials met with counselors from 
the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) to discuss the body,s role, priorities, and 
challenges. The six counselors represented Austria, Finland, 
France, Lithuania, Malta, and the UK. CIVCOM is a relatively 
new body, established by an EU Council decision in May 2000 
within the general framework of strengthening the EU's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in particular, the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Its members are 
relatively lower-ranking diplomats, most of whom do not have 
a technical background in crisis response. 
 
3. (C)  CIVCOM reports to the EU's Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), and its official responsibilities 
are to "provide information, formulate recommendations, and 
give advice on civilian aspects of crisis management" to the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC). The counselors 
described the committee as a civilian "mirror to the EUMC" 
(EU Military Committee), playing an "important but not 
leading role" as an advisory body for ESDP operations. Unlike 
the EUMC, however, CIVCOM does not have a group of 
professional support personnel, which is institutionalized on 
the military side in the form of the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS).  Instead, CIVCOM calls upon and coordinates member 
states' civilian crisis management experts as situations 
dictate. 
 
4. (C)  As a bureaucratic body, CIVCOM sticks closely to its 
advising and coordinating roles, trying to identify available 
capabilities and relevant issues and objectives as well as 
define the appropriate structure of operations for the EU in 
general and for specific missions as they arise. The 
counselors stressed that it is political pressure from 
individual member states that serves as the driving force for 
bringing various crisis situations to the fore, and they 
mentioned as an example Portugal,s interest in a mission to 
Guinea-Bissau. An exception to this process has been the 
current study of a mission to Aceh, which the counselors 
say--with some frustration--was initiated via UNSR 
Ahtisaari,s close relationship with HiRep Solana. Other EU 
officials have expressed that they feel they are being 
"maneuvered into" a mission by Ahtisaari, who as facilitator 
of the Aceh peace talks had initially fostered the idea of 
sending first EU forces and then an EU monitoring team to 
oversee the negotiations. The option of peacekeeping forces 
was rejected by the Indonesian government, but the EU role in 
monitoring the ceasefire was accepted by both parties to the 
conflict. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is 
expected to forward the proposal for an Aceh monitoring 
mission to CIVCOM on July 8 for technical advice on the 
structure of the mission and to begin to identify necessary 
personnel. 
 
5. (C)  The CIVCOM counselors provided some guidelines or 
priorities for current and future civilian operations. The 
first was seeking "quality over quantity," which they said 
explained the small size of some EU missions (between 10 and 
25 people). The second was giving priority to regional 
conflicts with direct security implications for Europe 
(Georgia, Moldova, and the Balkans). The third was designing 
operations that supported regional organizations or at least 
had a definite end date and could be handed off to long-term 
development programs. As for future collaboration with the 
US, the CIVCOM counselors appeared open to discussing how 
parts of the planned US-EU civilian crisis management 
cooperation agenda can be informally implemented. They 
welcomed the opportunity to have officers from the Office of 
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 
present to CIVCOM how the US wants to proceed regarding the 
agenda. The UK Presidency urged a cautious, step-by-step 
approach to avoid reopening contentious issues over the 
respective roles of the EU and NATO in crisis response. 
 
6. (C)  The counselors acknowledged there exists competition 
between the Council and the Commission because the division 
of labor over crisis management has not yet been defined. One 
unequivocal Commission responsibility is its control of the 
CFSP budget, which funds civilian operations, but the CIVCOM 
counselors expressed concern that it is too small 
(approximately $63 million euros annually) and admitted that 
there are only four million euros left for the rest of the 
year. The counselors also described the Commission,s 
mechanisms, including the European Humanitarian Aid Office 
(ECHO), as better able to handle crisis prevention, and to 
run long-term development programs. They pointed out the 
difference in the mandates between ESDP crisis management 
operations and Commission funded programs, noting that ESDP 
might impose conditionality on an operation in an effort to 
improve governance while the Commission can provide aid on 
the basis of need without any conditions. 
 
7. (C)  Regarding the civilian-military (or civ-mil) cell 
that was recently declared operational, the CIVCOM counselors 
maintained that it will be evolving for a long time in both 
substance and infrastructure (so far there are only about 
four of the eventual 17 planners staffing it and some will be 
double-hatted as EU Military Staff personnel). It was 
described as more of an instrument rather than an independent 
actor, and the counselors said that operational planning 
would continue to be done by the Council Secretariat,s 
External Relations Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management 
and Coordination (DG E IX) in the foreseeable future. As for 
funding civilian-military operations, counselors hinted that 
although the CFSP budget is reserved exclusively for the 
civilian aspects of such operations, there is "room for 
interpretation" regarding what assets are considered civilian 
and CFSP money may be able to fund some capabilities that 
would be used for civilian purposes in these operations but 
in other circumstances would be considered military. 
 
McKinley 
 
. 

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