US embassy cable - 05ALMATY2558

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 002558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN: MUDGE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010 
TAGS: KDEM, KZ, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, 2005 Election, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHISTAN: OPPOSITION LEADER FEARS 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANIPULATION OF ELECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary: Ak Zhol party leader Alikhan Baimenov voiced 
concern over a tightening of party financing and the 
possibility of administrative manipulation of presidential 
elections in a June 23rd meeting with Ambassador Ordway. He 
admitted increasing prosperity of the electorate but hoped an 
anti-corruption pitch would attract disgruntled voters. The 
former regime insider claimed continuing contact with the 
presidential administration and hinted at an upcoming meeting 
with the president. He hoped that the democratic vote would 
be larger in Kazakh-majority regions than in mixed. Baimenov 
plans a trip to Washington in mid-July. End Summary. 
 
 
Money Drying Up 
--------------- 
 
2. (C) Baimenov complained of an increasingly shrinking pool 
of those willing to finance opposition politics. He said that 
all businessmen were connected with the authorities, "even 
those that help the opposition." The absence of "middle 
class", according to him, left about "six-seven businessmen" 
who were able of forming and financing a party. Authorities 
were actively "ferreting" out those in the business community 
supporting the opposition.  (Note:  In a conversation a week 
later, Sarsanbayev of the rival Ak Zhol faction also said 
that money was increasingly difficult to get. End Note) 
 
3. (C) Baimenov said the split in the party was in part 
caused by attempts--he did not identify the actors--to bring 
in shady money, especially that of former Prime Minister 
Nurlan Balgimbayev. He is reportedly involved in the Giffen 
affair. 
 
 
Cadres decide the day 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) Baimenov, himself a former head of the Presidential 
Administration (1998-9), lamented that even if Nazarbayev 
wanted free and fair presidential elections, local governors 
(akims) and the presidential administration might revert to 
old habits fearing a low turn-out for the President. "Their 
future depends on it." He pegged presidential elections for 
this December. Baimenov claimed that those around the 
President "put it in his head" that he has 90% support. First 
Deputy Head of the Administration Tazhin "has learned to tell 
him what he wants to hear" and will not let the vote "fall 
under seventy percent." He related that as head of the 
Presidential Administration he told akims 65-66% of the vote 
would suffice in 1999 presidential elections. Nazarbayev 
polled 82% in those elections. 
 
5. (C) Amendments to the constitution increasing the role of 
the parliament in the run-up to the election would, according 
to Baimenov, send a clear signal to aparatichiks that the 
President wanted a level-playing field. (Note: On June 30th, 
Nazarbayev announced that he saw no need to amend the 
constitution. End Note). Should the regime drive up results, 
Baimenov fears a presidential post-election euphoria that 
will hamstring reform. 
 
 
But we can do better! 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) Baimenov was extremely realistic about the popularity 
of the president (high) and the chances of the opposition 
(modest). He told how he sent AK Zhol activists to the market 
to read the pulse of the traders. They reported that people 
thought they were doing "better today than they were 
yesterday." He countered, however, by arguing that, "Think of 
how we could do without the corruption." 
 
 
Fear of Limited Unrest 
---------------------- 
 
7. (C) Baimenov, who indicated that he met frequently with 
members of the Presidential Administration and hinted at an 
upcoming meeting with the President himself, confided that 
insiders fear election-driven disorder. He added, however, 
that they worried about isolated pockets, not wide-spread 
unrest.  As proof he pointed to a large police presence, one 
hundred officers, that accompanied him on a visit to a small 
settlement (10,000) in rural Aktau province. 
 
8. (C) He also lamented what he claimed to be official 
manipulation of the congress of the "Union of Muslims of 
Kazakhstan", held in early June. The congress reelected 
Abasattar Derbisali, a loyal supporter of Nazarbayev, as head 
mufti. Baimenov said that the "the authorities set them up", 
adding that Kazakhstan did not need "weak muftis". The 
Ambassador said that he gave the same message to the 
authorities, namely that the state should not seek to 
manipulate religion or religious groups. 
 
Strength in Numbers 
------------------- 
 
9.(C) Baimenov believed that pro-democracy sentiments are 
stronger in majority Kazakh areas (Kizilorda, Chimkent, 
Mangistau) then in areas with a mixed population, such as 
Petropavlovsk. He reasoned that where Kazakhs felt they "are 
the bosses" there is less fear that a regime change may 
result in "a return of the Communists" (Russians). 
 
10. (C) Comment:  Baimenov is more pragmatic, and less 
inclined to confrontation, than the rest of the opposition. 
Charges whispered by other oppositionists that he is a 
stalking horse for Nazarbayev, strike us as a 
mischaracterization of his views and position.  His strong 
commitment to change -- particularly to overcome corruption 
-- was evident throughout the conversation, and he showed 
every sign of being sincerely opposed to President 
Nazarbayev.  While he has engaged in some limited, quiet 
exchanges with some of Nazarbayev's confidantes, the fact 
that he has neither taken his seat in the Mazhlis (the sole 
seat won by the opposition in last fall's election), nor 
participated in the National Commission on Democratization, 
keep him firmly and publicly in the opposition camp.  His 
proposed trip to Washington will offer an opportunity to hear 
from the pragmatic, but nonetheless very real wing of 
Kazakhstan's opposition movement. End Comment 
ORDWAY 
 
 
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