US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3978

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ANKARA EAC MEETINGS, 7/7 AND 7/8/2005

Identifier: 05ANKARA3978
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3978 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-07-08 10:13:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ASEC CASC PTER TU Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T ANKARA 003978 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/IP/ITA, EUR/X, EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2015 
TAGS: ASEC, CASC, PTER, TU, Security 
SUBJECT: ANKARA EAC MEETINGS, 7/7 AND 7/8/2005 
 
REF: STATE 126209 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowny; Reason 1.4 (c,d,g) 
 
1. (S) Charge convened a core EAC on 7/7/05 and RSO put an 
informational cautioning message to the full Embassy 
community concerning the London attack.  At the opening of 
business on 7/8 Charge convened a full EAC to review the 
terrorist attacks in London and to discuss other recent 
terrorist related events in Turkey.  In attendance on 7/8 
were: RSO, MGT, CON, DAO, POL, PAS, MSG, FCS, ECON, IMO, FAS, 
PMA, RAO, ODC, Det1, and AFOSI. 
 
2.  (S) RSO and RMAS briefed the EAC on the current situation 
and casualty numbers from London and noted that a little know 
European branch of al-Qaida was claiming responsibility for 
the coordinated bombings.  RMAS stated that the al-Qaida 
branch appears to be affiliated with terrorist Abu Musab 
Al-Zarqawi. 
 
3.  (C) In light of the possibility for a copy-cat type 
attack, the EAC reviewed current use of public transportation 
by members of the embassy community.  Because of the 
abundance of inexpensive taxis in the city and available 
parking on the embassy compound, only a very small number of 
employees choose to use the city bus service.  A small subway 
system does exist in Ankara, however it is not close to the 
embassy and is rarely used by employees. 
 
4. (C)  The Charge and RSO then provided the EAC with an 
update on the investigation involving last weeks suicide 
bomber, Eyup Beyaz, who made an unsuccessful attempt to 
attack the Ministry of Justice building in Ankara. RSO 
advised the EAC that the Turkish National Police (TNP) had 
contacted the embassy and advised of concerns that a missing 
female associate of Beyaz's may also act as a suicide bomber. 
 The TNP have distributed a picture of the female to all 
Turkish government buildings in Turkey.  RSO advised the EAC 
that a copy of the photograph had also been distributed to 
all embassy security staff, AFOSI, and the Istanbul and Adana 
consulates. 
 
5. (C) The EAC then discussed the most recent train attacks 
by pro-Kurdish insurgents in the southeastern region of 
Turkey.  In the past two weeks insurgents bombed and derailed 
two local trains killing five security guards. There was an 
additional July 7 attack against a train in Southeast, with 
no casualties.  Since the spring the PKK has stated they 
would expand their attacks to western cities and tourist 
locations in an attempt to damage the country's tourism 
industry.  The TNP and Turkish government are very sensitive 
to the potential of attacks against tourist areas, and, to 
date, have been successful in preventing attacks by arresting 
a number of PKK members. 
 
6. (C)  The EAC was advised by Consular that the Embassy's 
current Consular Information Sheet (CIS) is up to date and 
noted that the cautions to visitors to Turkey is based on 
possible PKK and pro-Kurdish activity throughout Turkey, 
including tourist locations.  RSO advised that in light of 
recent events, guards and police posted at the embassy and 
other US facilities throughout country will be instructed to 
exercise increased vigilance and conduct more thorough 
screening of visitors.  The EAC concluded that the level of 
security around the chancery and housing units was adequate 
though uniformed security would be instructed to present a 
more visible profile, and surveillance detection team would 
be instructed to step up the number and pace of their patrols. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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