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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA3978 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA3978 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-07-08 10:13:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | ASEC CASC PTER TU Security |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ANKARA 003978 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/IP/ITA, EUR/X, EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2015 TAGS: ASEC, CASC, PTER, TU, Security SUBJECT: ANKARA EAC MEETINGS, 7/7 AND 7/8/2005 REF: STATE 126209 Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowny; Reason 1.4 (c,d,g) 1. (S) Charge convened a core EAC on 7/7/05 and RSO put an informational cautioning message to the full Embassy community concerning the London attack. At the opening of business on 7/8 Charge convened a full EAC to review the terrorist attacks in London and to discuss other recent terrorist related events in Turkey. In attendance on 7/8 were: RSO, MGT, CON, DAO, POL, PAS, MSG, FCS, ECON, IMO, FAS, PMA, RAO, ODC, Det1, and AFOSI. 2. (S) RSO and RMAS briefed the EAC on the current situation and casualty numbers from London and noted that a little know European branch of al-Qaida was claiming responsibility for the coordinated bombings. RMAS stated that the al-Qaida branch appears to be affiliated with terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. 3. (C) In light of the possibility for a copy-cat type attack, the EAC reviewed current use of public transportation by members of the embassy community. Because of the abundance of inexpensive taxis in the city and available parking on the embassy compound, only a very small number of employees choose to use the city bus service. A small subway system does exist in Ankara, however it is not close to the embassy and is rarely used by employees. 4. (C) The Charge and RSO then provided the EAC with an update on the investigation involving last weeks suicide bomber, Eyup Beyaz, who made an unsuccessful attempt to attack the Ministry of Justice building in Ankara. RSO advised the EAC that the Turkish National Police (TNP) had contacted the embassy and advised of concerns that a missing female associate of Beyaz's may also act as a suicide bomber. The TNP have distributed a picture of the female to all Turkish government buildings in Turkey. RSO advised the EAC that a copy of the photograph had also been distributed to all embassy security staff, AFOSI, and the Istanbul and Adana consulates. 5. (C) The EAC then discussed the most recent train attacks by pro-Kurdish insurgents in the southeastern region of Turkey. In the past two weeks insurgents bombed and derailed two local trains killing five security guards. There was an additional July 7 attack against a train in Southeast, with no casualties. Since the spring the PKK has stated they would expand their attacks to western cities and tourist locations in an attempt to damage the country's tourism industry. The TNP and Turkish government are very sensitive to the potential of attacks against tourist areas, and, to date, have been successful in preventing attacks by arresting a number of PKK members. 6. (C) The EAC was advised by Consular that the Embassy's current Consular Information Sheet (CIS) is up to date and noted that the cautions to visitors to Turkey is based on possible PKK and pro-Kurdish activity throughout Turkey, including tourist locations. RSO advised that in light of recent events, guards and police posted at the embassy and other US facilities throughout country will be instructed to exercise increased vigilance and conduct more thorough screening of visitors. The EAC concluded that the level of security around the chancery and housing units was adequate though uniformed security would be instructed to present a more visible profile, and surveillance detection team would be instructed to step up the number and pace of their patrols. MCELDOWNEY
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