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| Identifier: | 05LAGOS1073 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05LAGOS1073 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Lagos |
| Created: | 2005-07-08 09:59:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 080959Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 001073 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2010 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NI SUBJECT: NATIONAL POLITICAL REFORM CONFERENCE REF: LAGOS 947 Classified by Acting CG William Howe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: The National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) remains deadlocked over the issues of resource control and the rotation and length of presidential power (reftel). July 11 has been set for the resumption of talks, but positions have hardened, increasingly along ethnic fault-lines, and there is no guarantee the conference will resume when scheduled. The South-South has shown significant political maturity and sophistication, forging useful alliances to advance its core issue - resource control. 2. (C) Summary Continued: Having scored two home runs in as many days with debt relief and the Supreme Court electoral decision, President Obasanjo is stronger politically than perhaps ever in his tenure. He can thus afford to let the NPRC stew for a while. The increasingly raw North-South strains will hurt presidential aspirants Buhari, Babangida, and Atiku more over the long term than they currently blemish the Obasanjo presidency. However, resource control won,t be moved easily off the political front page and there is always the risk of non-conference participants, i.e. the militias, deciding the agenda is not advancing far or quickly enough. End Summary. ---------------------------- North and South-South Dig In ---------------------------- 3. (SBU) On June 14, South-South delegates walked out of the NPRC after conference members adopted a proposal to increase the derivation given to oil producing states from the prevailing 13 to 17 percent (reftel). South-South delegates tell us the proposal was erroneously adopted. They insist there was no consensus on the 17 percent figure, only agreement to talk about 17 percent. Although one of the six geo-political zones was missing from the conference, the chair continued with the next order of business - rotation and length of presidential power. When delegates affirmed two-term mandates with power rotating dichotomously between the North and South, the South-East block and some members of the South-West stormed out in protest, compelling the chair to adjourn the conference. 4. (SBU) In the two weeks following adjournment, positions have hardened. While previously most northern delegates appeared reconciled to the four percent oil derivation increase, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) is now publicly calling on northern delegates to reject any increase, calling the 17 percent proposal "excessive generosity." Other prominent northern leaders have been similarly dismissive of the South-South demand. North-West leader Alhaji Dikko has reportedly threatened to withdraw his zone from the conference if the topic is re-opened. --------------- Horse - Trading --------------- 5. (C ) The South-East has made common cause with the South-South. The South-South is supporting the South-East,s desire to increase its girth by one state. (Note: The South-East is the only zone to have five states; all other zones contain six states, with the exception of the North- East which has seven.) In exchange for the South-East,s support on resource control, there is tacit understanding with the South-South that when the presidency rotates southward, the South-East will "go first." As part of the horse-trading, it is also possible the South-South has ceded to the South-East its 2007 vice presidential aspirations. 6. (C) The South-West has been a more cagey negotiating partner for the South-South. South-South delegates tell us in the early days of the conference, the South-West supported increased resource control. Later, delegates began to waffle. South-South delegates expressed anger and disappointment at this perceived turnabout. "We can understand the Middle Belt,s (North-Central) equivocation, they have been squashed under northern control for so long, it is hard for them to break free. However, there was no reason for the South-West to betray us." 7. (C) On June 27, twelve days after the conference was brought to a halt, the South-West reversed course and pledged its support for the South-South demand. This turnabout came after a presidential meeting with Southern governors and subsequent meetings between South-West governors and their delegates, leading some to suspect the President influenced the decision. A South-South delegate told us the South-West "returned to the fold" with the aim of securing support for a single presidential term of five or six years, as well as backing for presidential rotation through the six zones. This would guarantee the presidency eventually returns to the South-West. Obasanjo skeptics have held all along that the President intended to use the NPRC to constitutionally give himself new life - either through a new six-year term or through an extension of tenure in accordance with the new rules. That the idea has surfaced yet again, and seemingly at Obasanjo,s behest, has them saying, "I told you so." 8. (C) Having decided to prioritize resource control, the South-South is indifferent on the issue of a single presidential term. However, it recognizes it as an important bargaining chit. If the North supports increased oil derivations, the South-South will abandon the South-West and back the North,s desire for the status quo of two terms. On the other hand, if the North refuses to increase the derivation, the South-South will use the term limit chit to shore up its alliance with the South-West and try to present a united southern front against the North. 9. (C) The South-East would probably prefer the status quo of two terms so that when the zone gets "its turn," it can at least aspire for a full eight years. However, the length of tenure takes a back-seat to getting the mandate itself. Thus, the South-East is malleable on this issue. It is keener to see that the final conference report recommend power rotate among the six zones, thus guaranteeing its turn. The alliance between the South-South and South-East is reportedly strong, with both blocks believing they can trust the word of the other. 10. (C) Emboldened by the steadfast South-East support, growing civil society backing, and now tenuous South-West endorsement, the South-South is sticking (at least publicly) to its position that the derivation be increased to 25 percent immediately, with graduated increments up to 50 percent over a defined time period. South-South delegates are somewhat surprised by their own success. Delegates confide that when they meet in the NPRC corridors, they slap each other on the back, scarcely able to believe that they have been able to dominate the conference with their issue. 11. (C) Privately, some South-South delegates have told us they could countenance less than 25 percent as long as there is provision for future increases. However, this position would have to be proposed by the North and it would have to be presented with far less "arrogance" than has characterized the debate thus far. "Approach matters. The North cannot behave as if this is its gift, to us." --------------------------------------- Ethnic Divisions Rubbed Raw - Have the Nigerians Seen Movie "Crash"? --------------------------------------- 12. (C) In his speech inaugurating the NPRC, President Obasanjo expressed hope the conference would strengthen the body politic and Nigeria,s national identity. Though the final verdict is still out, the conference has veered far off course from that objective. Subcutaneous ethnic tensions have erupted and been rubbed raw. Slurs and accusations of arrogance and chauvinism have flown in all directions: The Yorubas of the South-West are shifty. The Hausa/Fulani of the North East and North West are lazy overlords who believe ruling their divine right. The ethnic minorities comprising the Middle Belt (North Central) are weak slaves, unable to break away from their turbaned masters. The crafty Igbo of the South East are good for trading, but not fit for holding the nation,s highest office. Igbos are incapable of organizing themselves, let alone a country. The Ijaw and other minorities of the South-South are shady, corrupt, spendthrifts undeserving of more money, having squandered that which has already been given them. 13. (SBU) A few political activists and pundits have urged delegates transcend this "tribalism." One such activist recently criticized delegates of viewing Nigeria not as a country, but as "a divided land where everyone has to make sure their area is taken care of, and the rest can go to Hell." The activist encouraged delegates to shelve ethnic identities and consider what reforms are best for the nation, not "which group is giving, what to the other." 14. (C) However, delegates tell us nerves are exposed. Conference discourse has been conducted in ethnic code. One delegate told us that even if agreement were reached on resource control, it would represent a "papering-over" of Nigeria,s real crisis - unresolved ethnic discord. ------- Comment ------- 15. (C) President Obasanjo and the South-South are both in the cat-bird,s seat, but for different reasons. The president's popular standing has improved because of his anti-corruption moves in recent months, success in securing debt relief after six years of effort, and most recently the Supreme Court decision validating his 2003 election. These successes have bought Obasanjo both time and political capital. The President can thus afford to let the conference stew a while. In fact, doing so may better serve his long-term interests. The North-South tensions laid bare by the conference hurt Buhari, Babangida, and Atiku more than they do Obasanjo, as those three northern politicians need good northern-southern relations for their 2007 presidential runs. However, pushing for a single presidential term, with the veiled implication that Obasanjo could be the first beneficiary either in the form of a new mandate or extension of time, could be an over stretch. 16. (C) The South-South has played this conference well thus far. The zone has kept trained on its goal of increased resource control, and has demonstrated the political maturity and sophistication necessary to advance that objective by forging strategic alliances. Resource control is an idea whose time has come in the Nigerian political context. The South-South success in dominating the conference is all the more remarkable when we recall that Obasanjo originally proscribed debate on resource control as a "no-go" zone. However this success is double-edged. South-South delegates have raised expectations at home - perhaps more so than they can deliver. While delegates might be willing to go home with something between the 17 and 25 percent range, the reaction from the homestead, particularly from the militias, is less clear. The South-South will walk away from this conference with some measure of increase in the oil derivation formula. What,s questionable is whether it will be enough. End Comment. 17. This cable has been cleared by Embassy Abuja. HOWE
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