US embassy cable - 05PARIS4751

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, EAID, PTER, MOPS, FR 
SUBJECT: PDAS CHENEY MEETS WITH MFA'S A/S-EQUIVALENT 
JEAN-FRANCOIS THIBAULT, FOCUSES ON LEBANON 
 
REF: BUCK-FITZPATRICK 6/28 E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: NEA PDAS Liz Cheney met July 1 with 
Jean-Francois Thibault, the MFA's A/S-equivalent for the 
Middle East, and focused on Lebanon while also briefly 
touching on Iran.  The two agreed that July 25 and 26 should 
be the next dates for a Core Group meeting in Beirut.  They 
also agreed that, following the formation of a new 
government, the US, UK and French Ambassadors should deliver 
a joint demarche to demonstrate Core Group and international 
community unity.  In addition, the French explained the 
apparent conflict between the view in Paris and the view in 
the French Mission to the UN on the issue of mentioning 
Hezballah and UNSCR 1559 in a Security Council discussion of 
cross-border violence in the Shebaa farms area.  They also 
informed the PDAS that, despite their earlier agreement to 
send a joint military assessment team to Beirut, the French 
would be moving ahead alone on this in August.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) French participants in the meeting, which took place 
at the French Foreign Ministry, included Thibault, 
PDAS-equivalent Christian Jouret, DAS-equivalent for UN 
issues Jean Pierre Lacroix and Remy Bonallegue, Lebanon/Syria 
desk officer.  PDAS Cheney was accompanied by Polmincouns 
Josiah Rosenblatt and Poloff Peter Kujawinski (note taker). 
 
IRAN 
 
3. (C) Thibault initially raised Iran, and said the the GOF 
was "quite surprised" about incoming Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad's reported role in the U.S. Embassy 
hostage-taking.  He added that the EU-3 still planned on 
transmitting to the Iranians a set of proposals by the end of 
July, as they had committed to do.  Because they were unsure 
of Ahmadinejad's position regarding negotiations with the 
EU-3, they saw transmitting the proposals by the end of July 
as a good way to lay down an EU marker before Ahmadinejad's 
August 3 inauguration.  (Comment: Readouts from other 
capitals on the latest EU-3/Iran round indicate that the EU-3 
may prefer to present its proposals only after the August 3 
inauguration of Ahmadinejad (reftel).  Thibault's information 
may be accurate, but it should be borne in mind that he is 
not in the inner circle of Iran negotiations.  End comment.) 
 
LEBANON/CORE GROUP 
 
4. (C) Cheney and Thibault decided upon July 25 and 26 as 
dates for the next Core Group meeting in Beirut.  They 
discussed who should be invited, and whether or not it was a 
good idea to invite Russia.  Thibault said Russia would not 
be happy if it wasn't invited, but that not inviting them 
would make it easier not to invite Italy.  He noted, and 
Cheney agreed, that the Russians had not been helpful at the 
June 13 meetings in Paris.  He added that France was not 
opposed in a general sense to Italy's inclusion, especially 
given its commercial ties with Lebanon, but that the GOF saw 
the Core Group as pragmatic, reactive and small.  If Italy 
came in, said Thibault, Germany would want to join as well. 
Cheney said the USG would like to keep the Core Group small 
and would come back to Thibault with U.S. views on Russia and 
Italy. 
 
5. (C) Cheney suggested that when the new Lebanese government 
is formed, the US, UK and French Ambassadors should make a 
joint demarche outlining the Core Group and international 
community's goals for Lebanon's transition.  Although 
initially Thibault preferred that any decision on joint 
demarches be made by the Ambassadors in-country, he 
eventually agreed upon issuing instructions from capitals 
requesting a joint demarche.  Beyond instructing the 
Ambassadors to make a joint demarche, Cheney and Thibault 
agreed that other details, including proposing a structure 
for the Beirut meeting, should be discussed by the 
Ambassadors in Beirut with recommendations coming to the 
capitals. 
 
HEZBOLLAH/SHEBAA FARMS/ARMS EMBARGO/SYRIA 
 
6. (C) Cheney noted that the GOF's June 30 press statement on 
Hezbollah's involvement in a recent Blue Line incident 
specifically cited Hezbollah and UNSCR 1559, despite the fact 
that the same day, France's UN mission resisted citing UNSCR 
1559 in discussions on a Security Council reaction (see GOF 
press statement at para 8).  Thibault and Lacroix argued that 
since France was UNSC President at the time, it was obligated 
to seek consensus as quickly as possible, and it "knew" that 
Algeria and perhaps other members would refuse to include a 
reference to UNSCR 1559.  They pointed to their June 30 press 
statement as the definitive GOF position.  Thibault said the 
statement was not controversial, given that it was based on 
facts.  Thibault added that the recent violence in the Shebaa 
farms area had caused concern in the GOF.  The French 
believe, said Thibault, that Hezbollah was very nervous and 
that in this situation, it might be tempted to undertake 
further actions.  In the current context, the GOF believed 
that a potential UNSC resolution regarding an arms embargo on 
Hezbollah would be "something dangerous" that would "put fuel 
on the fire."  He said Terje Roed-Larsen must deliver the 
right message to the Syrians, and also, Larsen was the right 
channel to deliver the message.  Cheney said that Syria must 
recognize that talking to Larsen is not enough, and it must 
act.  Regarding a possible UNSC arms embargo against 
Hezbollah, Cheney said the U.S. would consult with the new 
Lebanese government.  If it believed that such an embargo 
resolution (either "negative" or "positive") would help it 
extend control over the entirety of its territory, this would 
influence the U.S. position.  Thibault reiterated that an 
embargo aimed at Hezbollah would have very sensitive 
implications, and that great caution was required.  France's 
first priority, said Thibault, was stability in Lebanon. 
 
LEBANON/JOINT MILITARY ASSESSMENT 
 
7. (C) Following discussion of a potential arms embargo on 
Hezbollah and the needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 
Thibault mentioned that the French MOD planned a military 
needs assessment/audit to Lebanon in August, although no 
plans or dates had been definitively fixed.  When Cheney 
asked if the GOF had given up on their commitment to a joint 
U.S., French, UK assessment - as agreed on June 13 - Thibault 
was evasive.  He emphasized that their military attaches in 
Beirut should coordinate closely. 
 
8. (U) Informal translation of the French Foreign Ministry 
press statement, issued on June 30: 
 
"We condemn the action which provoked serious confrontation 
in the Sheba farms sector.  We mourn for the victims. 
 
In this period of a crucial translation regarding Lebanon's 
future, we call on all parties, in particular Hezbollah, not 
to cede to the temptation of violence and to demonstrate 
self-restraint and responsibility. 
 
Furthermore, we underscore our desire that all pertinent 
resolutions on Lebanon be implemented, including UNSC 
Resolution 1559 which anticipates that Lebanese authorities 
will exercise control over the entirety of their territory." 
 
9. (U) This cable was cleared by PDAS Liz Cheney. 
STAPLETON