US embassy cable - 05PARIS4750

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, 
PART 2 OF 2 
 
REF: PARIS 479 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (S) Summary: A USG delegation led by Counselor Philip 
Zelikow met with senior French officials June 27 to 
inaugurate strategic counter-terrorism consultations.  This 
cable reports on discussions addressing the radicalization 
and recruitment of extremists, and geographic areas of 
concern, which on the French side, included discussion of the 
GSPC terrorist group.  Other discussions on C/T doctrine 
formulation and the role of public diplomacy, threat 
assessments and crisis management are reported septel.  Both 
delegations hailed the talks as important steps in the 
furthering of excellent U.S.-French counter-terrorism 
cooperation.  The talks adjourned with the decision to meet 
again in Washington in October.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The consultations took place June 27 at the 
headquarters of the Secreteriat General de la Defense 
Nationale (SGDN), an interagency organization that reports to 
the Prime Minister on defense and security issues.  The U.S. 
delegation, led by Counselor Zelikow, included David 
Aidekman, State; Marc Norman, State; Charles Frahm, FBI; 
James Roberts, DOD; Randall Blake, NCTC; Josiah Rosenblatt, 
Political Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; Thomas White, 
Economic Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; Mark Motley, 
Embassy Paris; and Peter Kujawinski (note taker), Embassy 
Paris.  The French delegation was led by Francis Delon, SGDN 
Secretary General, and included Stanislas de Laboulaye, the 
 
SIPDIS 
MFA's Director General for Political and Security Affairs; 
Admiral Edouard Scott de Martinville, SGDN deputy Secretary 
General; Major General Jean-Pierre Meyer, Permanent Secretary 
of the SGDN's Joint Intelligence Committee; Eric Lebedel, the 
SGDN's director for International and Strategic Affairs; 
Prefect Bernard Boube, the SGDN's director for Protection, 
Safety and Security; Philippe Meunier, MFA DAS-equivalent for 
counter-terrorism and security; Jean-Francois Clair, DST 
(France's internal security service); and Thierry Liron, DGSE 
(France's external intelligence service.) 
 
THE RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT OF EXTREMISTS 
 
3. (S) Blake said the USG was focused on determining where in 
the process of radicalization a government might be most 
effective in preventing the turn towards radicalism. 
Potential radicals were exposed to the globalization of 
extremist thought, said Blake.  Much training could occur at 
the local or virtual level and recruiting can be localized as 
well, although the resources for training and recruitment can 
be found anywhere, via the Internet.  The FBI is most 
concerned about those driven to radicalism by ideology, said 
Frahm, as opposed to groups that had more traditional 
political grievances.  He said Iraq was the center of 
jihadist fighting. 
 
4. (S) Clair followed up with a review of radicalism and 
recruitment in France.  The DST estimated that approximately 
6 million Muslims lived in France, some 10 percent of the 
population.  Islamic extremism in France is largely Sunni, 
which makes the presence of "self-proclaimed imams" 
particularly difficult, given that Sunnis do not have a 
formal clergy.  These self-proclaimed imams are those with 
little or no religious training who nonetheless proclaimed 
themselves religious leaders and by force of personality, 
began to attract followers.  One example of this, said Clair, 
was the self-proclaimed imam in the 19th arrondissement of 
Paris who, in the space of a few months, managed to attract a 
group of teenagers and convince them to go to Iraq to fight 
Coalition forces and commit suicide.  This "imam" had never 
studied theology and was only 24 years old, but he was 
charismatic.  French security forces dismantled the group 
days before they had planned to leave (reftel). 
 
5. (S) To counter the message and attractiveness of these 
self-proclaimed imams, Clair said the GOF was working to 
encourage the Muslim community to organize itself with a 
clearly French identity.  In the past, said Clair, foreign 
governments, including Algeria and Morocco, funded 
nationally-linked mosques to exert control over their 
populations who were permanent residents of France or dual 
citizens.  To encourage Muslims in France to develop a French 
identity, the GOF has organized Muslim councils, focused on 
encouraging imams and prayer leaders to speak French, and 
encouraged local non-Muslim residents to accept mosques in 
order to drive all Muslim worship from the clandestine to an 
open environment.  Delon said France's Catholic heritage had 
made the country historically less willing to accept the 
construction of mosques, and this was something the GOF was 
working to overcome. 
 
6. (S) Clair said the GOF intentionally tried not to 
construct a profile of possible extremists, given that they 
wanted to cast their net as wide as possible.  Still, they 
observed certain common characteristics of those recruited to 
extremism.  Most were between the ages of 20 and 40, and 
either born in North Africa or of North African descent. 
Those targeted for recruitment are usually in poor, urban 
areas with precarious employment and often, a past of petty 
criminality.  Another group targeted is converts who live in 
the same poor areas as those of North African origin, Clair 
said.  The converts, who often have the same background of 
precarious employment and a criminal past, usually become the 
most radical.  Once recruited to extremist thought, a number 
of impulses push them to violence, said Clair, including 
frustration, a search for values, the prospect of a tightly 
knit community, and the incentive to aid victimized people. 
The two major recruitment areas, said Clair, are poor 
neighborhoods and prisons.  Clair estimated that the longer 
the conflict in Iraq continues, the more candidates for jihad 
will try to reach Iraq to fight. 
 
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF CONCERN 
 
7. (S) Zelikow opened the discussion of regional issues by 
noting six geographic areas of particular concern to the USG 
regarding terrorism.  They were: the Arabian peninsula 
(especially Saudi Arabia), Pakistan/Afghanistan, the Horn of 
Africa, Southeast Asia, the Sahel and certain European 
cities.  He asked whether the French considered any 
particular European cities as either specific targets or 
places where terrorists felt more comfortable.  He noted that 
it was probably not a coincidence that very few meetings of 
terrorists took place in France, while it seemed as if many 
meetings before 9/11 took place in Hamburg.  Liron agreed 
that certain terrorists did seem to have a comfort level in 
Hamburg, although he cautioned that it was extremely 
difficult to speculate which cities were considered easier to 
circulate in or which were considered targets.  As an 
example, he said that intelligence estimates in March 2004 
analyzed that terrorists might strike Italy, and therefore, 
the Madrid bombings caught them by surprise.  Additionally, 
no one believed the Netherlands would be a target, and 
therefore, the killing of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh also came 
as a surprise.  Liron said France shared the USG's concern 
regarding the six geographic areas, and that France would add 
the Balkans, particularly because criminal groups (especially 
the mafia) and terrorists intermingled, and the Balkans 
borders with the EU were porous. 
 
8. (S) Liron then launched into a presentation on the GSPC, 
the Algerian-based terrorist group that has targeted Algerian 
and French interests.  After some years of decline, the GOF 
estimates that the GSPC now represents a well-structured and 
well-organized threat to French and Western interests.  The 
GOF believes the GSPC is trying to reinvent itself, from a 
terrorist organization with largely political goals to an 
al-Qaeda-linked transnational organization fighting a global 
jihad.  French intelligence believes the GSPC has made 
contact with Iraqi-based terrorist Zarqawi, and that 
furthermore, there was a rapprochement between GSPC and 
al-Qaeda in 2003.  In an October 14, 2004 communique, the 
GSPC urged Zarqawi to target French citizens in Iraq.  In 
addition, the GSPC has begun to use geographic terms that 
relate to Islamic conquest, such as calling North Africa 
"Berber countries," just as Zarqawi refers to Iraq as 
"Mesopotamia." 
 
9. (S) The GSPC, said Liron, has shown signs of reaching 
outside Algeria to recruit and train sympathizers from 
Tunisia and Mauritania.  French intelligence suspects that 
the Sahel branch of the GSPC has attempted to set up networks 
in Niger and Mali.  Through its reaching out to sympathizers 
from other countries, its adoption of jihadist methods such 
as suicide bombers, and its merging of national combat with 
international jihad, the GSPC hopes to broaden its reach 
beyond Algeria and expand its terrorist capabilities. 
However, Liron said, the GSPC still considers France to be 
its hereditary enemy. 
 
10. (S) Zelikow noted that in an ideologically-driven 
environment, distinctions blur and terrorist groups have more 
leeway to work together.  Given the apparent resurgence of 
the GSPC, he asked how Algeria had been recently successful 
in fighting terrorism within its borders.  Liron replied 
saying that the GSPC had been forced to leave Algeria's north 
for the more inhospitable south because of the effectiveness 
of Algeria's counter-terrorism capabilities.  In addition, 
the Algerian government's reconciliation efforts had paid off 
and had encouraged many extremists to lay down their arms. 
Delon said the case of Algeria was a good example of the 
combination of military resolution and a policy of 
reconciliation.  Each one, on their own, would not have 
worked but used in combination, they were successful.  Delon 
also noted that terrorism had very little support among the 
Algerian people, given the bloodiness of previous terrorist 
attacks committed by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 
 
11. (U) This cable was cleared by Counselor Zelikow's staff. 
STAPLETON