US embassy cable - 05PARIS4749

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004749 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, 
PART 1 OF 2 
 
REF: PARIS 3118 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (S) Summary: A USG delegation led by Counselor Philip 
Zelikow met with senior French officials June 27 to 
inaugurate strategic counter-terrorism consultations.  The 
two delegations exchanged points of view on counter-terrorism 
doctrine formulation and the role of public diplomacy, threat 
assessments and crisis management.  Other topics, including 
discussion of the radicalization and recruitment of 
extremists, geographic areas of concern, which on the French 
side included a discussion of the GSPC terrorist group, will 
be reported septel.  Both delegations hailed the talks as 
important steps in the furthering of excellent U.S.-French 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  The talks adjourned with the 
decision to meet again in Washington in October, at which 
point both the U.S. and France would be further advanced in 
their counter-terrorism doctrine formulation.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The consultations took place June 27 at the 
headquarters of the Secreteriat General de la Defense 
Nationale (SGDN), an interagency organization that reports to 
the Prime Minister on defense and security issues.  The SGDN 
is lead rapporteur for the GOF formulation of a "White Book" 
on security and counter-terrorism, a project that is due out 
by the end of 2005.  The U.S. delegation, led by Counselor 
Zelikow, included Josiah Rosenblatt, Political 
Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; Thomas White, Economic 
Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; David Aidekman, State; 
Marc Norman, State; Charles Frahm, FBI; James Roberts, DOD; 
Randall Blake, NCTC; Mark Motley, Embassy Paris; and Peter 
Kujawinski (note taker), Embassy Paris. 
 
3. (C) The French delegation was led by Francis Delon, SGDN 
Secretary General, and included Stanislas de Laboulaye, the 
 
SIPDIS 
MFA's Director General for Political and Security Affairs; 
Admiral Edouard Scott de Martinville, SGDN deputy Secretary 
General; Major General Jean-Pierre Meyer, Permanent Secretary 
of the SGDN's Joint Intelligence Committee; Eric Lebedel, the 
SGDN's director for International and Strategic Affairs; 
Prefect Bernard Boube, the SGDN's director for Protection, 
Safety and Security; Philippe Meunier, MFA DAS-equivalent for 
counter-terrorism and security; Jean-Francois Clair, DST 
(France's internal security service); and Thierry Liron, DGSE 
(France's external intelligence service.) 
 
COUNTER-TERRORISM DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
4. (S) Delon opened the consultations by characterizing 
U.S.-French counter-terrorism cooperation as "excellent," 
especially at the level of intelligence sharing.  France and 
the U.S. were united, said Delon, in understanding that 
terrorism was a threat to be countered by all available 
means.  Zelikow agreed that cooperation between the U.S. and 
France was excellent, and added that the U.S. realizes it is 
not enough to have a national strategy on terrorism, but that 
the nature of the threat demanded international coalitions 
and cooperation.  He said the consultations were a good first 
step towards the goal of broadening cooperation and 
discussion to the level of strategy and policy.  Zelikow 
explained that in recent weeks, the USG interagency community 
had been working on a counter-terrorism doctrine that 
downplayed the use of the word "war" in favor of a strategy 
against violent extremism.  One key point, said Zelikow, is 
that terrorism is considered a tactic, while the enemy - 
violent extremism - is a movement. 
 
5. (S) In response, Delon complimented this new approach, 
saying it was more comprehensive and nuanced.  Furthermore, 
focusing on violent extremism instead of a global war on 
terrorism allowed for the use of other tools, including 
public diplomacy, diplomacy, intelligence, and development 
assistance.  Delon said France was also engaged in a 
reflection on its counter-terrorism doctrine, and it planned 
to issue a "white book" on security and terrorism by the end 
of 2005.  This interagency exercise (reftel), with Delon as 
overall rapporteur, would seek to lay out in detail France's 
approach to combating terrorism and safeguarding its 
territory.  Although the focus would be on issuing a publicly 
available report, said Delon, the GOF planned on also writing 
a classified version.  Delon said the white paper had three 
goals: 1) define the terrorist threat; 2) enable public 
buy-in for the GOF's policy; and 3) evaluate resources and 
methods used to combat the threat, and determine whether 
these are sufficient for the task. 
6. (S) In formulating a counter-terrorism doctrine, Zelikow 
said the USG was focused on the importance of public 
diplomacy.  Similar C/T discussions in London with HMG on 
June 24 included a discussion on how to combat the effective 
single narrative of the enemy; i.e., that Islam is under 
attack and the source of that threat is the West and more 
specifically, the U.S.  The U.S. and its partners, said 
Zelikow, should have an equally clear-cut and effective 
message.  He offered statements that had been discussed and 
debated in London, and said they might serve as building 
blocks to form a unified and coherent message issued by the 
U.S. and its allies.  Zelikow said these draft messages could 
be tailored to individual countries' needs, but agreement 
upon them would serve as an important foundation for a common 
message. 
 
7. (S) Delon replied saying that the idea of a few, simple 
messages was a good one, and that he personally did not 
disagree with any of them.  He agreed that violent extremists 
had a simple, weighty message and that it was up to the West 
to counter this.  Delon said the GOF would examine the 
messages and respond with any French suggestions.  Laboulaye 
added that he thought the messages were "good," although some 
would be harder to convince Muslims to accept than others. 
Zelikow said the issue of detainees was extremely difficult, 
given that neither the civilian nor military justice system 
applies in a clean way.  The U.S. was open to French 
suggestions on how to move forward regarding the detainee 
issue, said Zelikow.  Delon promised to reflect on this and 
to respond, and underlined the difficulty of the subject. 
Laboulaye agreed that the issue of detainees was difficult, 
and added that there were practical, political and moral 
issues to consider.  He said France knew how difficult this 
was, especially given the lingering pain of its role in 
Algeria. 
 
THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
8. (S) Meyer gave a presentation on the GOF terrorism threat 
assessment.  He said the GOF believed there was an increase 
in the number of individuals and groups ideologically linked 
with al-Qaida but not trained or advised by al-Qaida or its 
affiliates.  Examples of this in Europe are the Madrid 
bombers and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van 
Gogh.  France considered the main terrorist threat to come 
from autonomous cells, even individuals, said Meyer.  Of 
those groups suspected of having links with al-Qaida, Meyer 
cited the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat) and the 
GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group).  The GOF believed 
that the Iraqi-based extremist Zarqawi had recently been in 
contact with the GSPC; the GOF feared that the GSPC was 
transitioning from a nationalist group intent on fomenting 
insurrection in Algeria to a transnational group focused on 
international jihad. 
 
9. (S) In listing a number of GOF preoccupations on 
terrorism, Meyer began by saying the GOF had determined that 
the use of suicide bombers had become an almost 
systematically considered option in the planning of attacks 
by violent extremists.  For this and other reasons, the GOF 
worried that French citizen fighters in Iraq would return 
with new capabilities, coupled with their willingness to 
commit suicide.  According to the latest GOF figures, the GOF 
has arrested 21 people on French soil for suspicion of 
assisting potential jihadists to Iraq; at least six French 
citizens have died in Iraq which includes two suicides; nine 
French citizens have entered Iraq, three are in Iraqi 
prisons, and 30 on French soil are being investigated for 
links to the jihadists in Iraq.  This makes approximately 70 
people in France or in Iraq currently linked to the 
"jihadists to Iraq" investigation (which is being led by 
investigating judges Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois 
Ricard). 
 
10. (S) Meyer added that France had growing worries about the 
potential use of MANPADS by terrorists, which he said was a 
real non-conventional threat in the medium-term.  Terrorists 
could buy any type of arms in the Balkans, said Meyer, and 
discussion of how to attack civilian airliners during takeoff 
using Stinger missiles was available online.  France also had 
discovered recent plots regarding the use of chemicals either 
as weapons or as products to make artisanal bombs.  In one 
case, that of the so-called "Chechen network" first 
discovered in 2000 and 2001, French police discovered cyanide 
products, still in development, that could have been 
processed into explosives.  Most recently, a Moroccan 
arrested June 21 in Montpellier in connection with the 
"jihadists to Iraq" investigation was found in possession of 
a number of chemical products that could have been 
transformed into explosives.  The Moroccan reportedly 
attempted to enter Iraq in 2004 via Syria, failed in that 
attempt, and returned to Montpellier to prepare a terrorist 
attack in Europe. 
 
11. (SBU) Following these threat assessments, Boube presented 
the GOF crisis management plan.  He said the preliminary 
focus in devising these plans was three-fold: analyses of 
potential threats, vulnerabilities and impacts.  The key 
plan, called "Vigipirate," included four graduated threat 
levels, each adaptable according to the crisis.  Specialized 
plans included Piratome (for nuclear and radiological 
attacks), Biotox (for bioterrorism), Piratox (for chemical 
terrorism), Piratair, (airborne threats), Pirate-Mer 
(sea/water threats), Piranet (cyberthreats) and Pirate-Ext 
(threats against French citizens living outside of France). 
Although Vigipirate and the specialized plans focused on 
terrorism and affiliated threats, Boube said all the plans 
could be tailored to civil disaster uses; for example, 
flooding or avian flu. 
 
12. (U) This cable was cleared by Counselor Zelikow's staff. 
STAPLETON