US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1104

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: FDLR REPATRIATION INITIATIVE UPDATE 
 
REF: A) KINSHASA 1100 B) KINSHASA 1099 C) KINSHASA 1078 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Several ambassadors met with Presidency 
Special Advisor for Security Kaputo July 6 for an update 
regarding GDRC activities to achieve repatriation of FDLR 
members to Rwanda.  Kaputo attributed the delay of a GDRC 
statement on the subject to an extended GDRC &assessment8 
seminar, and acknowledged that the FDLR statement issued June 
25 was more conditional that had been earlier hoped. 
Nonetheless, he indicated that the GDRC has been proceeding 
with talks focused on FDLR field commanders Amani and Omega, 
and believes they are ready and able to deliver significant 
returnees.  Indeed, he indicated, hard-liners are attempting 
to isolate Amani through overt military attacks, as reflected 
in intra-FDLR fighting (ref a).  The ambassadors again urged 
a strong GDRC statement as soon as possible, and continued 
work toward a GDRC capability for meaningful military 
pressure.  We may wish to consider a USG statement to 
encourage repatriation, pending the timing and contents of 
the promised GDRC communique.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The ambassadors and charges of the U.S., Belgium, 
Holland, and the U.K., and UN SRSG Swing met with Presidency 
Special Advisor for Security Samba Kaputo late afternoon of 
July 6 to discuss the current situation regarding the FDLR. 
Kaputo was accompanied by several other GDRC officials.  SRSG 
Swing opened the substantive discussion by noting that the 
GDRC statement that Kaputo had earlier promised (ref c) had 
not been issued, and inquired about its status. 
 
3. (C) Kaputo reiterated that the GDRC intends to issue a 
statement, and attributed the delay to a much-prolonged GDRC 
transition &assessment8 seminar which involved all 
government ministers for over a week.  Nonetheless, he 
reported that the Supreme Defense Council had met earlier 
this week to discuss and approve a new draft text, and that 
Defense Minister Onusumba had been charged with presenting a 
revised draft to the Council of Ministers for approval. 
Kaputo indicated that could happen as early as this Friday, 
July 15. 
 
4. (C) In the meantime, Kaputo indicated that the GDRC has 
been pursuing contacts with FDLR field commanders to promote 
repatriation.  Having concluded that FDLR President Ignace 
Murwanashyaka could not or would not produce any positive 
results, the government had identified FDLR South Division 
commander Amani as a potentially useful interlocutor.  Kaputo 
said that the GDRC had conducted an assessment as to whether 
Amani could be relied upon to take serious action, and 
whether he had any apparent support.  Their conclusion was 
that Amani had the support of the great majority of southern 
division FDLR members, and that he was serious about pursuing 
repatriation.  Through Amani, contact was also made with FDLR 
North Division commander Omega, who indicated sympathy with 
Amani,s position.  Initial plans were being formulated to 
regroup scattered FDLR elements prior to going to 
MONUC-supervised transition centers, and then on to Rwanda. 
The June 25 FDLR statement was a part of this process. 
 
5. (C) Seeing real progress toward repatriation, Kaputo said 
that FDLR hard-liners, particularly those in the FDLR general 
headquarters under the direction of General Mudakumura, had 
been alarmed.  Armed FDLR groups under their direction 
apparently attacked Col. Amani and his forces the afternoon 
of July 5 (as reported ref b) in an attempt to forestall 
further action.  Should Amani win that engagement, Kaputo 
added, his hand whould be even further strengthened, and the 
GDRC would pursue repatriation with him and his allies. 
Kaputo reported that GDRC information suggested Amani had the 
upper hand in the ongoing clash as of July 6. 
 
6. (C) Several ambassadors noted that the June 25 FDLR 
statement was more conditional than Kaputo had indicated 
would be the case.  Kaputo acknowledged the fact, attributing 
it to Amani,s sense that he could not convey a sense of 
total &capitulation8 and retain credibility with the FDLR 
troops or fellow officers.  All the ambassadors urged the 
GDRC to issue its promised communique in as strong terms as 
possible, and as quickly as possible.  The reported fighting 
on the ground only underscored the need for an immediate 
public GDRC statement.  Kaputo accepted the suggestion 
without comment. 
 
7. (C) Responding to other questions, Kaputo said that there 
has been no recent direct Congo/Rwanda government contact 
regarding the FDLR.  He indicated that he believed that such 
contact should go through &the international community.8 
The ambassadors collectively pushed back, emphasizing the 
need for direct Kinshasa/Kigali communication.  Kaputo also 
reiterated his view of the importance of the Pilotage and 
Monitoring Committees, the former to consist of two 
representatives each from the GDRC, GOR, and FDLR, and the 
latter composed of members of the international community, as 
agreed in the last Tripartite meeting in Lubumbashi. 
 
8. (C) SRSG Swing noted that MONUC had launched Operation 
Falcon Sweep (ref b), an initial probing action to gain 
information, provide experience, and increase pressure on the 
FDLR.  Kaputo confirmed that the GDRC continues to pursue a 
plan for coordinated FARDC/MONUC military operations directed 
against the FDLR, but noted that FDRC forces are not yet 
ready to initiate offensive operations.  The ambassadors 
encouraged planning and preparations to move forward as 
quickly as possible. 
 
9. (C) Comment:  While the GDRC assessment seminar did indeed 
delay many things, possibly including the GDRC statement, the 
real story more likely was GDRC indecision or lack of 
internal agreement regarding the specifics or form of the 
statement.  The project still seems to be on the table, 
however, despite the fact that the overall sequence and form 
is no longer that which Kaputo earlier described.  The 
intra-FDLR fighting is a new element that bears monitoring as 
to its significance and outcome.  If it appears that FDLR 
commanders are emerging from that, however, with an interest 
in repatriation, and if the GDRC issues quickly a 
sufficiently useful statement, we may wish to consider a USG 
statement that could support further repatriation movement. 
The Belgian and British representatives at the July 6 
meetings indicated that their respective governments might be 
interested in similar statements as well.  The International 
Committee to Support the Transition (CIAT) is another 
potential mechanism for a supportive statement.  End comment. 
 
MEECE